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The conciliation movement at the Cape was largely the offshoot of 
a parent body in England. This factor.tempts the researcher to compare 
the one with the other, a practice which produces the most frustrating 
results. Unlike their English counterparts, the conciliators at the 
Cape did not form a clearly defined, centrally directed, organisation. 
They were, on the contrary, members of a ioosely knit alliance of like 
minded persons. Although the movement resulted from the stimulus of 
a number of leading figures, it had a large and varied supporting cast 
and there were even individual~ who were not formally associated with it 
who played a leading role in its activities. The term conciliation 
movement therefore covers a very wide range and there is a voluminous 
amount of material available in connection with it. There are, however, 
also the most tantalising lacunae in the available information. 
In dealing with the conciliation movement I have attempted to con-
centrate on the activities of its English-speaking associates, as it was 
they who gave it its essence, but as it drew the bulk of its support ~rom 
the Dutch section of the colonists their activities cannot be ignored. 
With regard to terminology, I have used the word Dutch to refer to 
the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Colony, applyi~g the term 
Afrikaner in a wider context to include the inhabitants of the Republ~cs 
as well. When referring to the conciliation party in the period imme• 
diately preceding the war I have used the term 'peace party', for this 
was the manner in which they referred to themselves; the conciliation 
movement only developing early in 1900. The word 'race' has also been 
used in the manner current at the time. 
Dr T.R.H. Davenport, in his study of the Afrikaner Bond and Dr. 
C.J.S. Strydom in his history of the Cape Colony during the Anglo-Boer 
war are the two historians who touch most directly on the co.nciliation 
movement. Dr Davenport deals with many of the salient points where 





played leading roles .in the mbvement, his book provided valuable back-
ground material. Strydom presents a most useful account of the impact 
of the war upon the Colony and of the administration of martial law. 
This system, has therefore been dealt with only in so far as it directly 
affected the conciliation movement. The issue of an enquiry into mart-
ial law and compensation after the war have ·not been touched upon as 
Strydom covers this ground in his book. 
In writing this thesis I have made ext'ensive use of material from 
newspapers, particularly the South African News, the official organ of 
the conciliation party. Both the conciliators and their opponents 
relied on the press to convey their opinions during the strident battle 
of words.which accompanied the war and I have frequently quoted from 
newspapers to try to impart the temper of the time. 
Research for this thesis was begun several years ago as a full time 
student, but was somewhat unintentionally interrupted when I joined the 
ranks of the gai.;fully employed. I should therefore like to express 
my appreciation to·my supervisor, Mr A.M. Davey, for the patience ·with 
which he has borne with me and for the manner in which he has enabled 
me to benefit from his extensive knowledge of the subject based on his 
own research. To the staff of the South African Library I am greatly 
indebted for the generous use of their facilities both as a researcher 
and as a semi-official colleague. My thanks also to the staff of the 
manuscript department of the Jagger Library for their assistance during 










ON THE EVE OF THE CRISIS 
On 31 May 1899 the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, 
and President Kruger of the South African Republic met at Bloemfontein 
to discuss the points of difference which had arisen between their 
governments. To many contemporaries this meeting marked a vital stage 
in the protracted controversy between Great" Britain and the South African 
Republic and the issues involved were of momentous importance to the 
future of South Africa. Britain embarked upon this final stage or the 
cor.frontation determined t.o assert its supremacy 1.n South Africa beyond 
any further cavil and the South African Republic was equally determined 
not to relinquish its independence. Relations between the two governments 
had reached a critical stage and public opinion in the Cape Colony was 
sl1arply divided.upon the issue. Supporters of the Imperial Government 
urged it to take a firm stand and the possibility of war was openly dis-
cussed, many holding that the threat of force would have a salutary effect 
~.:')On the Tr&"1svaal. Others, hoT,7ever,.advocated a conciliatory at·dtude 
c._1d warned that a war with the Transvaal would only bring ciisaster upon 
South Africa. 
These two factions represented radically different attitudes to 
the problem of how Britain's position as the paramount power 1.n South 
Africa was best to be maintained and consolidated. In the eyes of British 
statesmen, who regarded t.he existence of an economically powerful and 
politically hostile state in the Transvaal as a threat to British 
supremacy in South Africa, this had become a roost pressing imperial issue. 
A closer union of all the states and colonies in South Africa was regarded 
as the ideal solution to the problem, but to this the Transvaal's isola.:.. 
tionist policy presented a major obstacle. On two occasions in the past 
attempts to force the Transvaal into a union had led to armed conflic~. 
The first had occurred in 1881 when the Transvaal succeeded in regaining 
a qualified independence after it had been annexed in 1877 as part of 
Lord Carnarvon's federation scheme. After gold had been <;l.iscovered in 
the Transvaal in 1886, making it the wealthiest state in South Africa 
and attracting a large immigrant population, mainly of British origin, 
the question assumed a new urgency. The second armed clash took place 
on a less heroic· scale at the end of 1895 when C.J. Rhodes, roanag1.ng 





Cape Colony, tried 1to solve the problem by organising the abortive 
J~~eson Raid with the support of Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. Chamberlain was an ardent imperialist who regarded 
the British as the greatest of governing races and the British Empire 
as a guarantee for peace and civilisation in the world. 1 Having im~ 
bibed the doctrines of Professor.Seely, he became a fanatical supporter 
of Imperial Federation for which the federation of South Africa was one 
of the prerequisites .. 2 His particular inte;est i~ South African 
affairs dated from the 1880s and his ass).lmption of office as Colonial 
.secretary in June 1895 heralded the advent of a more vigorous policy 
in South Africa. Chamberlain's determination to consolidate Britain's 
position in that part of the Empire prompted his support for Rhodes's 
ill-conceived conspiracy against the Transvaal. 
The effects of the Jameson Raid reverberated throughout South 
Africa. Together with the Committee of Enquiry, which did not altogether 
succeed in allaying suspicions regarding the Colonial Office's role in 
the affair, it convinced Afrikaners in the Transvaal and elsewhere that 
Britain wished to deprive the Republic of its independence. Between 
1877 and 1881 imperial pressure upon the Transvaal had caused it to 
become the focus of a nascent Afrikaner nationalism. 3 In the ensuing 
years Kruger's obstructive economic policy lost him the sympathy of 
many Afrikaners, particularly in the Cape Colony. The Jameson Raid, 
however, aroused renewed sympathy for the Transvaal and stimulated 
Afrikaner nationalism by giving it yet another grievance to rally around. 
It also struck a serious blow at the co-operation which had been deve-
loping between the English- and Dutch-speaking inhabitants of South 
Africa and replaced it with suspicion and hostility which became more. 
and.more exacerbated as the controversy between Britain and the Republic 
progressed. 
In the Transvaal the. Raid cut the ground from under the feet 
of the more progressive party~which had been emerging under the leader-
ship of Commandant-General P.J. Joubert, favouring administrative 
1. J.L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, v·. iii' PP• 27' 186. 
2. J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 68. 
... 3'. F.A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism, 
pp. - 19 8-202 ' 219-220. 
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reforms ~vhich would conciliate the uitlanders, and rallied support 
round Kruger's conservative regime. The Republic, which had been 
virtually defenceless on the eve of the Raid, began arming extensively. 
in order to ward off any possible future attack. 
1 In the Cape Colony the Raid· shattered the alliance between Rhodes 
and the Afrikaner Bond and out of the ensuing confusion emerged a 
division of parties along racial lines. Dutch support rallied around 
the Bond and moderates like J.X. Merriman, J.W. Sauer and W.P. Schreiner 
moved towards closer co-operation with it. ·On the other hand the 
formation of the South African League and its subsequent activities 
brought about a crystallisation of a distinctive and strongly imperial-
4 ist Progressive Party. Men like James Rose Innes and Richard Solomon 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain an independent stand. The 
Transvaal issue became the dominant theme in Cape politics and support 
for or disapproval of Rhodes became the criterion according to. which 
political affiliations were judged. Although the Raid spelt the end 
of Rhodes as the dominant force in Cape politics, contemporaries did 
not see him in that light. He still commanded considerable support 
5 
and his opponents were dogged by the fear that he might return to power. 
After much wooing by the Progressives he eventually emerged as a supporter 
of that party in March 1898. Sir Gordon Sprigg's stop-gap ministry fell 
~n June of that year and after the most bitterly contested election ~n 
the history of the Cape Colony the Bond under the parliamentary leader-
ship of W.P. Schreiner, emerged with a small majority. His ministry, 
composed of the moderates, Merriman, Sauer and Solomon and two Bondsmen, 
A.J. Herholdt and T.N.G. Te Water, assumed office in October 1898. 
Bound together mainly by their fear of Rhodes, the ministry's main ob-
jective was to maintain peace in South Africa. 6 
The appoin~ment of Sir Alfred Milner as Governor of the Cape 
and High Commissioner for South Africa marked a decisive stage in the 
4. Y. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 
1884-1898, chs. V- IX; 
5. E. van Heyningen, The Relations bet~..reen Sir Alfred Milner and 
W.P. Schreiner's Ministry, 1898-1900, p. 4. 
6. Ibid., p. 17; P •' Lewsen, Selections from the correspondence of 
J.X. Merriman, v. iii, P• 24. 
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British Government's attempts to solve its problems in South Africa. 
Hilner was deliberately chosen for the post because of his absolute 
devotion to the interests of the Empire. After a brilliant academic 
career at Oxford, he had earned his laurels first as under-secretary 
in the Egyptian ministry of finance and then as chairman of the 
British board of revenue. Both-Liberal and Conservative politicians 
had the highest regard for his outstanding abilities and the appoint-
ment of a man of his calibre was indicative of the gravity with which 
the British Government ~iewed the situation ~n South Africa. Milner 
was far too forceful a character to be merely the instrument of his 
superiors at the Colonial Office. As. the man on the spot he exercised 
a decisive influence on the formulation of Britain's policy and, in 
Herriman's phrase, w·rote his name in lasting characters on the memory 
7 
of the South African people.· Between 1899 and 1902 many came to 
regard him as the greatest obstacle to the restoration of good rela-
tions bet~veen Briton and Afrikaner. These considerations justify a 
brief examination of his personality and of the imperial creed which 
directed his actions. 
Having come under the influence of George Parkin at Oxford, 
Milner fully shared Chamberlain's views on the mission of the British 
Empire and remained throughout his life an ardent champion of Imperial 
Federation as the best method of strengthening the Empire in an age of 
increasing foreign competition. 8 The significance of his views,.how-
ever, lay not in their. originality but in the singlemindedness and 
rigidity with which he adhered to them. He arrived in South Africa a· 
self-confessed "civilian soldier of the Empire", 9 determined not only 
to maintain Britain's supremacy there but also to consolidate her 
position with a view to a united British South Africa eventually taking 
its place in an Imperial Federation.· Milner ·admitted that he could not 
understand the point of view of those who did not ·share his enthusiasm 
for the Imperial cause. He viewed Afrikaner nationalism with extreme 
hostility and regarded the Transvaal as .the focus of disaffection in 
the British possessions in South Africa. In the Cape Colony Milner was. 
7. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. ii:l, p. 76. 
8. A~M. Gollin, Pioconsul in politics, pp. 16-18. 




quick to equate loyalty with unreserved support for his views and he 
therefore regarded the bulk of the Dutch population as being merely 
10 
nominally loyal. .·This attitude rankled with many and aroused 
the hostility of not only the Dutch, but of some of the English-
speaking colonists as welL ! 1 Milner tended to minimise the influence 
of the Dutch as a political force 
h d b 'd 12 a come to power y accl ent. 
and maintained that a Bond ministry 
He did not take their leaders into 
his confidence and discounted their advice. Although he had admitted, 
on his arrival at the Cape, that the restoration of good relations be-
tween.English and Dutch should be a major consideration guiding his 
k h kl d h. k . h d f . . 13 wor , e never tac e t e tas Wlt any egree o conv1ct1on. 
·Milner did not intend solving the problem of dual loyalties which 
divided South Africa through conciliation or accommodation. On the 
contrary, he meant to arrest the grmvth of Afrikaner nationalism by 
eliminating the Transvaal as an independent state and hoped to neutral-
ise Afrikaner influence through a large influx of British settlers. 14 
In 1899 L.S. Amery, a close associate of Milner's, wrote; " ... , what 
we are committed to is the stamping out of a national movement which 
15 
we have allowed to grow up in the last twenty years", and after the 
war Milner maintained: "If two years hence there are three men of 
British race and two of Dutch in the country.we will be safe ,,,, If 
there are three of Dutch and two .Bdtish we shall have perpetual diffi-
culty," 16 Those who recognised the Dutch as a permanent feature of 
the South African political scene and believed that their sentiments 
would have to be accommodated if any lasting settlement were to be 
arrived at, regarded Milner's attitude as fraught with the gravest con-
sequences for the future of British influence in South Africa. On first 
being apprised of his policy Merriman had warned Milner against the 
danger of turning South Africa into a second Ireland 17 and this cry was 
10. C. Headlam, The Milner Papers, v. i, p. 477; G.H.L. LeMay, 
British Supremacy in South Africa, p. 51. 
11. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 77. 
12. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 39. 
13. Headlam, The Milner Papers, v. i, p. 177. 
14. Marais, Kruger's Republic, p. 319; Headlam, Milner ·Papers, v. 1, 
p. 425; Le May, British Supremacy, pp. 35~36. 
15. Le May, British Supremacy, p. 35. 
16. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, p. 62. 
17. Lew~en, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 98. 
'·' 
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reiterated by the conciliation party throughout the war. 
Milner's authoritarianism was another feature of his political 
outlook ~vhich aroused resentment amongst a section of the Cape colonists. 
Gollin says of him: "As an imperialist he desired to preserve the 
British system over vast areas oJ the world. But a basic thing about 
him was that he disliked the British system, and British parties and 
18 British democracy." By temperament an administrator rather than a 
politician, Milner's dislike of the democratic process might have 
originated in his failure to win a seat in parliament early in his career> 
but more probably sprang from resentment at having to accept the inter-
ference of men whose motives he often distrusted and whom he regarded 
as less capable and less well informed than himself. His lack of 
sympathy with constitutional forms enabled him to disregard the advice 
of his Cape ministers, advocate the suspension of the Cape constitution 
and insist on crown colony government for the conquered republics after 
the. war, without any qualms. In a self-governing colony like the Cape, 
which was not only jealous of its constitutional rights, but where many 
regarded these rights as the most noble principles embodied in the 
British Empire, Milner's attitude caused considerable alarm. 
Merriman was quick to sense Milner's sentiments and after his 
first long talk with him reported: "He gives one the idea of an atavar 
of Sir Bartle Frere, a very clever intellectual man with a charming 
manner, but an official of officials whp profoundly distrusts and despises 
Parliament. I gathered also that he was a strong Rhodes .and anti-
Transvaal man." 19 Rose Innes too, judged Milner to be a man of great 
fixity of purpose, more· inclined to give advice than to take it. ~O 
Milner's rigidity and his tendency to confine his society to those who 
shared his own views, created an unfavourable impression. After a con-
versation with Mrs. Marie Kobpmans de Wet, the distinguished Cape Town 
hostess, Merriman's wife reported that it was thought that Milner "sees 
no one but his ministers, shuts himself up, and reads only the subsidised 
press!! He hates the place and won't put himself out in the least." 21 
18. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, P· 603. 
19. Lewsen, Merriman Corres:eondence, v. ii' p. 274. 
20. J. Rose Innes, Autobiography, p. 165. 
21 ~ Lewsen, Merriman Cor.resEondence, v. ii, p. 321. 
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On his arrival in South Africa Milner had been hopeful that the 
development of a progressive opposition to Kruger would eventually 
lead to reforms, but he abandoned all hope of an agreement with the 
Republic after Kruger's re-election with an overwhelming majority in 
February 1898. He regarded the Transvaal as·growing stronger and more 
hostile by the day and having de9ided that time was no longer on 
Britain's side, he determined to bring about a confrontation that would 
lead either to the Transvaal's complete capitulation or to war • 22 
. A vigorous policy in South Africa was, however, dependent upon two 
factors; Britain had to be free of any other international entangle-
ments and there had to be strong popular support for such a policy in 
Britain and South Africa. Despite Milner's dislike of bowing to "rotten 
public opinion", he skilfully undertook its 'education' along the de-. 
sired lines, both in Britain and South Africa. His two main auxilliaries 
in this task were the South African League arid the press. 
The South African League had been founded in 1896 for the ex-
.press purpose of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa. Its 
affiliated .body in Britain was the Imperial South African ·Association 
which had been established at the same time. 23 In the 'I'ransvaal the 
League undertook the .task of organising the uitlanders into a homogeneous 
body and it became the main mouthpiece through which their grievances 
were expressed. It availed itself of every possible opportunity to 
criticise the actions of the Transvaal Government and, as it regarded 
the Republic as obdurate, it appealed to Britain to intervene on behalf 
of the uitlanders. Chamberlain had been quick to grasp the importance 
of the League which provided a justification for British intervention 
and the British agent Conyngham~Greene soon began to keep an eye on its 
executive in order to regulate their activities to suit the needs of 
British diplomacy. From 1897 onwards the supreme direction of the League· 
in the Transvaal was unofficially ~n the hands of Greene and it became 
24 
an instrument of Imperial policy. After his return from England at 
the beginning of 1899 Milner took over the direction of the League from 
Greene, working mainly through him and F.J. Fitzpatrick. 25 
22. Headlam, Milner Papers, v. i, pp. 221-:-222; LeMay, British 
Supremacy, p. 13. 
23. Marais, Kruger's Republic, p. 170. 
24. Ibid., p. 164; Le May, British Supremacy, p. 16. 
25. Marais,.Kruger's Republic, p. 263. 
'·' 
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The Cape province of the League, of which Rhodes became president 
and Edmund Garrett, editor of the Cape Times, vice-president, supported 
the actions of its Transvaal counterpart. It also organised parliament-
ary op-position to the Afrikaner Bond and eventually became an extra-
parliamentary organisation of the Progressive Party. In order to dis-
credit the Bond it warned the Imperial Government that the disloyalty 
of the Dutch was on the increase and that there were "republican emis-
saries and republican Mausers" in the Colony. As early as 1897 it 
26 
advocated the. abandonment of the "servile policy of conciliation". 
The activities of the South African Leagu_e at the Cape created a 
powerful body of local opinion in favour of a v~gorous policy towards 
the Transvaal without which Britain would not have risked a war with 
the Republic. The role played by the League was_therefore of signal 
importance. "It may be seen as the first stage of the Boer War - a 
f d 1 h • h d h d f 1 f' • II 27 orwar co umn w ~c prepare t e groun or the rea ~ght~ng. · 
The activities of the League were widely reported in the imperial-
ist press which fully supported i·ts aims and objectives. Milner's 
most intimate link with the local press was Edmund Garrett., editor 
of the Cape Times, the newspaper. with the largest circulation in 
South Africa. They had become acquainted in Egypt in 1892 and a warm 
friendship had developed between the two men whose views on imperial 
matters were in close sympathy. Garrett, who came to the Cape in 1895, 
had used his influence to support Milner's appointment as High Commis-
sioner and he had been one of the first persons with whom Milner had 
discussed South African affairs before leaving for the Cape. In Cape 
Town Garrett was a regular caller at Government House •. During these 
visi-ts the two men exchanged information and if Garrett's ideas frequently 
obtruded into Mi .. lner's dispatches, the High Commissioner's views were 
0• 
. equally frequently echoed in the columns of the Cape Times •. 28 Although. 
Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, an associate of Rhodes, was the major shareholder 
in the Cape Times, the newspaper did not form part of the· Argus group 
which was controlled by Rhodes and Garrett enjoyed complete independence 
26. M.F. Bitensky, The South African League, p. 143. 
27. Ibid., p. 165. 
28. A.N. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899", 
The Historical Journal, v. XVI, 2, 1973, p. 328; 
E.T. Cook, Edmund Garrett, pp. 151-156. 
'·-' 
- 9 -
d . 29 as e ~tor. Milner did, however, enter into close collaboration with 
the Rhodesite press. In 1895 control of the Argus Printing and Publish-
ing Company which owned the Johannesburg Star, the Transvaal counterpart 
of the Cape Times, had passed into Rhodes's hands. Two years later 
editorial policy was centralised and it was stipulated that company 
policy would be: 
·"as is indicated from time to time in the leading columns of the 
Star, and all publications of the company ynless specially 
authorised to the contrary by the Managing Director, are to fol-
low the lead therein given in all matters of a political nature 
which are of more than local importance" 30 
Determined to make the Star the leading newspaper in the campaign to 
consolidate anti-Boer opinion, the proprietors approached Milner for 
assistance in finding a really capable editor. During his visit to 
England at the end of 1898 Milner used his influence to secure the 
services of W.F. Monypenny, then on the staff of the Times, who was 
appointed as editor of the Star and Transvaal correspondent of the Times~ 
Monypenny arrived in South Africa shortly after Milner's return and 
thereafter the High Commissioner remained in close cont~ct with him ~n 
order to ~rovide him with ~uidelines and to co-ordinate their activi-
ties. 31 On 18 April another newspaper the Transvaal Leader, financed 
by Wernher, Beit & Co., edited by J.R. Pakeman late editor of the Star, 
and blessed by Milner, appeared to swell the wave of criticism against 
32 the Transvaal government. Through his influence with Monypenny and 
the Star Milner was able to direct the opinions of the other Argus company 
newspapers - the Bulawayo Chronicle, Rhodesia Herald, African Review, Cape 
Argus and Diamond Fields Advertiser - which in turn, through their editors 
.as local correspondents and through the news agencies, supplied most of 
.the information on South Africa acquired by the British newspapers. 
Milner was therefore in a commanding position to regulate the flow of ~n-
formation to Britain and he made use of this to influence public opinion 
in such a way as to make it all the more receptive for the ideas advocated 
. h. d. h ;3 3 ~n ~s own ~spate es. 
29. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899 11 , Hist. Jour., 2, 
I 973, p. 85. 
30. Ibid., p. 330. 
31. 'Ibid., pp. 334-5. 
32. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. ~u.:, p; 44; Porter, 0 Sir. Alfred 
Milner and the Press, 1897-1899", Hist.. Jour., 2, 1973, p. 335. 
33. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899",, Hist. Jour., 2, 
1973, p. 334 •. 
'.! 
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During his long association with the Pall Mall Gazette Milner had 
also made an impressive array of friends in the British world of journal-
is~who were to stand.him in good stead. These included G.E. Buckle, 
editor of the Times; C.F. Moberly Bell, its assistant manager; Flora 
Shaw, the colonial editor; E.T. Cook, editor of the Daily News; H.S. 
Wilkinson, foreign leader writer of the Morning Post and E.B. Iwan-Muller 
of the Daily Telegraph. While visiting England at the end of 1898 Milner 
saw most of the leading pressmen in order to "stamp on rose coloured il-
lusions about South Africa" and to prepare the ground for a policy of in-
creased pressure on the Transvaal. In the ensuing crisis he relied on 
his journalist friends to spread the right ideas and to try and influence 
the Liberal newspapers in his favour. 34 Milner's opponents were only 
too we 11 aware that the· major part of the i.mperialist press spoke with one 
voice and this strengthened their belief that public opinion was being 
"manufactured" and that there was a ·"capitalist conspiracy" afoot against 
35 the independence of the Transvaal, but the extent of Milner's involve-
ment with the press was not known, even to as astute a journalist as J.A. 
Hobson of the Manchester Guardian, who made a special study of the inner 
36 
workings of the imperialist press. The .Irish member of parliament, 
John Dillon, 37 voiced what few realised when he declared ~n the House of 
Commons that Milner's dispatches consisted of, 
" •••• clippings from newspapers and partisan reports g~v~ng one 
side of the question without alluding to the other side •...• 
The editor of the Cape Times calls every day on Sir Alfred Milner 
and between them in the study of the latter they concoct articles, 
which are published and then sent by Sir Alfred Milner to the 
Colonial Secretary who issues them in a blue book as evidence of 
the opinion in South Africa ••••• " 38 
The close relations between Imperial officials and the South African 
League and Milner's considerable influence with the imperialist pr.ess, 
therefore created a complex, interrelated system by means of which the 
way was prepared for British action against the Transvaal. Their modus 
34. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-189911 , Hist. Jour., 
2, 1973, pp. 336-337. 
35. South African Ne~vs, 25 Feb. 1900. 
36. J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa, pp. 206-228. Also published 
by the South Africa Conciliation Committee (S.A.C.C.) as a pamphlet 
(No. 14) "How the press was worked before the war". 
37. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 286. 
38. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897:...1899", Hist. Jour., 
2,.1973~-pp. 338-339. 
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operandi ~s epitomised by this communication from Greene to Milner on 
10 March 1899: 
" ••••• Monypenny came to see me today and we had a long chat: 
.he seems sound on all points except the South African League, 
on which he appeared uncertain. When, however, I had explained 
to him that they •••• bound themselves .·to be guided by me, as. 
in the past, he was quite reassured, and said, while he might 
not support them publicly in his paper, as a political Body for 
fear of spoiling the game, he would take care that their objects 
and efforts were supported.. This is, after· all what we want 0 • 39 
At the Cape there existe'd a body of opinion which ran strongly con-
trary to the views held by the Colonial Secretary and the High Commis-
sioner. This group, named the South African Party by W.P. Schreiner, 
their parliamentary leader, cons is ted of an alliance between the 
Afrikaner Bond and a small body of moderate English-speaking politicians. 
It was out of this alliance that the conciliation movement eventually 
crystallised in the early months of 1900. It then organised a campaign 
against the annexation of the republics, but before the war the same 
individuals were·engaged in expounding the same views, although ~n a 
less concerted fashion. The movement derived its essence from the support 
of men who·, despite their close affinities with England, championed the 
cause of the Republics and urged a policy of peace and conciliation upon 
the British Government. Of these John X. Merriman was the ablest and 
most articulate and, after the resignation of the Schreiner ministry in 
June 1900, he assumed the parliamentary leadership of the party, supported 
by his political twin~ J.W. Sauer. Other prominent participants in the 
movement were the brothers James and Charles Molteno, sons of Sir John 
Molteno, first Prime Minister of the Cape Colony; the authoress Olive 
Schreiner, sister of the Prime Minister, and her husband S.C. Cronwright-
Schreiner; F.J. Centlivres, managing director of the South African 
Newspaper Company; Albert Cartwright, editor of the South African Ne1vs; 
40 
advocates H.L. Currey and Henry Burton; William Hay, one time editor 
of the Cape Mercury; Dr. F.C. Kolbe, the Roman Catholic clergyman and 
scholar; Ramsden Ba1mforth, the Unitarian minister and author and Andrew 
Murray, the well known Dutch Reformed theologian and author. Througcyout 
39. Porter, "Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899", Hist. Jour., 
2, 1973, p. 335. 
40. H.L. Currey was the son of J.B. Currey, a close friend of Merriman's. 
He had been personal secretary to Rhodes and secretary of the 
Chartered Company. Henry Burton had contested Barkly West against 
Rhodes at the last general election. He later held several cabinet 




their campaign the conciliationists co-operated with like-minded men 
in England. One of their most valuable links wit11 their Liberal allies 
was P.A. Molteno, a brother of James and Charles Molteno, who had settled 
in London where he w~s in partnership with his father-in-law, the ship-
owner and prominent public figure, Sir D~nald Currie. Holding radical 
Liberal views, Percy Molteno worked energetically in the interests of the 
Boer cause.· 41 In his recently .. published book A Federal South Africa 
he had expounded the principle that South Africa could best prosper with 
a minimum of interference in its internal affairs by the Imperial 
Government, a view in which the peace party at the Cape heartily con-
curred. His intimate knowledge of South Africa was of great value to 
Liberal politicians whom he often supplied with material for their 
speeches and with whom he frequently co-operated in planning parliamentary 
strategy. He also had access to the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, and frequently consulted with his parliamentary secretary, 
Captain John Sinclair, so that he was in a position to use any information 
from his Cape friends to the greatest advantage. 42 Percy Molteno also 
attempted to establish a more reliable organisation for the transmission 
of information to some of the British papers. In co-operation with the 
Daily Chronicle, Morning Leader and the Star, it was arranged that H.L. 
Currey, S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner and Albert Cartwright should be approach-
. 43 ' ' 
ed to act as South African correspondents of these papers. Other 
members of the conciliation party, like Schreiner and Merriman, also fre-
quently exchanged views with Liberals including Frederick Mackarness, 
' 44 James Bryce, John Morley and John Ellis. 
The ideas underlyi,ng the conciliation movement were entirely 
opposed to the concept of empire of which Chamberlain and Milner were 
such ardent advocates. Their attitude was outlined by a correspondent 
in the columns of the South African News who criticised the movement .to-
wards Imperial consolidation and asked: 
41. P.A. Molteno Papers (M.P.), P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 23 June 
1899 and 30 June 1899. 
42. M.P., P.A. Molteno to Betty Molteno, 4 July 1899; P.A. Molteno 
to J.H. Hofmeyr, 1 Aug. 1899. 
43. Ibid., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 14 ·Jan. 1899. 
44. Lewsen, MerrimanCorrespondence, v. ii; p. 29; Ibid., v. iii, 
p. 68; E.A. Walker, W.P. Schreiner: a South African, p. 90. 
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"What on earth is wrong with the British Empire that it should 
not be left as it is? Disguise it as we may the whole Trans-
vaal question has arisen because certain enthusiasts influenced 
by narrow and shallow vanity-laden doctrines for which Professor 
Seeley and his disciples are mainly responsible, wish to make 
our present Empire something very different from what it is". 
Chamberlain, he continued, wanted a provincialised, homogeneous, cen-
trally adm~nistered empire and war with the Transvaal was intended as 
the first step in the general reversal of Britain's colonial policy of 
45 the last half century. Merriman, a firm believer in the Liberal 
laissez faire theory of empire, had been a correspondent of Professor 
Goldwin Smith, the great exponent of that theory, since the 1870s when 
confederation had first been mooted in South Africa. On the eve of 
the war he ·wrote to him lamenting Milner and Chamberlain's rampant 
imperialism which he felt had put the clock back twenty-five years and 
which he predicted would ultimately destroy the Empire. Merriman re-
regarded the other .colonies' offer of troops as meddling in what should 
be a domestic quarrel and cited 'it as "a fi·ne example of what [fmperia]J 
Federation might lead us to". 46 
The belief that South Africa should be left i:o solve its own 
problems unaided by interference from Downing Street formed a corner-
stone of the conciliation party's philosophy. While giving evidence ·be-
fore the Committee of Enquiry into the Raid, Schreiner had warned: 
"You must either let salvation come from inside or else have a 
condition of things in South Africa which there is not a man 
in this hall today would wish ever • • • • to· have had any re-
sponsibiiity for" 47 
h f . ld h . f d h f . . d 48 Sout A r~ca wou not ave a un~on orce upon er rom outs~ e. · 
Merriman 1 s efforts in March and April 1899 to arrange a conference be-
tween the representatives of the republics, Natal and the Cape Colony 
to discuss matters of common interest was indicative of the determina-
tion to prove that South African matters could be settled in South Africa 
49 by South Africans. 
45. South African News, 4 July 1899. 
46~ Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 84-85. 
47. Walker, Schreiner, pp. 93~94 • 
. 48. J.X. Merriman Papers (J.X.M.P.), Sauer to Merriman, 3 May 1899; 
South African News, 8 May 1899. 
49. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 65. 
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The peace party did not agree that the Transvaal constituted a 
threat to British supremacy in South Africa. They believed that 
Britain derived her supremacy, not from agreements and conventions, 
but from her enormous wealth and the vigorous energy of the ideas ~nd 
institutions which she carried with her. They also believed that, in 
a country like 
Britain had to 
South Africa where British and Dutch had to live together, 
follow a policy of fusion rather than strive for supre-
50 
macy. Because of their belief in England's innate superiority they 
were convinced that it would eventually, in the natural course of events, 
come to control the Transvaal politically as well as economically. 51 
While visiting South Africa just before the war, J.A. Hobson gained the 
impression that the Schreiner ministry and its supporters were: 
"as firmly convinced as the most pronounced Jingo that England 
must in effect control the destinies of the whole of South 
Africa, but they deprecate the doctrine of force as the mid-
wife of progress seeing - what the Imperial Government fails 
to see - the moral and political reactions of menace and war 
upon the 'race question which underlie the political future of 
the country". 52 
With ·regard to the immediate causes of the crisis, the conciliation 
.party did not deny that the Transvaal Government had many faults. They 
condemned Kruger's evident determination to found his state on a narrow 
and unenlightened minority and urged a moderate reform of the franchise 
which would give the uitlanders a fair voice in the direction of affairs. 
They did not regard the·uitlanders as unreservedly hostile to the 
Republic, but maintained that there was a responsible section amongst· 
them who genuinely had the interests of the Republic at heart and who 
were opposed to the machinations of men like Rhodes. On the other hand 
they believed that those who were agitating most loudly for the franchise 
were merely. ~sing it as a stalking horse to penetrate the defences of 
the Transvaal. Besides the franchise issue ·the conciliation party also 
saw numerous other blots upon the Transvaal administration, such as the 
ambiguities in the constitution and the ignorance. and corruption in its 
financial administration. They 'regarded the dynamite monopoly as a 
SO. South African News, 28 Sept. 1899. 
51. M.P., Merriman to P.A. Molteno, 1 Jan:. 1900. 
52. Hobson, The War in South Africa, ch. I; South African News, 




scandal and urged ~he appointment of a competent financier to reform 
financial matters. 53 Long before the situation became critical pro-
minent Cape poli tici~ns like Merriman, Schreiner and Sauer urged reform 
on the Transvaal and encouraged their friends in.the Orange Free State 
to do the same. 54 
On the other hand they pointed out that the goldfields presented 
the Transvaal Government with a problem of particular complexity with 
which they were totally unprepared to cope. Its opponents they felt, 
tended to overlook the fact· that its administration had not been totally 
without merit and that nruch had been accomplished regarding railways, 
. telegraphs, public buildings, hospitals and education. Merriman thought 
its administration, despite its shortcomings, compared favourably with 
that of the goldfields in America and Australia and believed its mining 
law to be better than those ~n force anywhere else. Its taxation also, 
both direct and indirect, was lower than on. any other goldfields in the 
world. 55 D-espite these achievements the Transvaal Government had met 
with virtually unrelieved hostility from Britain for the previous ten 
years and .every reform had been stigmatised as a sign of weakness by 
the hostile press. The Jameson Raid and the inconclusive enquiry follow-
ing it, the agitation of the capitalist press and the activities of the 
South African League, all served to.retard the progress of reform just 
as much as the prejudice and obstinate conservatism of the Boer Volks-
56 raad. The conciliation party believed that the Transvaal should 
be given credit where it was due, even if the occasion did not arise 
very frequently, and that this would be more conducive to further advances 
than a constant harping on its deficiencies. 
While recognising the need for reform the conciliation party, 
however, regarded the uitlander grievances as grossly exaggerated. 
Moreover, they maintained that while friendly representation on the 
matter should be tnade to the Transvaal Government, any at tempt by 
:--
53. Lewse.n, Merriman Correspondence, v. ii, p. 302; Ibid., v. i~i, 
p. 53; South African News, 15 May 1899. 
54. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. ii, p. 302. 
55. Ibid., v. iii, pp. 126-127; South African News, 15 May 1899. 





Britain to force reform on the Transvaal would constitute an unwarranted 
I 
interference in the internal affairs of the Republic and a breach· of the. 
London Convention which had restored the Transvaal's complete independence 
in internal matters. They regarded any claim to internal supervision as 
preposterous and saw it as creating the impression that by some feat of 
legerdemain Britain "gave back the Transvaal and yet did not give it 
back". 57 In addition the conciliationists felt that, in view of the 
Jameson Raid and the scandal of the Committee of Enquiry and Chamberlain's 
whitewashing of Rhodes which followed it, the British Government's hands 
were not clean in the matter and that living in a glass house it was in 
no position to throw stones at the Transvaal. 
As a panacea for the problems besettins South Africa the conciliat~on 
d 1. f d . 58 Th h f 1 S ' party urge a po ~cy o peace an pat~ence. e t erne o Genera ~r 
William Butler's speech at Grahamstown on 17 December 1898 in which he 
said: 
"South Africa ••••• does not need a surgical operation; she 
needs peace, progress and the development which is only po§sible 
through the union of many hearts and the labour of many hands ••• ", 59 
60 
virtually became the rallying cry of the movement. Butler, who was 
commander-in-chief of the British forces in South Africa and had been 
acting High Commissioner during Milner's absence in England, was a man 
after their own heart and he echoed the conciliationists' sentiments 
exactly when he informed the War Office: 
"The whole social fabric of life in South Africa is too closely 
woven together to allow the sword to be the arbiter of the 
differences between the white races without endangering the 
very existence of the social body itself". 61 
The very nature of the population would turn a war between Britain and 
the Transvaal into a civil war as there was hardly a Dutch family in the 
Cape Colony that did not have relations in the Republics. In such 
57. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, pp. 55-56; 
Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. }0; South African Ne~V"s, 
15 May 1899, 3 Oct. 1899. 
58. What Milner contemptuously referred to as 
twaddle" of the peace-at-any-price party. 
Republic, p. 271. 
59. W.F. Butler, Autobiography, p. 398. 
60. South African News, 2 May 1899. 
61. Butler, Autobiography, p. 447. 
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circumstances a war would be the greatest calamity that could befall 
South Africa. 62 The first shot fired against the Transvaal would 
unite Afrikanerdom from the Zambezi to Cape Agulhas and destroy at 
one stroke the achievements of those who had been striving to bring 
about a better understanding and harmonious co-operation between the 
63 two races. War with the Transvaal would not only be a crime as there 
was no casus belli, it would also be a political blunder of the first 
magnitude. Thus the conciliation party believed that the paramount 
interests of both Britain and South Africa. demanded peace and they saw 
it as the duty of all who had the interests of the Empire at heart to 
64 tirelessly urge the necessity of preserving peace. 
In the constant reiteration of these warnings the peace party 
found itself seriously handicapped by the lack of support in the English 
language press which was almost entirely pro-imperialist. The desire 
to establish an English paper to put across their views had long been 
present, the main problem, however, being the lack of funds. 65 When 
the opportunity arose of acquiring the building and plant of the defunct 
South African Telegraph at a very favourable rate an attempt was made to 
raise the money and the first prospectus of the South African Newspaper 
Company was issued in September 1897. 66 It was hoped that the paper 
would be established before the pending Legislative Council e.lections or 
at least in time to influence the election which would follow the ~is-
solution of the Assembly in 1898. Lack of .funds, however, proved an ~n­
surmountable obstacle and the undertaking had to be shelved. From London 
Percy Molteno kept on chiding them for allowing "that pestilential 
fellow Garrett" to continue leading public opinion by the nose without 
contradiction and by October 1898 sufficient funds had eventually been 
subscribed to allow the company to be officially registered. Sauer, 
Merriman, Schreiner, Charles and James Molteno and Harry Currey all lent 
their support.to the venture and Percy Molteno, besides taking up a: 
generous number of shares hims~lf, used his influence to raise some 
financial support in·England. Alexander Mair, J.A. van Reenen, F.K. Wiener 
62. Butler, Autobiography, p. 449. 
63. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. ii, p. 272. 
64. M.P., J.W. Sauer to P.A. Molteno, 3 March 1897. 
65. Ibid., P.A. Molt.eno to Merriman, 5 Feb. 1897;· Merriman to P.A. 
Molteno, 6 Feb. 1897 and 18 Aug. 1897. 
66. Ibid., Sauer to P.A. Molteno, 9 Sept. ·1897. 
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and Charles Molteno were the first directors with F.J. Centlivres as 
managing director. 67 Albert Cartwright, an associate of Schreiner, 
Merriman and Innes, was appointed as editor. Originally from England, 
he had been in South Africa for ten years and had gained considerable 
experience in the field of South African journalism. He had begun 
his career with the Cape Times i? 1889, joined the staff of the Cape Argus 
three years later and in 1892 went to the Rand where he became sub-
editor and later assistant editor of the Johannesburg Star. Objecting 
to its plutocratic atmosphere he resigned ~rom the Star after the Raid 
to become editor of the Diamond Fields Advertiser, but resigned in 1898 
when that paper too was taken over by the Argus group. He then became 
editor of the Cape Mercury at King William's Town where he remained 
until approached to edit the South African News. Cartwright had there-
fore worked for every major newspaper in South Africa and had establish-
ed a reputation for honesty and independence, preferring to resign ex-
cellent prospects rather than write to order. 68 As editor of the 
South African News his views were in complete agreement with those of 
the proprietors. On the fundamental issue of the relationship which 
should prevail between Britain and her colonies, he believed that the 
colonies should to all practical intents and purposes be fellow nations 
with England. The champions of Imperial Federation seemed to him to be 
working against nature and her processes and he predicted that their 
69 
efforts would come to naught. 
The South African News appeared as an eight page daily on 2 May 1899. 
In making its "Confession of Faith" it expressed its conviction that 
there were no problems in South African which could not be settled by 
the unaided efforts of the people of South Africa themselves. 
"Our country's need is a South African policy in the broadest 
sense - non-interference by Downing Street and the study of 
the interests of the whole people by the various governments 
in South Africa • • • .The essential thing is that we should 
feel - and act as if we feel - that we are all South Africans. 
Nature has made us one country; and a common if different 
ancestry and the abs~nce of religious and social differences 
67. Walker, Schreiner, p. 121; M.P., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 
17 Feb. 1898 and 27 May 1898; P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 
29 July 1898 and 17 Nov. 1898; Murray-Parker Collection (M.P.C.), 
F.J. Centlivres to Betty Molteno, 5 Nov. 1898. 
68. South African News, 23 Feb. 1901; Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, 
v. ii, p. 305. 
69. M.P.C., A. Cartwright to Betty Molteno, 6 May 1901. 
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emphasize the tact that we are meant to be one people. Let 
us see that no man puts us asunder ••••• " 
On the issue of the Transvaal it therefore indicated that it would keep 
both sides of the question in mind and it disavowed any sympathy for 
"philanthropic proposals to take over and manage neighbour Naboth 's 
highly desirable vineyard", or e~en with an attempt to prove that 
"Naboth's relations are a pestilential disloyal set of fellows who ought 
not t.o be tolerated". Finally, Cartwright made it clear that the J?aper 
"would not deal in blood"; he would not sit.at home in ease and conjure 
up Armageddon from an ink-pot. As a final jibe at the imperialist press 
he suggested that the following quotation from Burke be framed and hung 
in some newspaper offices in South Africa: 
"I cannot conceive of any existence under heaven more truly 
odious and disgusting than an impotent, helpless creature 
calling for battles which he cannot fight and contending for · 
a violent dominion which he can never.exercise". 70 
The appearance of the South African News was heralded with enthusiasm 
by the conci liat{on party which· not only hoped that it would make con-
verts in the Imperialist camp, but also that it would present the true 
facts of the situat{on in South Africa to the British public and prove 
that there was a ·body of English-speaking opinion in the Colony opposed 
·to the Imperial Government's policy. 71 From England Percy Molteno 
assisted with advice on editorial policy· and arranged that at least the 
Cambridge Union would receive the paper regularly. He and Frederick 
Mackarness also contribut~d by, at various times, writing its weekly 
"London Letter". 72 On the local front the South African News co-
operated cordially with Ons Land, but it got a. rough reception from the 
opposition press, which even before its appearance had ridiculed the 
publication of another morning paper. As the official organ of the 
conciliation movement the South African news remained locked in constant 
combat with the imperialist press in its efforts to counteract what it 
regarded as the constant stre~ of misrepresentation emanating from that 
70. South African News, 2 May 1899. 
71. Ibid., 9 Oct. 1$99 and 30 Dec. 1899; Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, 
v. iii, p. 47; J.X.M.P., F. Mackarness to Merriman, 6 Dec. 1899. 
72. M.P., P.A. Molteno to A. Cartwright, 28 April 1899 and 15 Feb. 1·900; 
P.A. Molteno to.C. Molteno, 3 June 1899; J.X.M.P., F. Mackarness 
to Merriman, 6 Dec. 1899. 
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source, and in tur~ it was referred to derisively by its opponents as 
"the conspirators'· organ". 
On the eve of the crisis few contemporaries understood the rela-
tionship between the Imperial authorities and the war party in South 
Africa. Haunted by the b;ogey of Rhodes and the Jameson Raid they re-
garded the.agitation against the Transvaal as part of a "capitalist 
plot" designed, this time by constitutional means, to force the British 
Government to take action against the transvaal in order to enable a 
gang of wealthy adventurers to exploit the natural resources of South 
Af ' f h ' b f'. 73 Th I ' 1 r~ca or t e~r own ene ~t. e mper~a Government was seen as 
being dragged by the apron strings of the capitalists into a position 
from which it would be difficult to retreat without loss of face. 
J.A. Hobson was mainly responsible for popularising this theory and al-
though the peace party was. not always consistent ~n its attitude, the 
majority shared his views. Thus Olive Schreiner wrote to her brother: 
"If the English Government once gains control of the Transvaal 
in a military sense as she now has control of the Colony it 
seems to me South Africa may and almost must fall entirely 
into ·the hands of the capitalists •••• Ultimately we have 
nothing to fight the capitalists with but the guns and forts 
of the Transvaal ••••• " 74 
Merriman also complained: 
of the 'newspapers ••••• 
· 1 II 75 specu ators •••••• 
"If war comes • • • • • it wi 11 be the outcome 
We are made the football of Stock Exchange 
As Chamberlain's reputation had already been 
tarnished by the Jameson Raid, many were prepared to believe that he was 
implicated in the capitalist conspiracy and the conciliation party!s 
severest criticism was at this stage directed at him, Milner being re-
garded as merely carryi~g out his instructions. After the Bloemfontein 
conference Merriman still saw Milner as "the man at the end of the 
string". 76 Although his provocative Graaff-Reinet speech in March 
1898, which had been hailed with such enthusiasm by the Progressives, 
had caused some to view Milner with suspicion, others still regarded 
him with an open mind. Olive Schreiner, for example, decided to reserve 
73. South African News, 24 Feb. 1900. 
74. W.P. Schreiner Papers, U.C.T. (W.P.S •. P., (U.C.T.)), 0. Schreiner 
to W.P. Schreiner, 14 Sept.' 1899. 
·75. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 44, 50. 
76. Ibid., y. iii, p. 56. 
·, 
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her judgment until ,after the Bloemfontein conference and saw Garrett 
as the evil influence. 77 Sir William Butler, whose position brought 
him into intimate contact with Milner and his staff, was one of the few 
who understood the situation. Soon after his arrival in South Africa 
he became convinced that there existed a "colossal syndicate for the 
spread of systematic misrepresen~ation" and he eventually came to the 
conclusion ·that more powerful forces than he had imagined were joined 
with the old agencies to force a racial war upon South Africa. 78 
His reluctance to be party to such a policy resulted in his resignation· 
in August 1899. 
Milner's visit to England, during which he set about preparing the 
ground for a more forceful policy towards the Transvaal, coincided with 
the easing of Britain's international position. The Anglo-German 
agreement of August 1898 had removed the fear of possible German inter-
vention in favour of the Transvaal; the 
eluded a month later and in November the 
campaign in the Sudan was con-
French withdrawal from Fashoda 
79 
removed the threat of complications in that quarter. Although 
Chamberlain would not commit himself, Milner adopted a more bellicose 
attitude after his return to the Cape. The South African League had 
worked up a lather of excitement over the Edgar case and Milner en-
couraged them to "keep on pegging away". 80 On 24 March the second 
uitlander petition was p~esented to the High Commissioner, and unlike 
the first, which had been frustrated by Butler, this one was duly for-
warded to the British Government. Milner's dispatches became more 
stringently worded in order to strengthen Chamberlain's hand in the 
cabinet and eventually culminated in the notorious 'helot' dispatch of 
4 May. Milner also began to intimate to the Cape ministry that the 
British Government "meant business". His relationship with Schreiner 
and his colleagues was a delicate one. Although they held divergent 
views on the Transvaal question, Milner was inclined to make the best 
of the situation as he did not think that a Progressive ministry could 
muster enough support to maintain itself in office. On the other hand 
77. Olive Schreiner Papers (O.S.P.), 0. Schreiner to W.P. Schreiner 














he did not think that the Bond ministry would be able to take a line 
too divergent from Imperial policy in the face of strong and united 
opposition from the Progressives. In addition, they would be able to 
hold Afrikaner opinion in check more effectively than the latter in the 
event of a crisis. Milner also placed considerable reliance on 
Schreiner personally, believing that his moderate views would prevent 
his straying too far from the imperial path. 81 Having decided to 
keep the ministry in office Milner's main problem was to channel their 
energies in the right direction without taking them into his confidence. 
As the Imperial Government was averse to a settlement arrived at without 
its intervention, Milner disapproved of Merriman's efforts to arrange 
an interstate conference and was secretly relieved when the scheme fell 
through, not long after J.P. Fitzpatrick h~d also wrecked the 'capital-
ist negotiations' in Pretoria. Milner capitalised upon the Cape 
leaders' horror of war to oblige them to bring greater pressure to bear 
upon Kruger. 82 At the end of April his attitude during a series of 
interviews with Schreiner greatly alarmed the Prime Minister. Together 
with warnings from friends in London, that the situation was becoming 
extremely critical and that some concessions.from the Transvaal had 
become imperative, this prompted the ministry into taking the initia-
tive in arranging a conference between Milner and Kruger. 83 Milner found 
the suggestion extremely inopportune as it came at a time when the Colonial 
Office was preparing to take the·diplomatic offensive by publishing a 
serious indictment of the Transvaal administration together with a blue 
book on uitlander grievances, which was to contain, inter alia, Milner's 
'helot' dispatch. The British cabinet had on 9 ·May approved a strongly 
worded dispatch by Chamberlain which in fact committed it to an aggressive 
policy. The dispatch concluded with a suggestion of a conference between 
Milner and Kruger at Pretoria which, if the desired concessions wer'e not 
obtained, would be followed up by 'stronger measures'. 84 ~ulner there-
fore received the Cape Government's proposals with little enthusiasm as 
"a good stroke of business on the part of the enemy" which he could not 
very well decline without being accused of not sincerely desiring a settle-
ment. He was determined, however, that the conference would take place on 
81. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, pp. 19-20. 
82. Marais, Kruger's Republic, p. 272. 
83. Ibid., p. 273; _..Van Heyningen, Hilner and the Schreiner Ministry, 
PP• ,33-35. . 
84. Marais, Kruger's Republic, p. 273. 
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his own terms and refused to allow either Hofmeyr or Schreiner to 
accompany him, although Schreiner had expressed the desire to be 
present as the Cape Colony's interests too were vitally involved.· 85 
Milner's reasons for the decision were manifold, but in essence he was 
determined not to give the Cape ministry the opportunity of exercising 
a moderating influence upon British policy towards the Transvaal. 86 
The indications were that Milner was beginning to view the prospect· 
of war with increasing equanimity. Two weeks before the conference 
he wrote to Selborne that he did not want war, but that he was begin-
ning to think that it was the only way out, The Transvaal Government 
would probably climb down' under pressure, but if it did not it would 
be better to fight at that stage than five or ten years later when 
the rransvaal would be even stronger and more hostile. Shortly after 
the conference he confessed to Chamberlain that war would enable them 
to "put things on a sound basis for the future better than even the 
best-devised Convention can". 87 
In these circumstances the conference at Bloemfontein had .little 
likelihood·of success. The imperialist press naturally shared Milner's 
lack of enthusiasm, and 'in the weeks preceding the conference, devoted 
much editorial space to what steps it considered should be taken in the 
event of its failure. The conciliation party, ignorant of the atti-
tude of the imperial Government, fixed their hopes on the conference 
and the correspondence of Merriman, Sir·Henry de Villiers and Charles 
Molteno reveals that they all expected that a genuine effort would be 
. ) . ' . 88 
made to bring each side a step nearer to the·other. On the eve of 
the conference the South African News, while admitting that it did not 
expect the meeting to result in an instant solution, expressed the hope 
that the British Government's views would be "calmly and respectfully 
represented" and that Kruger would reciprocate by recognising the 
"honest and peaceable nature" of Britain's.intentions and begin an 
85. Van Heyning~n, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 37, 
86. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
87. Headlam, Milner Papers, .v. i, pp. 384-385, 444; Van Heyningen. 
-Milner and the. Schreiner Ministry, pp. 39-40. 
88. M.P., C. Mol~eno to P.A. Molteno, 23 May 1899; Lewsen, Merriman 
Corresponderi.ce, ... v. iii, p. 51; E.A. Wa~ker, Lord De Villiers 
and his Times'· P• 337. 
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honest effort at reform so that the present rumours of war which were 
paralysing the coun~ry would be once and for all dispelled, 89 
Milner's prediction that: "The real turning point of the battle is 
coming after - and I think verx soon after the conference break up", 
was, however, to prove more accurate. 90 
/ 
\ 
89. South African News, 29 May 1899. 




THE POLICY OF RESTRAINT 
During the troubled months .. which intervened between the Bloemfon-
tein conference and the outbreak of the war, the peace party consistent-
ly adhered to the principle that the crisis could best be dealt with by. 
the Cape Government and other prominent men such as J.H. Hofmeyr and 
the chief justice, Sir Henry de Villiers •. As the recogl)ised leaders 
of the majority of the colonists their actions would carry far more 
weight than the unauthorised activities of the rank and file of the 
party. Although their efforts were supported by appeals for peace from 
the Afrikaner Bond, from prominent men of religion and from the women 
of the Colony, the Schreiner ministry played the central role in the 
peace party's attempts to avert war and there was no concerted action 
by their supporters outside parliament. Throughout the crisis the 
ministry adhered strictly to a policy of restraint and moderation, even 
when it became increasingly apparent that, in sincerely striving for a 
. negotiated settlement, it was in fact working at cross purposes with 
the Imperial Government whose actions created the growing impression 
that it did not desire a settlement that would leave the South African 
Republic's independence unscathed. The ministry believed that enough 
ill feeling had already· been caused by the imperialist party's intemperate 
utterances and frowned upon any actions which might fu~ther inflame feel-
ings. Although there was not always unanimity within the cabinet, they 
remained steadfastly opposed to any drastic action on their part, b~liev­
ing that it would only des troy such influence as they had with the Im-
perial Government. Although their restraint was not always successfully 
emulated by their supporters, th~y did succeed in'keeping their follow-
ers fairly well in hand in the face of constant provocation from the 
imperial party which became increasingly bellicose and vociferous. 1 
There were, however, some who were of the opinion that the Cape 
Government should make a determined stand and that its supporters· should 
vigorously demonstrate their disapproval of the Imperial Government's 
· ..... 
I. T.R.H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 197-198; M.P., C. Molteno 
to P.A. Molteno, 12 Sept. 1899. 
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poiicy. This would indicate to the British public that there was a 
strong body of opinion in the Colony opposed to war with the Transvaal 
and would fortify the,Liberal Party's at tacks upon Chamberlain and his 
supporters. But to responsible leaders at the Cape the dangers inherent 
~n such a course seemed to outweigh the advantages. A determined stand 
by the government involved the rfsk of an open breach with Milner and 
the possible dismissal of the ministry and there could be no certainty 
that strong opposition from a section of the Cape colonists would ~n fact 
be regarded as significant enough to cause the British Government to 
modify its policy. The two parties at the Cape were fairly evenly balanc~d; 
the South African Party's small majority in the Legislative Assembly being 
countered by the fact that their opponents had a decided advantage over 
them in the press, both locally and in Britain. Constant complaints from 
their Liberal allies in England, that their point of view was hardly ever 
represented in the British.press, were indicative of the measure of success 
which attended the imperial party's efforts to influence public opinion. 2 
In addition, thanks to the work of the South African League, the imperial 
party at the Cape was so well organised that enthusiastic public meetings 
to support. Imperial policy and counter peace demonstrations could be 
arranged without difficulty. These meetings were prominently reported 
in the British press and Milner's sympathy assured their inclusion in 
Impedal blue books. The state of disarray in which the Liberal Party 
found itself, owing to the split·between the moderates and the Liberal 
Imperialists, was another factor hampering the peace party. Although it 
had many sincere and enthusiastic allies in England, the weakness of the 
Liberal Party: limited the scope of their influence and prevented them 
from exerting any effective pressure upon the Government. 3 In addition, 
the Cape leaders feared,that if sympathy with the Transvaal were too 
readily demonstrated in the Colony it might cause the Republic to become 
more obdurate, thus rendering a settlement more difficult. Although a 
policy of moderation and restraint would almost certainly be misconstrued 
in England as indicating the weakness of the peace party, 4 it would, if 
it did not succeed in averting war, at least leave the Cape Government 
in a position to cushion the impact .of war upon the Colony and to influence 
2. M.P., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 14 Jan. 1899; F. Harrison to P.A. 
Molteno, 28 Nov. 1899; Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 91. 
3. Lewsen, Merriman·Correspondence, v. iii, p. 156; M.P., P.A. Molteno 
to G. Molteno, 7 July 1899 • 
.- . 
4.· M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 26 July 1899. 
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the settlement after the war. Furthermore, as the Imperial Government 
never confronted the Cape ministry with a direct challenge, it was ex-
tremely difficult for them to make a determined stand at any particular 
stage without running the risk of doing their cause more harm than good. 
As expediency at times caused the Imperial authorities to adopt an am-
biguous attitude, interspersing. 'provocative actions with pacific gestures, 
the crisis was characterised by the manner in which periods of acute 
tension, crowded with rumours o.f war, were relieved by lulls in which the 
atmosphere became more relaxed as it was felt that the crisis had passed. 
The correspondence between Percy Molteno in London and his brothers at 
the Cape offers an interesting illustration of the difficulties which 
arose out of this situation. Molteno's repeated demands that the Cape 
Government should make a firm stand and clearly indicate their attitude 
to their allies ·in England met with the reply that, in view of the con-
stantly changingsituation, information which reached him through the 
mail after three weeks was often more or less useless. 5 Until almost 
on the eve of hostilities the peace party was never confronted with a 
clearly defined situation and it was therefore forced to formulate its 
policy to.meet the demands of every situation as it arose. The lack of 
finesse which the Transvaal displayed in its handling of the negotiations 
further added to the Cape's difficulties. The attitude of the peace party 
was also to some extent influenced by its reluctance to believe that the 
more responsible members of the British Cabinet would sanction a war for 
which a. casus belli was so obviously lacking. 6 
Immediately after the Bloemfontein conference the Cape ministry re-
sumed its efforts to secure a settlement. It regarded President Kruger's 
offer of a seven year franchi~e as a considerable step in the right direc-
tion and determined· to secure such a modification of the proposals as to 
render them acceptable. to the Imperial authorities. 7 The attitude of 
the Cape ministry reflected the reaction of the peace 
the outcome of the conference. Although its failure 
appointment to many, the tendency was to grasp at its 
5. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, ·23 Aug. 1899. 
6, Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 73. 
party in general 
came as a dis-
more positive 
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the Cape ministry's role as 
mediator between Britain and the Transvaal, see Van Heyningen, 
. Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, ch. IV. 
to 
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results. Milner's ,demand that the proceedings be published and his 
b ' ' 8 a rupt term1nat1on of·the conference caused a few raised eyebrows, 
but any criticism was·by far o~tweighed by the emphasis which was 
placed upon the fact· that Kruger's franchise proposals indicated a 
radical change in the Republic's attitude towards the uitlanders. 
While admitting that the scheme contained many imperfections, the 
South African News hailed it as the most significant point to have 
emerged from the conference. It expressed the hope that the Volksraad 
would accept the President's scheme stripped of its more ambiguous and 
undesirable features and urged Britain to adopt a sympathetic attitude. 9 
The Republic's abandonment of its intransigent attitude towards the 
uitlanders caused such relief that the conciliationists, in an un-
warranted mood of optimism, placed far too hopeful an interpretation 
on Milner's attitude. Following the publication of the official memo-
randa on the conference the South African News confidently stated its 
belief that "the situation had reached a stage at which all idea of war 
may be dismissed". 10 A few days later the paper praised the "friendly 
and peaceable tone" of Milner's speech to a deputation of Progressives 
'which called on him to express their approval of his attitude at the 
conference. The South African News pointed out that he had the reputa-
tion of being one of the most thoughtful and philosophical men of his 
time and it was therefore, "inconceivable that such a man could meditate 
a resort to methods which could not withstand the criticism of just and 
·1 , h d b 1 ' , , . II 11 Tw d 1 h , 1 f th en 1g tene pu 1c op1n1on • o ays ater t e arr1va o e 
12 . 
first cabled summaries from the 'grievances' blue book effectively 
dispelled these illusions. 
Having been delayed by the Bloemfontein conference the blue book 
was published on 14 June with -a view to further strengthening public 
opinion against the Transvaal. It contained Chamberlain's dispatch of 
10 May which was a 'stringent indictment of the Transvaal administration 
8. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 56. 
9·. South African News, 8 June 1899. 
10. Ibid •. , 9 June 1899. 
11. South African News, 13 June 1899. Schreiner also misinterpreted 
this speech by which Milner in fact meant to bolster the confidence 
of his supporters.. Cf. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner 
Ministry, p. 43. 





and which spoke of 1Milner as "living in the midst of hatred and in-
trigue" at the Cape. More significant, however, was Milner's 'helot' 
dispatch in which he argued that "the case for intervention is over-
whelming" and in which he also accused the Cape Dutch of disloyalty 
on the evidence of such obscure newspapers as the Stellalander and 
the Rand Post. From the peace party's point of view,. the publication 
of this blue book, revealing as it did not only the High Commissioner's 
true sentiments but also the extent to which he personally influenced 
the formulation of Britain's policy, brought about a profound change 
in the situation. They now began to realise that the forces against 
which they were struggling in their efforts to maintain peace were far 
more formidable than they had anticipated. They also realised that 
the chances of war had been greatly increased as the aggressive tone 
of the blue book committed the British Government to a policy from 
which it would be difficult to retreat without loss of face. 
The Prime Minister was shown the dispatch when news of its publica-
tion first reached the Cape and the revelation of Milner's attitude 
caused profound disillusionment in Schreiner who realised that the High 
Commissioner had never truly taken him into his confidence and had 
placed little reliance upon his judgment. 13 . He made no secret of the 
disappointment, and r~lations between Milner· and the Cabinet, which had 
already been clouded by Milner's ·refusal to allow Schreiner to accompany 
him to Bloemfontein, now became increasingly strained. Schreiner's 
sense of duty and his loyalty did not allow.him anything but the mildest 
criticism of the High Commissioner, 14 but his colleagues did not share 
his reticence and both Sauer and Merriman complained bitterly of the 
15 difficult conditions under which the ministry had to operate. It. 
was mainiy due to Schreiner's influence and Milner's personal regard for 
him that the ministry was able to continue co-operating with the High 
16 Commissioner at ill. 
Apart from the disappointment and apprehension which the contents 
of the blue book'.caused the ministry, its publication at a time when 
13. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 48. 
14. Ibid.,p. 47. 
15. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 70; 
M.::, Sauer to P.A. Molteno, 4 Oct. 1899. 




the most delicate negotiations with the Transvaal were in train, 
came as a double blow. It was bound to further antagonise the Republic 
and cause a furore. in. the Colony at a time when the Cape leaders were 
doing ·their utmost to foster a spirit of reasonable compromise. The 
Cabinet, with Milner's consent, therefore decided to delay the publica-
tion of the dispatch in South Af_Fica until its inevitable arrival on 
the mailboat three weeks later, and Schreiner used his influence to 
17 prevent any discussion of it in the press. His task was facilitated 
by the fact that the Bond press was already .operating under self-imposed 
. . 
restraint, and it had been unofficially decided at its Congress in March 
that the handling of the crisis should 'be left to its leaders and that 
undue publicity should be avoid~d. 18 Despite this, reaction could not 
be stifled altogether. The ministerial organ at first expressed the hope 
that the cabled summaries had been deceptive and decided to reserve its 
judgment until the full text became available, but it did not strictly 
adhere to this resolve. On the other hand it refrained from commenting 
upon that part of the dispatch which dealt with the Transvaal and reserved 
its criticism for the aspersions which Milner had cast upon the ioyalty of 
the Dutch in the Colony. In an editorial headed ''Waiting", the South 
African News said: 
"It appears>to us to be a most painful and deplorable thing 
that the High Commissioner, who, on his own showing, has not 
had time to mix much with the Colonists, should take the 
grave step of hinting that they are not loyal to their alle-
giance •••• That Her Majesty's High Commissioner should 
think such thoughts •••• might easily become a calamitous 
fact". 19 
Two days later it returned to the charge: 
" • • • • it 1s a thousand pi ties that the full dispatch of Sir 
Alfred Milner, in which Cape Colonists are accused of dis-
affection, has not been made public. At present the attitude 
of the leaders of the majority of the Colonists is one of 
blank incredulity. They do not believe that such a charge 
has been made. If it has been made, it will. be idle to pre-
tend that the incident could be left where it is • • • • If 
Sir Alfred Milner has penned the words attributed to him he 
has in our humb'te judgment made an astounding departure from 
the principles of democratic statesmanship •••• " 20 
17. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 45. 
18. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 197. 
19. South African News, 15 June 1899. 
20. Ibid., 17 June 1899. 
- 31 -
On 20 June it gave ~further vent to its indignation in a lengthy 
. editorial attacking Chamberlain's dispatch of 10 May which it de-
scribed as "packed with inaccuracies and exaggerations". 
,.- •••• one would almost be justified in concluding that 
some person went to Johannesburg who had already made up 
his mind on the question, spent a few hours at the Rand 
Club and the Star office, finished up at the local habita-
tion of the L~e and then wrote a dispatch which Mr. 
Chamberlain signed. That British statesmanship should 
take its final stand upon such a document is inconceivable". 
Even Olive Schreiner was moved to admonish:. "The News •••• must re.:... 
strain itself! When the lives of thousands of human creatures are in 
21 the balance every word becomes of solemn· importance" • 
. The imperialists were, however, not hampered by any such scruples. 
They had heralded the failure of the Bloemfontein conference as an in-
dication that war was now inevitable and during June a spate of rumours 
that Britain was making active preparations for war with the Transvaal 
appeared in the imperialist press, causing such alarm that Schreiner 
was forced to seek a denial from Milner and the South African News gave 
prominent publicity to a statement from military headquarters contra-
dicting these canards. 22 It advised South Africa to keep cool in the 
face of "a campaign of callous mendacity" which was being skilfully 
engineered by publishing reports Jn South Africa of the mobilisation of 
troops and the choice of commanders and by bombarding the public in 
England with lies about 40 000 Cape Colonists ready to rush to the 
assistance of the Transvaal, and of Boers drilling and receiving ammu-
nition. 23 Feelings were further inflamed by a series of public meet-
ings held in towns throughout the Colony in support of Milner's demands. 
These "spontaneous expressions of public opinion".were organised by. the 
Demonstrations Committee of the South African League in Cape Town. 24 
The meeting which took place in the Good Hope Hall in Cape Town, a 
favourite venue for Lea~ue gatherings, on 28 June, set the tone for ali 
the others. On that occasion Dodd, secretary of the Transvaal branch 
21. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner ~o Betty Molteno, 23 June 1899.: 
22. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 23 June 1899; South African 
~' 22 June 1899. 
23. South African News, 26 June 1899. 










of the League annolfnC.ed: "The Paramount power having spoken, men must 
range themselves on one side or another. This is no time for mealy-
mouthed platitudes. He who is not with us is against us". T.L. Graham, 
a leading Cape Progressive, expressed the hope that there would be no 
withering away from the irreducible minimum of reform. If the British 
Government receded it would sound the death-knell of British paramountcy 
in South Africa. A wave of republicanism would sweep from the north 
and Pretoria would become the Mecca of the republican Afrikaner. 25 
Schreiner believed that these noisy imperi~lists hoped to provoke the 
. 1' . 26 d 1 h d peace party 1.nto reta 1.at1.ng, an a t ough they proteste that these 
meetings did not represent the true voice of the Colony, suggestions 
that counter-demonstrations should be held were quashed so as not to 
add further fuel to the flames. 27 Although Schreiner had requested 
Milner to use his influence with the imperialist press to prevent in-
flammatory writing, the High Commissioner h~d disingenuously disclaimed 
any influence in that quarter. The series of League meetings, which 
continued into July, took place with his approval and the resolutions 
passed were submitted to Chamberlain for inclusion in the next blue 
book. 28 . While the peace party was despairing of any results deriving 
from the negotiations with the Transvaal in an atmosphere of such hos-
tility and suspicion, Chamberlain delivered a further blow to their 
hopes with his provocative speech at Birmingham on 26 June. It was 
meant as another instalment in,the by now familiar process of educating 
29 public opinion and its significance was not lost on the Cape leaders. 
But their cup of woe was not yet full, for on 4 July the 'grievances' 
blue book arrived and on the following day its contents were blazoned 
out in the press for all the world to see, accompanied by comment 
from leading British newspapers. The ministerial press at once sprang 
to the defence of the Transvaal and the Cape Dutch, but for the present 
moderated its tone and refrained from a direct attack on Milner. The 
South Mrican News maintained .that it wished to avoid 'personal references 
25. South African News, 29 June 1899. 
26 •. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to John Ellis, 27 June 1899. 
27, South Mrican News, 28 June 1899; M.P., C. ·Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 
5 July 1899. 
28. Headlam, Milner Papers, v. i, p. 430; Marais, Kruger's Republic, 
p. 287. 
29. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 72-73; W.P.S.P,, 






in discussing the situation and referred in general terms to the 
slight practical experience of the Imperial staff in South Africa. 
Although it had no means of knowing what public notice would be taken 
of the· "momentous" dispatch, it thought that some action would almost 
certainly be taken during the coming parliamentary session, an augury 
which boded ill for the future •. ~0 
The Cape ministry's silence during this period of tumult and 
shouting caused considerable agitation amongst some of its less patient 
allies in England. Percy Molteno regularly reported on the state of 
opinion in England to his brothers at the Cape with the object of 
assisting the peace party in formulating its policy and his letters 
h H f d S h · 3 1 H' l'b 11 were s own to o meyr an c re~ner. ~s reports were ~ era y 
interspersed with advice from himself and the Liberal leaders with whom 
he co-operated. Immediately after the publication of the blue book he 
wrote to his brother Charles urging the advisability of tabling a p.eace 
resolution in the Cape parliament: 
" ••••• your parliament occupies a pos~t~on of great responsi-
bility and great advantage at the present juncture ••• , peti-
tions and public meetings and such expressions of opinion may 
be, and generally are, the result of interested action and as 
such are discounted here, but a resolution of the Cape Parlia-
ment is understood here, carries enormous weight and is re-
ceived as the expression of the opinion of the Colony". 32 
This theme was reiterated with increasing urgency in his letters but 
the length of time which they took to reach the Cape virtually rendered 
his advice ineffective. At the beginning of July, when the air was 
thick with rumours of war, Molteno, with the concurrence of Gampbell-
Bannerman, telegraphed to the Cape advising the absolute necessity of 
at once giving public notice of a peace resolution to be tabled when 
the Cape parliament met on 14 July and urging that this be cabled to 
30. South African News, 5 July 1899. A. Cartwright, who was the 
South African correspondent of the Daily Chronicle, wrote an 
article for that paper, defending the Dutch colonists, and 
this was later published as part of the S.A.C.C. pamphlet No. 2 
"Some Answers to Sir Alfred Milner's Reflections on the Loyalty 
of the Cape Dutch". . 
31. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 23 June 1899; C. Molteno to 
P.A. Molteno, 18 July 1899 and 23 Aug. 1899. 







His ~essage was shown to the cabinet by James Molteno, 
but although Schreiner at first seemed prepared to consider the step • 
he decided against it. after having consulted Hofmeyr. They feared 
that the move might provoke Milner into intervening to prevent such a 
motion being brought before the House. 34 The need for a public de-
claration by the ministry was, h?wever, becoming increasingly apparent. 
Its opponents were criticising it for not giving public opinion a lead 
and on 4 July Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons, in reply 
to a question from John Ellis, that he had received no representations 
from the Cape Government on the subject of the Transvaal. 35 The 
ministry's reticence in this regard was evidently due to their anxiety 
.that a firm presentation of their views might antagonise Milner and 
'the Colonial Secretary to the point where they would consider dismissing 
the ministry. Although a minute had been drafted in which the Cabinet . 
frankly expressed its opposition to British intervention in the Trans-
vaal, it had not been presented to Milner and Schreiner had contented 
himself with conveying the ministry's views verbally. There is no doubt, 
however, that Milner was fully conversant with the ministry's views 
and that h~ had communicated these to the Colonial Secretary. 36 After 
a protest from Schreiner, Chamberlain qualified his earlier statement 
by informing the House that he had in fact meant that he had received 
. . 
no formal representations from the Cape Government· and on 7 July Schreiner 
sent a communication to the South African News explaining that his govern-
ment had refrained from addressing a formal minute to the imperial Govern-
ment because it had been convinced that its·views were known in that 
quarter. He emphasized that the Cabinet's views had been fully and fre-
quently represented to the High Commissioner but declined at that stage 
to record t~em at any length or to discuss the role of the Cape Govern-
ment.in the recent negotiations. The concluding part of his message was, 
however, more positive. It stated that: 
" •••• while .anxious and continually active with good hope in 
the cause of securing reasonable modifications of the existing 
representative system of the South African Republic, this 
33. M.P. • Union Castle Mail Packets Co. Cape Town to Dona.ld Currie & Co. 
London, 5 July 1899. 
34. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 23 Aug. 1899; Van Heyningen, 
Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 53. 
35. South African Ne-ws, 6 July 1899. 







government is, convinced that no ground whatsoever exists 
for active interference in the internal concerns of that 
Republic". 37 
\ ' 
Schreiner's explanati'an did not, however, satisfy the peace party's 
allies in England. Complaints continued that the Liberals were placed 
in a difficult posit~on by the ministry's advice not being official. 
Informal representations were atl very well but they did not appear in 
' blue books and were of no use for public purposes. Percy Molteno re-
ported with some irritation that they had been forced to abandon most 
valuable questions in the House because of uncertainty as to the Cape 
38 Government's official posi don. / 
In view of the increasing difficulties of the situation, the news 
that Hofmeyr had finally induced the Transvaal Government to modify its 
franchise proposals so as to meet virtually all the demands made by 
Milner at Bloemfontein, came at a most opportune moment. The new pro-
posals were communicated to the press at once and they were published on 
8 July together with a statement that the ministry regarded the new 
measures as "adequate, satisfactory and such as should secure a peaceful 
settlement". In an editorial, indicative of' the relief felt by the peace 
party at the successful outcome of the negotiations and full of praise 
for Hofmeyr's efforts, the South African News hailed the scheme as usher-
ing in a new era for South Africa and as bringing peace with honour to 
all cpncerned. 39 
It was then decided that the time had come for the Bond to break its 
silence on the issue and on 12 July a meeting was held in Cape Town with 
Hofmeyr taking the chair. Resolutions were passed endorsing the ministry's 
Transvaal policy and calling for the maintenance of peace and the qrbi-
tration of disputes arising under the London Convention. Although the · 
self-imposed ban. upon, public demonstrations had been lifted the Bond was, 
however, determined to maintain its moderate stand and avoid the con-
tentious issue of a resolution condemning Milner's accusations of dis-
loyalty against the Dutch colonists which was ruled out of order by the 
chairman. 40 Once they had been given the green light by their leaders 
37. South African News, 8 July 1899. 
38. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 7 July 1899 and 14 July 1899. 
39. South African News, 8 July 1899. 










approximately 185 tpeetings were held by branches of the Bond throughout 
the Colony approving resolutions similar to those passed at Cape Town • 
. The South African News lent its support to the movement and expressed the 
.hope that English colonists no less than Dutch would without hesitation 
or reserve endorse the "moderate and statesmanlike" resolutions. 41 
Some of these peace resolutions were forwarded to the High Commissioner 
f . . h I ... 1 42 . or commun+cat~on to t e mper~a Government but they were rece~ved 
without enthusiasm and the peace meetings .did little to dispel the im-
pression created in Britain by the noisier demonstrations of the imperial" 
43 party. Friends in England therefore continued urging the advis-
ability of tabling a peace motion as soon as parliament met and this view 
was supported by the South African News. 44 But although the Transvaal's 
new proposals had served to ease the situation they had not provided a 
conclusive solution to the problem and the Cape Government was not pre-
pared to depart from its policy of restraint while the Cape leaders were 
still in close communication with the Transvaal. From that time onwards 
Milner excluded the ministry from direct participation in the negotia-
tions, but Hofmeyr in particular continued to do his utmost to avert a 
deadlock. 45 After the meeting of parliament Merriman and Sauer tried 
to persuade Schreiner to i.ntroduce a motion "which would open the eyes 
of the British public to the facts of the situation" but the prime minister 
refused to comply. In this he was supported by Hofmeyr and by the Chief 
Justice, Sir Henry de Villiers, who feared that such a move would. lead 
to the introduction of a counter-resolution in the Legislative Council 
where the South African Party did not have a majority. 46 On 18 July 
Schreiner repli~d to Sir Gordon Sprigg's question in the House as to the 
Government's intentions by reading the text of the peace motion adopted 
by the House on 26 April 1897. He also made it clear th~t he thought that 
no good purpose could be served by a heated debate at a time when "every 
lover of the Empire and South Africa should exercise stern control over 
theunnecessary expression of heated feelings". 47 Percy Molteno 
· 41. South African News,· 13 July 1899; M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 
25 Oct. 1899. 
42. Ons Land, 19 Oct. 1899. 
43. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 28 July 1899. 
44. South African News, 14 July 1899. 
45. Van Heyningen, Milner. and the Schreiner Ministry, pp. 66-67; 
Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, pp. 200-206. 
46. Walker, De Villiers, pp. 341-342. 














admitted that Schreiner's move had been a clever one, but continued 
to complain, in rath~r exaggerated terms, that lack of information as 
to the Cape ministry's attitude paralysed the Opposition in the House 
of Commons. 48 No doubt, he admitted, there were sound reasons for 
the Cape minis try's cautious behaviour and ·he implored his brother 
Charles to get Schreiner to give·him some hint as to what these were. 
There are fndications, however,· that Schreiner regarded the impatient 
Molteno as a dangerous ally and that he feared that he might make 
indiscreet use of confidential. information, for he appears to have left 
him unenlightened. 49 Molteno was not, however, the only one who found 
the ministry's attitude inexplicable. Frederick Mackarness also com-
plained to Merriman that although there were many Liberals who wished 
to··work with the Cape ministers, they were not always able "fully to 
understand their ways" and John Morl~y later expressed his regret that 
there.had been so little communication between the Cape Government and 
its Liberal allies. 50 
These reactions to a certain extent indicated a failure to fully 
appreciate· the difficulties of the situation in which the Cape Government 
found itself. Their approval of the Transvaal's franchise scheme P,laced 
them in public opposition to the High Commissioner and their relations . 
became increasingly strained. Their disagreement with Milner, .who occu...; 
pied the dual position of Govern~r and High Commissioner, created an 
ambiguous constitutional position, for as Governor of the Cape Colony 
he was obliged to heed the advice of his ministers but as High Commissioner 
he could overrule them in matters of Imperial concern. As the Cape 
Colony's interests would be vitally involved in the event of war its 
government could reasonably expect its views on the question to receive 
some consideration, but as Britain's relations with the Transvaal were, 
in strictly constitutional terms, a purely Imperial matter, it was a moot 
point whether the Cape ministry had the right to insist that its advice 
should be followed and the danger was always present that it might be 
dismissed if its views embarrassed the High Commissioner~ Its opponents 
48. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 2I July I899 and 28 July I899. 
49. Ibid., 3 Aug. 1899 and II Aug. I899. 


































did not hesitate to point to Sir William Butler as an example of the 
I 
fate which awaited those who opposed "the man at the wheel". Percy 
Molteno held extremelx radical views on the constitutional aspect of 
the qu~stion. He urged that "the constitutional course was to take the 
advice of the Cape Government and to qualify the advice even of the 
51 High Commissioner if necessary by such opinion of the Cape Government". 
Schreiner, powever, saw the situation in a very different light and as he 
was not opposed by Hofmeyr and the Bond his views prevailed and the 
ministry refrained from carrying its opposition to the point where it 
would provoke a constitutional crisis. Molteno therefore had to be 
satisfied wfth assurances from his sister· Caroline Murray, that: 
"We all appreciate so much all your efforts and only wish more 
could be done from this end to co-operate with you •••• but. 
they wish to do nothing that could be said to add to the diffi-
culties or prevent Chamberlain and Milner from having what they 
might call "fair play" for their policy •••• " 
Charles Molteno also felt that "some day we shall have to reckon wi~h 
M'l b h . . " 52 ~ ner, ut t e t~me ~.s not yet • • • • • 
When the British Government countered the Transvaal's offer of a 
modified franchise scheme with a request for a joint commission of enquiry, 
the Cape leaders advised the Republic to agree to it. They had from 
the outset regarded Milner's request that the proposals should be submitted 
to the Imperial authorities. for examination before they expressed an 
opinion on them, as reasonable. 53 On 11 August a meeting of Afrikaner 
parliamentarians was held to endorse a petitition to President Kruger 
which had been drafted by Hofmeyr. While sympathising with the Transvaal 
in its troubles they urged the expediency of its doing its utmost, short 
of sacrificing its independence, to avert the horrors of war. 
"While agreeing that the Commission of Enquiry proposed by Mr. 
Chamberlain cannot be asked for as a matter of right, we be-
lieve that such a commission might prove a way out of the 
51. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 7 July 1899; Percy Molteno wrote 
a letter to the Times (10 July 1899) in which he defended the right 
of the Cape and Natal governments to have their views consulted. 
It was·sent to the Prime Ministers of all the self-governing colonies 
and was later published as a S.A.C.C. pamphlet No. 1 "A Plain State-
ment of the Facts by Percy A. Molteno.-" •. 
52. M.P., Caroline Murray to P.A. Molteno, 12 Sept. 1899; C. Molteno 
to P.A. Molteno~. )2 Sept. ·1899. 







existing diff~culties, which are fast approaching a cr1s1s, 
with results which might prove fatal to the best interests 
not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren, but also 
to the Afrikaner. party in the Cape Colony • • • • We beg 
that Your Honour will lay these words which are only dic-
·tated by a keen sense of our common interests and risks 
privately before you·r Executive and Volksraad". 
This appeal was signed by fifty-.three parliamentarians and was dispatched 
K .. Ab . 54 2 I • to ruger v1a raham F1scher. On 0 September Kruger· s reply, 1n 
which he pointed out that his Government had accepted the joint enquiry, 
·was communicated to the caucus.of the South African Party. The meeting 
passed a resolution expressing its satisfaction at the Transvaal's action 
and the hope that it would "render the· outbreak of active hostilities 
practically impossible". The hollowness of these hopes was reflected, 
however, in the proposal of a further resolution that subscription lists 
in aid of Transvaal widows and orphans be opened throughout the Colony. 
Discussion of the. ·matter was. postponed in the hope that war might still 
be averted, but Hofmeyr had in fact abandoned his attempts to influence 
the Transvaal two days before and Charles Molteno reported to his brother, 
·on the day of the meeting, that the situation was as bad as it could 
possibly be and that it seemed almost hopeless to look for a peaceful 
solution. 55 The proceedings of the meeting, together wi~h the text of 
the appeal to Kruger, were communicated to the press and the South African 
News hailed it as conclusive proof of the Afrikaner party's loyalty to 
Britain. 56 Milner, however, regarded the terms in which it was couched 
as evidence that: "The Afrikaner alliance is thus solid and defiant in 
. . . . . '' 57 1ts oppos1t1on to our pol1cy • 
Amidst preparations for war on both sides last minute appeals for 
peace were made by the ministry and its parliamentary supporters. On 21 
September the Cabinet petitioned the British Government to approach the 
Transvaal in a spirit of magnanimous compromise, but Milner's brief reply 
indicated that Britain 1 s patience had been exhausted and Chamberlain was 
' 54. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 202; J.H. Hofmeyr and F.K. Reitz, 
Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, p. 549. 
55. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 206; M.P-., C. Molteno to P.A. 
Molteno,, 20 Sept. 1899. 
56. Ons Land, 21 Sept. 1899; South African News, 21 Sept. 1899. 





equally unyielding. 58 At the suggestion of Rose Innes and Hofmeyr ,-
Schreiner then drafted a peace resolution in the hope of. securing a 
unan1mous vote in the. Hous'e of Assembly, but they failed to agree upon 
. 59 
the wording and the attempt was abandoned. The caucus of. the South 
African Party then appointed Dr. J.H.M. Beck, Charles Searle and James 
Molteno to draw up a petition tq the Queen which was signed by fifty-
eight parliamentarians. ·It was presented to Milner by James Molteno 
on 29 September but constituted little more than a last desperate ges-
ture as the petitioners realised that their appeal had come too late 
to have any appreciable effect. 60 A counter petition supporting 
.Imperial policy was circulated amongst the Progressives and the fact 
.that it received fifty-three signatures indicates how evenly the parties 
were divided. 
Although the Cape Government made the major contribution to the 
peace campaign its suppbrters outside parliament did not remain alto-
gether inactive. While Schreiner was working for peace in the realm of 
politics his sister Olive made her contribution in another sphere. In 
this eloqUent denunciator of Rhodes the Boer cause found one of its most 
ardent champions. Her literary reputation alone was bound to secure her 
a hearing, and although her political judgment was often too impetuous 
and intuitive to be sound, she was associated with prominent men like 
Smuts and Reitz 1n the Transvaal· and with virtually all the leaders of 
the peace party at .the Cape and could therefore reasonably be expected 
to be well informed, so that her opinion was often more highly valued 
than it warranted. She was known in literary circles in England through 
her writings and during the early months of the war Montagu White~ the 
Transvaal's consul-general. in London, wrote from New York that he had 
been astonished to find how much influence she had in America "especially 
amongst cultivated Americans". He urged that she and her husband should 
come to the United States to address public meetings in support o£ the 
61 
republican cause. On the eve of the war the New York Journal asked 
62 her to act as its war correspondent and offered her a handsome fee • 
.. ::~. 
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The chronic asthma 'from which she suffered necessitated her living in 
a dry climate at a high altitude which removed her from Cape Town and 
therefore the centre of activity for most of the war, but it did not 
prevent her from making a spirited contribution to the conciliation 
movement • 
In November 1898 she and her husband had settled in Johannesburg 
where she therefore had the opportunity of s'tudying the situation at 
first hand. She formed a very low opinion of the average uitlander and 
contact with the leaders of the South African League convinced her that 
no concessions of Kruger's would satisfy "Rhodes and his crew". 63 
The increasing deterioration of relations between Britain and the Trans-
vaal disturbed her so deeply that, with a fine sense of the dramatic, 
she launched an impassioned plea for peace on the eve of the Bloemfontein 
conference. It appeared in the Standard and Diggers News in the shape 
of an article entitled "Words in. Season- An English South African's view 
of the Situation". The value of her appeal lay in its passionate sincerity 
rather than in its rational argument and from the latter point of view 
it had many weaknesses. Edmund Garrett, in the course of an article repu-
diating it;: objected with some justification to her "question-begging 
rhetoric" and maintained that her appeal "supports the logic of a school-
girl with the statistics of a romanticist and wraps them both in the lambent 
64. fire of a Hebrew prophetess". From the conciliation party's point of 
view: her appeal was particularly significant for the manner in which she 
interpreted the r,:,ole of the English South African: 
"We English South Africans of today who are truly South African, 
loving the land of our birth and men inhabiting it, yet bound .by 
intense and loving ties, not only of intellectual affinity but 
of personal passion to the homeland from which our parents come, 
and where the richest formative years of our lives were passed, 
we stand today midway between these two great sections of South 
African folk, the old who have been here long and the new who 
have only come; between the homeland of our fathers and the 
love-land of our birth and it would seem as though, through no 
advantage of wisdom or intellectual knowledge on our part, but 
simply as a result of the accident of our position and of our 
. double affections, that we are fitted to fulfil a certain function 
63. W.P.S.P., (U.C.T.), 0. Sch,reiner to W.P. Schreiner, 24 Sept. 1899. 
64. E. Garrett, "The Inevitable in South Africa", Contemporary Review, 
Oct. 1899. 
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at the present, day, to stand as it were as mediators and inter-
preters between those our opinion compels us to sympathise with 
and to understand them as they may perhaps not be able to 
understand each other. 
Especially at the present moment has arrived a time that 
it is essential that however small we may feel in our inherent 
·fitness for the task we should not shrink nor rema~n silent and 
inactive, but exert by word and action that peculiar function 
with w~ich our position invests us". 
She concluded her appeal with a warning to Britain that it could only 
lose by war and with a pointed reference to Milner, "this new Englishman 
of ours", whom she hoped would save an Empire for England and heal the 
wounds of South Africa. "Are we asking too much when we turn our eyes 
in hope to him?". She had originally, on he-aring of the proposed con-
ference between Kruger and Milner, intended going to Bloemfontein in 
the hope of securing an interview with the High Commissioner, but she 
eventually contented herself with working feverishly to complete her 
article in time to send Milner a rough printer's proof to meet him at 
Beaufort West so that he might read it before the conference. 65 What 
Milner would have thought of a personal confrontat1on at that stage with 
this "most.interesting of South African humans"66 can only be surmised. 
Her gesture, however, received a predictably polite reply, "a very nice 
' 67 letter not mentioning politics but very cordial personally". 
The article ·was taken over by the South African News which publish-
ed it in three instalments.and later issued it as a pamphlet. 68 Ons 
Land devoted a leader to it and the editor, F.S. Malan, wrote to Olive 
Schreiner expressing his appreciation, as did James Butler, editor of 
the Midland News, .whom she had always regarded as more or less a Rhodes 
man. The Cape Times. also published extracts from it as "anything Olive 
Schreiner writes is always exceedingly worth reading" even though it 
thought she displayed a "sublime blindness" to the facts of the case. 69 
In the Transvaal it- was translated into Dutch by the State Secretary, 
65. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to W.P. Schreiner, 17 May 1899 and 30 May 1899; 
0. Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 31 May 1899. 
66. Milner's comment on Olive Schreiner, see Headlam, Milner I>apers, 
v. i' p. 336. 
- -
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68. South African News, 1-3 June 1899. 
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F.W. Reitz, in order to circulate it amongst the burghers and a. 
translation by Edward Boucher, the French consul in the Transvaal, was 
sent to Paris. 70 /tt was also ci.rculated by publishers in America and. 
. ' 71 England where Percy Molteno lent it his energetic support. 
Olive Schreiner followed up. her "Words in Season" with an article 
on the situation which.she sent to the Sun appealing to the American 
people to strengthen the hands of those in England and South Africa who 
were struggling for peace by expressing their sympathy. On the advice 
of J.A. Hobson she also cabled to the Manchester Guardi~n urging that 
public meetings be held throughout England in support of John Morley's 
Arbroath speech in which he had urged Britain to follow a policy ~f 
fusion instead .of supremacy. On the outbreak of the war she again ap-
pealed to the Americans through the New York Journal, but by then she 
admitted that it was like administering medicine to a. dying child. 72 
In July Mrs. Koopmans de Wet, friend and mentor of the editor of 
Ons Land, sent a copy of Olive Schreiner's pamphlet to England with the· 
· .request that it be presented to Queen Victoria. This gesture was 
.prompted by the widely prevalent belief that the Queen was oppose4 to 
the war and revealed the faith that many had in'her as the personal 
champion of peace. When Mrs. Koopmans de Wet's appeal got no further 
than the Queen's private secretary, who informed her on 28 July that 
publications of a politically controversial.nature had to be submitted 
through her responsib.le ministers, she took the lead in composing a · 
petition to .the Queen to be. signed by the women of the Colony. 73 
The .idea had already been mooted in the columns of the South African 
News at the end of June when the energetic circulation of a petition 
supporting the resolutions passed at the Good Hope Hali meeting of 28 
June was causing the peace party .considerable annoyance. The South 
African News had pointed out that "some means will have to be taken to 
remove the semblance of unanimity concerning which the Rhode$ite wire-
70, O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 13 July 1899; Lewsen, 
Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 90. 
71. o.s.P., .Q, ·Schreiner .to Betty Moltenq, c. July. 1899 and 4 Nov • 
. 1899; M.P., P.A. Molteno to Betty Molteno, 4 July 1899. 
72. W.P.S.P,, (U.C.-T.), o. Schreiner to W.P. Schreiner, 14 Sept. 189.9; 
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justified the horrors of war, signed by the moderator, J.H. Hofmeyr 
and three senior officials of the Church, was presented to Milner for 
transmission to the Queen. 78 Individual congregations also petitioned 
. 79 for peace and 20 August was consecrated a day of prayer for peace. 
·of all the appeals which emanated from the clergy of the Dutch Reformed 
Church that of its senior and most distinguished representative, Andrew 
Murray, received the most attention •. On 5 October he appealed to the 
people of England on behalf of 100 000 members of his church to pause 
and reconsider, and on the first day of the war the South African News 
published another eloquent appeal from him in the place of its usual 
editorial. 80 It was followed up by three articles on various aspects 
of the dispute which formed part of a series, but in the face of the 
outbreak of hostilities their publication was abandoned. 81 A few days 
after the war had commenced the Chief Justice appealed to Andrew Murray 
to lead a deputation to England to remonstrate with the ~ritish people 
but he regarded it as a hopeless errand and advised that they concen-
82 trate their energies upon keeping their own people from open rebellion. 
Support for the peace party was not confined entirely to the Dutch . 
Reformed Church. Although most of the prominent Anglican clergy approved 
of .the Imperial Government's policy, the peace party did receive some 
support from the ranks of the Nonconformists. Of these the Unitarian 
minister and author Ramsden Balmforth was the most prominent. Having 
arrived at the Cape at the sam~ time as Milner he had since then become 
convinced that the High Conn:nissioner was not the man to solve South . 
Africa's problems and he did not hesitate to express his views from the 
83 pulpit and in the press. Even more energetic and outspoken support 
for the peace party came from Dr. F.C. Kolbe. In July he defined his 
position in an extremely frank article in the South African Catholic· 
78. South African News, 10 Aug. 1899. 
79. Ibid., 12 Aug. 1899; 12, 18 and 26 Sept. 1899; 10 Oct. 1899. 
80. South African News, 12 Oct. 1899. 
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Magazine of which &e was the editor. Describing himself as a Progres-. 
sive in Cape politics and a Liberal in British politics, he accused 
Britain of having stolen the diamond fields from the Free State and of 
now having the same designs upon the Transvaal gold fields. He even 
went so far as to express the hope that Imperial arms would not be 
successful if so unjust a war we~e ever entered upon. After the out-
break of. tlie war he described the attack upon the Transvaal as "the 
84 greatest national crime of the century". His outspoken views ·led 
to his resignation as editor of the.South African.Catholic Magazine in 
April 1900 and it was only after ·it had been decided that the discus-. 
sion of political issues - except where ·they directly involved the 
interests of the Church- would .be avoided,. that.he resumed that posi-
·tion in January 1901. 85 
The attitude of the South African News towards the Anglican Arch-
bishop, W.W. Jones, marked. a signal departure from the peace party.'s 
policy of avoiding unnecessarily provocative actions. Throughout the 
months of crisis:the Archbishop had avoided committing himself beyond 
instructing that .a. prayer "for the removal of all hindrances to the 
peace of our .land"·be inserted in the service of the Church. In this 
he was apparently.motivated by the desire to avoid giving extremists 
. within the Church the opportunity to preach political sermons which 
would further inflame public opi~ion. He was, however, repeatedly· 
criticised for not giving the Church a more definite lead and was even-
tually provoked into breaking silence by the editor of the South African . 
News who sent him a copy of that paper in which Andrew Murray's appeal 
for peace had been pointedly marked. In his reply the Archbishop ex-
pressed his abhorrence of war and the hope that it might still be averted. 
at the eleventh hour, but left little room for doubt as to where his 
86 sympathies lay. This inevitably led to further correspondence, in 
the course of which the Archbishop, in referring 'to the exodus of 
refugees from ·the Rand, expressed his astonishment that the paper had 
not seen fit to express. its disapproval of: 
84. South African News, 27 Feb. 1900. 
85. South African News, 13 April 1900; ·s·outhern Cross, 29 Dec. 1954. 








influence to preve~t the opposition holding any public meetings. 
Thus, for a brief period, a "truce of God" prevailed between the two 
sides. 90 During the months which followed' most Bond parliamentarians 
energetically exerted their influence to restrain their constituents 
and Schreiner in particular, made a titanic effort. His correspondence 
during this period bears witness. to the innumerable appeals which he 
sent to all and sundry encouraging, admonishing and advising against 
"passionate utterances which might breed lamentable consequences". 
The situation was indeed such as to arouse the liveliest apprehension 
91 
amongst the Cape leaders. For some time past they had feared that 
they might lose control over their followers and the invasion of the 
Colony by the Free State forces in November dashed their hopes of ~re­
venting a rebellion. Wherever they appeared the connnandos were enthu-
siastically welcomed by their colonial sympathisers and by the end of 
the first invasion of the Colony they had been joined or otherwise 
' ' 92 
assisted by 10 000 rebel Afrikaners. Prior to the war Schreiner 
had appealed to President Steyn not to invade the Colony and he had been 
convinced that this would not be done. The Free State's action bitterly 
disappoint~d the ministry who felt that the Republic gained little from 
such a move which merely placed a cruel strain upon the loyalty of the 
' 93 Cape Afrikaners. Schreiner roundly condemned the invasion and re-
ported annexation of Colonial territory and Merriman complained bitter-
ly: "The Free State is bent on ruining this Colony and all South 
Africa. We deserve better treatment". 94 The Cape leaders did their 
utmost to dispel any illusions which might have been created by the 
'annexation' of some districts of the Colony by the Republicans and 
strove with might and ma~n to convince their followers of the folly of 
rebellion. This telegram from Merriman to G. Hugo, himself a potential 
rebel, speaks for many: 
"The suicidal proclamation by the Republics of Colonial terri-
tory makes us very anxious knowing the strain of your people'. 
I do most earnestly beg you to use all influence to keep things 
90. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, pp. 210, 213; Cd. 261, p. 183. 
91. M.P., C. Molteno to Betty Molteno, 3 Aug. 1899. 
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quiet. Anything like /-a T rising would mean ruin to all con-
cerned and destroy all-chance of our acting hereafter as peace-
makers. The truest patriotism is toremain tranquil". 95 
The ministry also used its influence to prevent military arrangeme~ts 
being made which would unnecessarily irritate a section of the colonists. 
Schreiner had obtained a qualified assurance from Milner that colonial 
troops would be used only for defensive purposes and the colonists were 
assured that they would not be commandeered to fight against their 
96 
republican kin. The ministry .also tried to restrict the proclama-
tion of martial law and on 23 November a proclamation was issued to 
counteract rumours that th~ Colony was to be deprived of· its constitu-
tion. 97 The fear that the natives would be armed caused particular 
alarm and Schreiner was in favour of making a public statement on the 
issue, but disagreement within the cabinet prevented this and he had 
h . lf . . . . . d. . d 1 9 8 to content ~mse w~th ~ssu~ng pr~vate assurances to ~n ~v~ ua s. 
The fear was particularly prevalent in Merriman's constituency of Wade-
house which adjoined the native territories and was used as a pretext 
by some disaffected persons who were in collusion with the Republicans 
to obtain arms. Sauer w~s dispatched to Dordrecht to try and salvage 
the situation, but his mission ended in disaster when the Free State 
commando entered the town on the invitation of some of the inhabitants 
. s d . h' . 99 w~th whom auer ha been co-operat~ng to prevent t ~s occurr~ng. 
The incident placed him in a compromising position and was eagerly 
seized l)pon by the oppos.ition press to cast suspicion upon Sauer's 
integrity. The Cape Argus even went to the length of suggesting that 
"by the side of Mr. Sauer's.sort of loyalty open.treason itself is 
100 
respectable". The ministerial press spoke up in Sauer's defence 
and the verbal exchanges which ensued merely added to the heated feel-
ings on both sides. The affair also led to an exasperating exchange 
between Milner and Sauer. A meeting of Aliwal North refugees took. 
place at Queenstown on 25 November and a resolution casting suspicion 
95. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 10Z. 
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on Sauer's motives1 for visiting Dordrecht was forwarded to Milner after 
which it duly appeared in a blue book 101 without Sauer h~ving been con-
sulted. When he protested, Hilner replied that he had notmenti~ned 
the resolution in his dispatch, which had in fact commended Sauer for 
102 his efforts to prevent the rebellion from spreading. But the. in-
sinuation had been there and the. harm had been done. 
While the Dordrecht affair.was agitating the public mind another 
incident occurred to add to the state of ferment in the Colony. On 21 
November the South African News published a report of a conversation 
·between James Molteno and Sir Alfred Hilner in which the latter had 
allegedly said that he was "determined to break the dominion of 
Afrikanderdom". The. conversation had taken place on 4 October when 
Molteno, as the representative of the South African Party caucus, had 
called upon Milner to enquire whether any communication had been re-
ceived from the Imperial Government in reply ·to the party's peace peti-
tion. James Hol.teno had sent a summary of the conversation to his brother 
in London .and Percy Molteno, after seeking the advice of the eminent 
jurist Sir Edward Clarke, had on his own initiative communicated i·t to 
the press. It was published by the Horning Leader and the Daily Chronicle 
on 3 November and was reprinted in the South African News after the 
103 
arrival of the mail at the Cape. Milner's private secretary imme-
diately informed that paper that· "the report is so imperfect and in-
accurate· as to be absolutely misleading. Not only are expressions attri-
buted to His Excellency which he never used, but the whole tenor of his 
observations is entirely distorted" and in replying to a query from 
Chamberlain Milner denied having used the phrase." 104 Both in England 
and at the Cape the report caused considerable excitement and a heated 
controversy ensued with the imperialist press showering abuse on James 
Holteno which in turn caused his associa·tes to leap to his defence. On 
the strength of a letter from L.S. Amery, their war correspondent in 
South Africa, which ·falsely described Holteno as being a prime contributor 
1 0 1 • Cd. 43 , p. 220. 
102. James, The Rebellion ~n Barkly East and Dordrecht, pp. 69-70. 
Cd. 261, pp. 47-48. 
103. M.P., P.A. Holteno to Capt. J. Sinclair, 3 Nov~- 1899. 
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to the columns of Ons Land, ·"the most mischievous of Afrikaner journals", 
the Times attacked him in a .fierce leader accusing him, inter alia, of 
a breach of etiquette,in publishing a confidential conversation. 105 
In England the more outspoken Liberals v1ho had expected the Cape parlia-
ment to censure Milner after the publication of the 'helot' dispatch 
and ,who had been advocating his recall, regarded this. "bombshell" as a 
106 great coup. Campbell-Bannerman, however, while assuring Percy 
Molteno that he did not dotibt the veracity of his brother's word, found 
his hands tied by the strong support which Milner received from the 
"Oxford group". Asquith had warned him bluntly: "To countenance an 
107 
attack upon Milner would 'be to split the party at once into fragments". 
In his speech at Manchester on 15 November the Liberal leader therefore 
found it prudent to refer to the objectionable phrase as almost certainly 
a mistake in the report. As a palliative he added: "If we are to coin 
barbarous words, I would say that if South Africa ~s to be saved to the 
Empire it will be saved 'by Afrikanerdom and .never by Downingstreetery", 
f . h b k d b A . h lOS I S h Af . h a remark or wh~c he.was re u e y squ~t • n out r~ca t e 
Cape Times took up the cudgels on behalf of the High Commissioner, but 
Molteno stuck to his guns despite its "extraordinarily malevolent" 
. . . 1 109 "O f leader and adhered to h~s memorandum ~n every part~cu ar. ne o 
the 57" wrote to the South African News verifying that the published 
version was consistent with the report which Molte.no had given to the 
party caucus on 5 October, when the members "to a man sat thunders truck" 
by what they heard •. Although Milner's alleged remark therefore did not 
come as a complete surprise at the Cape, its publication further estranged 
the Dutch whom Milner, in Sauer's words, "made to feel that because of 
. . . b b d . h f ld f h u . . J k" ll 0 the~r nat~onal~ty they cannot e em race ~n t e o s o t e n~on ac . 
105. The Times, 19 Jan. 1900; H.P.C., J. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 
7 Feb. 1900; P.A. Molteno to Betty Molteno, 19 Jan. 1900. 
106. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 115; 
M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 22 Nov. 1899. 
107. M.P., Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman to P.A. Holteno, 18 Nov. 1899; 
J. Sinclai~ to P.A. Molteno, 29 Nov. 1899; Gollin, Proconsul 
~n Politics, p. 60. 
108. Le Hay, British Supremacy, p. 39. 
109. Cape Times, 22 Nov. 1899; South African News, 23 Nov. 1899; 
The text of the interview with Hilner's denial of its accuracy 
and Molteno's reassertion of its truth was published as a S.A.C.C. 
pamphlet No. 6; "Sir Alfred Hilner on the Real Object of the War". 
110. M.P., Sauer to P.A. Holteno, 4 Oct. 1899. 
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The conciliation party, whose resentment against Milner had been stead.:.. 
i ly grm..ring since the phock of the 'helot' dispatch, now became increas-
ingly outspoken in their criticism of the High Commissioner. Although 
the official policy of restraint had caused the press to moderate its 
tone, there had already in the past been indications that it found it 
difficult to adhere to its resolve. On 21 August the arrival of the blue 
book containing Milner's dispatch on the Bloemfontein conference and the 
correspondence between the South African League and Imperial officials, 
had provoked a violent leader in the South African News in which the 
desirability of Milner's recall had been openly hinted at• .The editorial 
claimed that: 
"The connection bet~..reen the Colonial Office and the South African 
League constitutes a scandal in its partisanship and its scarcely-. 
·concealed encouragement to that organisation to persevere in its 
endeavours to bring about a war of races in this land". 
Its assertion that the blue book "reeked" with prejudice and contained 
a dozen references from both Milner and Greene which "almost suggest the 
inferior mi~ds of a couple of Rhodesite leader ~..rriters", left little 
doubt as to its attitude towards the High C~mmissioner and its senti-
ments were echoed by most of the peace party, Charles Molteno describing 
Milner's policy as "nothing less than villainous", and Merriman referring 
to the "cynical immorality" of his collusion with the imperialist press. Ill 
Demands for Milner's recall began to be heard and the issue of the South 
African News in which Molteno's memorandum appeared also contained a re-
port from the paper's London correspondent stating: 
"It is at last safe to say that the gradually growing conviction 
that there can be no chance of peace until Sir Alfred Milner 
has been recalled from the Cape will be enormously strengthened 
by the insight into his mind afforded by this conversation with 
Mr. Molteno ••••• " 
Although what Milner termed the "truce of God" continued to prevail for 
some months yet, it became increasingly apparent that this was a most 
precarious state of affairs. 
Ill. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, II Oct. 1899; 
Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 223-. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PROTEST AGAINST ANNEXATION 
While there had still been a chance of averting war the concilia-
tion party had adopted· the course favoured by their political leaders 
and had refrained from any concerted action. When, however, theyfound 
themselves completely outclassed by their opponents many began to pause 
and reconsider. The outbreak of hostilities cleared away the tangle 
of negotiations and false hopes which had to a certain extent obscured 
the issue and the conciliation party saw with greater clarity how well 
organised the war party had been. They were also not lacking in candid 
friends who, while admitting that it was easy to be wise after the event, 
reproached them for not having realised from the outset what a powerful 
combination they had to contend with. Although the disturbed state of 
the Colony and the presence of enemy forces within its borders at first 
tied their hands, increasing demands began to be heard that the concilia-
tion party too, should organise itself into a more effective force. In 
this they had before them the example of the allies in England where 
several organisations were established to oppose the war, the most signi-
ficant being the South Africa Conciliation Committee (subsequently denoted 
by the abbreviation S.A.C.C.) with Leonard Courtney as president, F.C. 
Selous as vice-president and Frederick Mackarness as chairman. The ob-
jectives of the S.A.C.C. were to watch South African affairs with a view 
to. issuing accurate information so as to enable the public to form a just 
estimate of the political situation in that country and to advocate the 
paramount importance of a policy aimed at re-establishing goodwill bet~.;reen 
the British and Dutch races in South Africa by recognising the just claims 
of both in a settlement of the conflict at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Percy Molteno had been a prime mover in the establishment of the Committee 
which became public on 15 January 1900 and his brothers at the Cape had 
been kept abreast of developments from the inception of the idea. Molteno 
was throughout the war an extremely active member.of the S.A.C.C. and the 
first month of its existence in particular was a time of almost frenzied 
activity on his part. During this period he showered upon his associates 
1. South African News, 8 Feb. 1900. 
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at the Cape a veritable torrent of advice in order to galvanize them 
int.o action, providing them with the minutest instructions as to what 
he thought they should do. There 'tvere two points in particular which 
he continually stressed. He in'sisted that Milner was riding rough-shod 
over the Cape Colony's constitutional rig~ts and urged the conciliators 
.to take action to defend their li~erties; and secondly, he insisted 
that something had to be done to dispel the profound ignorance which 
prevailed in England as to the true state of affairs in South Africa. 
Prior to the war Molteno had already been severely critical of what he 
regarded as the Schreiner ministry's too complaisant attitude and after 
the outbreak of hostilities he continued pursuing the subject with 
unabated vigour. He maintained that in 1889, when the High Commissioner's 
salary had been increased and the Cape parliament had undertaken to pay 
two thirds of it, an understanding had been entered into according to 
which the High Commissioner agreed that, in the conduct of negotiations 
with the two Republics, he would consult the Cape ministry. Furthermore, 
the Cape was being used as a base for military operations against the 
Republics and Milner therefore had no right to ignore its government. 
In doing so he was usurping power to which he was not constitutionally 
or historically entitled. "Milner's action is that of the Crown and 
Strafford at the time of the Stuarts and must be stopped or your liber-· 
2 ties are worth nothing". Molteno wrote a series of five letters on 
the subject to the Westminster Gazette and the Manchester Guardian and 
these were later published by the S.A.c.c. as a pamphlet entitled "The 
Action of Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner from a Constitutional 
Point of View". Molteno was most insistent that the points he raised . 
should be brought to the. attention of every member of the Cape House of 
Assembly and that a firm stand should be made in defence of their liber- · 
ties when their parliament met.- 3 He also urged Albert Cartwright to 
take the matter up in the South African News and personally wrote to the 
paper under the noms de plume "Constitutionalist" and "Contributor", 
with the result that further criticism of the government's 'inertness' 
4 before the war began to appear in that paper. Equally urgent was the 
2. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 2 Feb. 1900; P.A. Molteno to the 
editor of the Westminster Gazette, 7 Feb. 1900; P.A. Molteno to 
A. Cartwright, 10 Feb. 1900. 
3. Ibid., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 15 Feb. 1900. 
4. M.P., P.A. Molteno to A. Cartwright, 2 Feb. 1900; South African News, 
2 Feb. 1900, 28 Feb. 1900. 
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need to provide the British public with accurate information about South 
Africa. This problem had become more acute after H.H. Massingham's 
resignation as editor of the Daily Chronicle in November 1899 when that 
paper changed hands. It became increasingly difficult for the anti-war 
party to get a hearing in any of the major London newspapers. Frederick 
.Harrison cot1plained that there was. virtually a "reign of press terror" 
and Percy Molteno also pointed with increasing exasperation to the 
5 dwindling support of the press. The s.A.c.c. was making a concerted 
effort to remedy the problem by publishing a large number of pamphlets 
on matters relating to the war and Percy Molteno suggested that a committee 
be farmed at the Cape to supply them 'tvi th accurate information and to 
a~sist in distributing their literature • 
. "It is no use being co'tved down by the deplorable circumstances 
in which you are placed - only by solid, exact, carefui and 6 
continuous work are any successful results to be obtained". 
He was particularly anxious to counteract the ·theory that a great Afrikaner 
conspiracy consisted to.oust Britain from South Africa, which became 
increasingly prevalent once the British army had suffered a series of 
reverses during the first months of the war and which soon replaced the 
7 franchise issue as a justification for the war. In answer to his 
appeals Dr. J.H.M. Beck, M.L.A. for Worcester, wrote a tract refuting the 
charge which was published by the s .. A.c.c. as one ot' its first pamphiets 
under the title "The Pan-Africander Conspiracy - A Refutation by an Afri-
cander Member of the Cape Parliament". 8 
While Percy Molteno was urging the conciliation party at the Cape to 
"work like the devil" his exhortations were enforced locally byErnest 
Temple Hargrove who played a prominent role in the conciliation movement 
during the first half of the year, but whose assistance ultimately proved 
.to be rather a mixed blessing to his associates. Hargrove was a member 
of a well placed English family and although his parents did not share 
5. M.P., F. Harrison to P.A. Molteno, 28 Nov. 1899; P.A. Molteno to 
C. Molteno, 8 Dec. 1899. 
6. M.P., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 2 Feb. 1900, 15 Feb. 1900. 
7. LeMay, British SuEremac~, pp. 31 34. 
8. M.P., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 14 Dec. 1899; J.H.M. Beck 
to P.A. Molteno, 29 Jan. 1900. 
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his pro-Boer sentime.nts his sister also actively supported the Repu-
blican cause. 9 He had been educated at Harrow, was a former member 
of the Middle Temple and an author of some note, including a work on 
world politics. Being a gentleman of means and leisure he and his , 
American wife were travelling in South Africa when the war broke out. 10 
In November 1899 he accompanied S~uer on his mission to Dordrecht and 
was an 11unofficial 11 member of the deputation sent to request Commandant 
01 . . . d h. 11 . . . . lVler not to lnva e t e town. He malntalned that hls observatlon 
of the situation in South Africa convinced him that the war was unjust 
and unnecessary and in a letter to the South African News of 19 December 
he urged the people of the Colony to exert themselves to stop it by 
telling the people of Britain the simple truth. They should not waste 
time appealing to the political leaders but should speak boldly and 
clearly to the man with the vote and strike hard home with facts. An 
editorial commenting upon this letter pointed out that nothing could 
be done while there were enemy troops on British territory, but expressed 
the hope that once the Republicans had been driven out of the Colony, 
member's of the South African Party would come together on platforms 
throughout the Colony to u~ge Britain to declare her intentions towards 
the Republics. 12 All the talk of an Afrikaner conspiracy prompted 
Hargrove to take the unorthodox step of travelling to Pretoria via 
Delagoa Bay with the object of securing from the Republican leaders 
themselves a statement as to their exact aspirations. Although he 
spoke no Dutch and had no. introductions, he c~aimed that he experienced 
no difficulty in getting about and between 17 January and 15 February 
had had the opportunity of coming into intimate contact with Presidents 
Kruger and Steyn as well as Fischer, Smuts, Reitz and others. The 
Presidents and their executives assured him that they were merely 
fighting for their freedom and that they had no territorial ambitions. 
Hargrove in fact suggested that President Kruger should appeal to Queen 
Victoria, and although the President had declined to do so, he favoured 
Hargrove with a lengthy explanation, couched in strongly religious terms, 
of the Republic's objectives and the conditions upon which it would be 
9. J .X.M.P., Agnes Merriman to Sarah Merrintan, 15 June 1900~ 
10. South African News, 12 March 1900, 19 March 1900. 
11. Cd. 43, pp. 222 ~ 223; South African News, 29 Nov. 1899. 




prepared to make peace. Kruger pointed out that all the Republics 
~,ranted ~vas to be left alone and that the Transvaal was pre_pared to abide 
by the London Convention. The war, he said, could only be ended either 
by their extinction or by their retaining their independence. "With us 
13 the only question is one of freedom or death". On his return to Cape 
Town Hargrove sho'tved this "documentary evidence" to Cart'tvright and t"t-10 
of his associates and it appears that this convinced them that the time 
had arrived to actively advocate the cessation of hostilities on the 
basis of continued independence for the Republics. 14 
Another strong appeal· for action came from Thomas Hannah of Pieter-
maritzburg, who took the lead in organising anti-war opinion in Natal. 
He urged the conciliation party to rouse itself from the lethargy of the 
past "for the enemy is active and vigilant", and advocated the formation. 
of a Conciliation· Committee in South Africa w'i th branches in even the 
smallest villages to reveal the great capitalist conspiracy which was 
fl . h. . h . . d d . d . h 15 ourl.s l.ng l.n t el.r m1.. st an l.n so ol.ng to stop t e war. 
All these ap.peals culminated in an editorial in the South African Ne\vS 
under the heading "Wanted, a Conciliation Committee and £1,000". Con-
trasting the disheartening lack of organised effort on the part of the 
conciliation party with the effective machinery operated by the capi-
talists to influence public opinion, and pointing out the ignorance on 
the true facts of the situation which prevailed both locally and in 
Britain, it drew the conclusion that the first great need of the peace 
party WaS II a Well Organised J Capably managed J adequately SUppOrted in-
telligence Department". If they were to achieve anything they 'tvould 
have to make liberal use of "that material which has brought about more 
reforms than all the bullets ever cast - printer's ink". It therefore 
appealed to opponents of the war to subscribe a thousand pounds for the 
purposes of a printers ink campaign. It also advocated the formation 
of a conciliation committee, pointing out that it would be a poor re-
flection on the local conciliation party if they remained inactive while 
.. :-:~' 
13. Cd. 261, pp. 127- 128. 
14. South African News, 12 March 1900, 19 March 1900, 8 Jan. 1901. 
15. !bid., 24 Feb. 1900. In April T. Hannah became secretary of the 
conciliation committee established at Grey Town in Natal, vide, · 
South African News, 1 May 1900; Ons Land, 3 May 1900. -
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men in England were courting unpopularity and making personal sacrifice.s 
in order to champion the cause of peace and justice. It urged the more 
timid souls who deplored the war, but who hesitated to speak out against 
it for fear of personal odium to join with the meniliers of the South Afri-
can Party in establishing a local conciliation committee and offered to 
place a room in the newspaper's o~fices at the disposal of the committee 
and also to print without any profit all the material that was required. 
"Time passes, the capitalists are powerful, unscrupulous and excellently·· 
organised. Are we to do nothing?". 16 
The appeal came at a juncture when even the boldest might hesitate 
to commit themselves to public support of the Republican cause. The 
relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith and the surrender of General Cronje 
on the anniversary of Majuba resulted in a series of demonstrations 
which did not remain confined to the parading of the Union Jack and the 
singing of "Rule Britannia". In Cape Town Mrs. Koopmans de Wet's house 
was hooted by a loyalist mob and at the offices of the South African News. 
they expressed their disapproval more forcibly by breaking several win-
dows and thr.eatening to wreck the machinery so that police protection 
17. ' . 
had to be sought. Similar scenes were witnessed in towns throughout 
the Colony, the homes of prominent Afrikaners being singled out for 
special attention by hooting, stone-throwing crowds. Even Milner admit-
ted that the English were ra:ther overdoing "Rule Britannia11 and on 13 
March the Attorney-General felt obliged to issue a circular to all resi-
dent magistrates containing special instructions on how to deal with 
. 18 . h f . . h exuberant publ~c reJo~c~ngs. It ~s t ere ore not surpr~s~ng t at 
the conciliation party strongly disapproved when Schreiner agreed to the 
relief of Mafeking being celebrated by a public holiday, an event which 
Ons Land satirically styled "Sint Schreiners holiday". 19 
Despite the prevailin~ unpleasantness the South African News 
announced that it had received a '~gratifying" response to its appeal 
16. South African News, 26 Feb. 1900. 
17. Ibid., 17 Feb. 1900, 28 Feb. 1900, 3 March 1900; M.P., C. Molteno 
to P.A. Molteno, 8 March 1900. 
18. Le May, British Supremacy, pp. 57 - 58; South African News, 
17 March 1900. · 
19. Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, p. 110; Lewsen, Merriman 




which had included, amongst others, suggestions that the proposed 
committee should consider carefully the question of the future of the 
Republics and that if necessary a congress should be held at Cape Town 
to point out to the British people the danger of a settlement that would 
place South Africa in the hands of the mining capitalists. 20 A meeting 
was therefore held in the offices of the South African News under the 
chairmanship of Charles Molteno on 12· March at which a committee of 
t~venty-one members with power to add to their number was elected to 
work with the S.A.c.c. in England to organise public opinion in South 
Africa. Amongst the founder members the legal fraternity was represen-
ted by advocates H. Burton, H.L. Currey, James Molteno and attorneys 
Vincent van der Byl, H.T. Standen (of the firm with which Sauer was asso~ 
ciated) and C.C. de Villiers, a younger brother of the Chief Justice. 
For the churches there were B.J. Marchand, C. Morgan, Andrew Murray and 
R. Balmforth; and for the South African News F.J. Centlivres, Alexander 
Mair, A.J. van Reenen and Albert Cartwright. The rest of the number 
were made up of C.P. Schultz, Olive Schreiner, F.S. Malan, William Hay, 
Melt Roux and Adrian van der Byl (the husband of Agnes Merriman's sister 
and a close .associate of the Merrimans). In duscussing the objectives 
of the Committee Charles Molteno deplored the fact that in the past they 
had generally been told to put off action in connection with the crisis 
with the result that matters had gone from bad to worse and some had 
accused them of inertia. Cartwright expressed the hope that the sup-
porters of the Afrikaner Bond would work in close co-operation with the 
Conciliation Committee despite the fact that the prejudice which existed 
against the Bond in some quarters hampered it as a promotor of peace. 
F.S. Malan agreed that the o?inion of the Dutch colonists was generally 
discounted because of their close ties with the inhabitants of the Repu-
blics and in the circumstances he felt that it v1as largely incumbent 
21 
upon the English~speaking colonists to voice their opposition to the war. 
The Committee at once set about drafting a programme of principles 
and on 17 March William Hay called on Schreiner to discuss these with 
him. ·The Prime Minister had already in December 1899 been invited to 
20. South African News, 5 and 10 March 1900. 
21. ·Ibid., 13 March 1900. 
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g~ve his support to the S.A.C.C. and he had from the start disapproved 
of such a body being established at the Cape fearing that it would do 
22 . 
·more harm than good. . With Lord Salisbury's recent categorical re-
jection of the Republics' peace overtures before him, Schreiner objected 
~o the Committee's intention of making the retention of the Republics' 
unqualified independence one of .its objectives and tried to persuade it 
to modify its aims through consultation with either Hofmeyr or himself. 
But the leaders of the conciliation movement had lost patience with the 
ministry's policy of moderation for they declined to do so arid made only 
.an insignificant alteration in their proposed resolution against annexa-
tion. When Hay, on Schreiner's behalf, pointed out that the Republics 
might be restored as mere empty shells without any real freedom or power 
(an objection also raised later by Hofmeyr) .the Committee replied that 
in asking for a loaf they might succeed in obtaining half. 23 F .S. Malan, 
who sought Merriman's advice in the matter also met with little encourage-
ment, as Merriman believed that an attempt to turn the clock .back to the 
London Convention would be impractical, and he recorded in his diary: 
"Never was I more struck with the proverbial Dutch failing /-of_/'asking 
too much'" .• 24 Richard Solomon was also strongly oposed to the movement 
and advised Schreiner to have nothing to do with it, maintaining: 
" ••••• however drastic it may be the best policy for South Africa 
is to have the British flag in the Republics. There is no doubt 
England has made up her mind to this and by recognising it we shall 
have far more influence in making the settlement as liberal as 
possible to the.Boers than by kicking against the pricks". 25 
Hofmeyr also, although sympathising with the co~ciliation movement, re-
fused to take part in it, explaining that it was; 
" not only because I hold that most Britons ar:e delirious 
on the subject of the war and therefore not able to calmly con-
sider any representations in connection with it but also and 
chiefly because I hardly believe that the racial bitterness re-
sulting from the war must inevitably and in any case be endless". 26 
22. Walker, Schreiner, p. 209. 
23. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), W. Hay to Schreiner, 20 March 1900. 
24. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. -170 • 
. 25. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), R. Solomon to Schreiner, 22 March 1900. 
26. Ibid., Hofmeyr to Schreiner, 22 May 1900. 
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It was therefore obvious that the Conciliation Committee would have 
to proceed without official support. On 22 March it published its pro~ 
gramme which provided· for assisting the. S.A.C.C. in obtaining and dis-
seminating information, maintaining peace throughout. the Colony, advising 
those who had suffered in person or property' during the war as to the . 
best method of obtaining redress .. and in general promoting a policy aimed 
at re-establishing the goodwill between the British and Dutch races in 
South Africa. It also published· the text of two resolutions which had 
·been unanimously adopted by the Committee .. The first declared that if 
due regard had been paid to the advice of the Cape minis try the un-
necessary and unjust war could have been avoided, and the second expressed 
the conviction that any settlement that did not respect the independence 
of the Republics would be detrimental to the highest interests of tqe 
Empire and '>vould .be fraught with grave danger for the future peace and 
progress of South.Africa. The office-bearers of the Committee were 
Charles Molteno (chairman), Albert Cartwright (secretary) and A.J. van 
Reenen (treasurer), thus making the executive virtually synonymous with 
· the management of the South African News. Sympathisers were invited to 
form conciliation committees throughout the Colony and to arrange public 
meetings '>vhich would endorse the resolutions passed by the parent body 
in Cape Town. The Committee also impressed upon its supporters the im-
portance of sending full reports of these meetings to the Cape Town 
branch which would see to it that they were submitted to the High Commis-
sioner for transmission to the Imperial Government. This appeal was en-
dorsed by Ons Land and it was obvious that the conciliators were deter-
mined to secure a mention in British blue books, something which had pre-
27 
viously been a prerogative of the war party. The Committee concluded 
by appealing for liberal monetary support to defray the expenses of print-
ing and disseminating literature and possibly even of sending delegates 
to Europe. Sympathisers were invited to send in their names as asso-
ciates or members of ·the Committee whose numbers had been S'>ve lled to 
thirty-two, largely as a result of the wives of existing members joining. 
Prominent amongst its feminine supporters were MarySauer, wife of the 
Commissioner for Public Works and Mrs. Koopmans de Wet. Mrs. C.C. de 
Villiers, Betty Molteno and her sister Caroline Murray were also to prove 
27. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 28· July 1899; Ons Land, 20 March 
1900. 
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very active members as were the two most prominent male recruits.Dr. 
F.C. Kolbe and Dr. Meiring Beck. 28 
The response to the Cape Town appeal was prompt if not overwhelm-
lug. A conciliation committee .was formed at Worcester under the chair-· 
manship of J.N.P. de Villiers, e~der brother of the Chief Justice, on 
the same day as the CaP.e Town Committee's programme was published and 
notice was immediately given of meetings to be held at Paarl, Stellen-
bosch and Tulbagh, at all of which places Hargrove was to be. guest 
speaker·. On 17 March he had already addressed a meeting in Cape Town 
on the subject of his recent visit to the Transvaal and the conversa-
tions he had there with Presidents Kruger and Steyn. On this occasion 
he also produced a petition composed by himself in the form of an appeal 
from the people of the Colony to those of Great Britain. It pointed out 
that the British public had been led in to the war "in ignorance of vi tal 
facts and by misleading statements", that even if Britain succeeded in 
conquering the Republics it would never be able to subjugate their people. 
The petitioners denied that .the Republics had ever aimed at conquest; 
they had assumed the offensive because they had believed their independ-
ence to be threatened, a fear which the British Government's recent de-
ciaration that it was determined to annex their territory proved to have 
been well founded. The Republics had proved themselves worthy to be free 
and to deprive them of their freedom "would not only be unjust, it would 
be a hideous and almost ·irremediable blunder". As the ultimate decision 
must rest ,.;rith the people of Great Britain the petitioners appealed to· 
them to grant the Republics 11 in the name of justice and for the sake of 
South Africa and the Empire, that freedom for which they ask 11 • If e lo-
quence had been their aim the Committee.might have fared better had it 
availed itself of the services of Olive Schreiner, but Hargrove's un-
sophisticated appeal reflected their. sentiments with sufficient accuracy 
to be received with enthusiasm and it was reported that there was a great 
rush to sign the petition at the Cape Town meeting, although the manner 
of its presentation would still have to be decided.· 29 It ,.;ras taken up 
by the South African News and Ons Land and copies with adequate space 
28. South African News, 22 March 1900. 







for signatures appeared repeatedly in their columns and were made 
available on application at their offices. At many of the subsequent 
conciliation meetings· in the country districts sub-committees were 
established for the purpose of circulating the People's Petition, as 
it became known,and the women in particular were asked to canvass sig-
30 
natures. 
Altogether fifty-seven conciliation meetings were reported up to 
the' end of June in the columns of the South African News and Ons Land 
and at twenty of these local committees were formed to co-operate with 
3 1 the parent body ~n Cape Town. The most active committees were the 
above-mentioned one at Worcester and the one at Stellenbosch, whlch 
counted three M.L.A.s (M.C. Neethling, G. Kruger and J.P. Marais) and 
Professors Hofmeyr, Muller, Viljoen and De Vos of the Theological Semin-
ary amongst its members. Although a committee was evidently not formed 
at Paarl, the local conciliationists under the leadership of A.B. de 
Villiers also played a prominent role in the movement. 
The fears of those who believed that the movement would.have violent 
results proved to be unfounded. The meetings were conducted in an order-
iy fashion and did not result in any disturbances, contrasting favourably 
~n this respect with the scenes of violence which ensued at similar meet.:.. 
ings in England. On the whole, opponents of the movement avoided the 
meetings but where they did attend, as for example at Oudtshoorn on 14 
April, they were given a hearing and then outvoted. At Hanover, where the 
conciliators attended a meeting organis~d by their opponents, the resolu-
tions ~n favour of annexation were allowed to be proposed and then nega-
tived ~n an orderly fashion. A motion appointing a Vigilance Committee 
for Hanover was not interfered with and a separate conciliation meeting 
was held four days later. 33 Many of the meetings were attended by the 
local M.L.A.s, Dr. Beck, .J.A. Graaff and D. de V. Rabie in particular 
30. The petition was published as pamphlet No. 37 in the S.A.C.C. series, 
entitled "A Petition in Favour of Peace by the Ministerial Party at 
the Cape." 
31. Although the organi~ers were anxious that the movement should receive 
the maximum of publicity, it is possible that some of the smaller 
meetings in the rural areas were not reported. --
32. South African Net-.rs, 28 March 1900. 




maldng a point of supporting the movement in the constituencies. 
Charles Searle, M.L.A. for George, was one of the few English-speaking 
members of parliament.who lent his support, presiding at a meeting at 
G d h B d h . lb d' . 34 h eorge an anot er at ran wac t ~n the Masse ay ~str~ct. T e 
opposition press went out of its way to discredit the movement as being 
due to the machinations of the Afrikaner Bond and it even laid the 
responsibility for the Stellenbosch meeting - where the Bond had no 
b h h d f h h 1 . d . . 35 h . ranc - at t e oor o t at roue rna ~gne orgam.sat~on. T ere. ~s 
no doubt that Bondsmen did play a prominent part in the movement, but 
the meeting at Wellington, which was also attended by Andrew Murray, 
appears to have been the only one s~mmoned directly at the behest of 
. . 
the local organisation of the Bond, and then largely at the instigation 
36 
of its feminine supporters.. As has been seen in the instance of 
Stellenbosch, the Dutch Reformed Church gave its tacit support to the 
movement, the local clergy.nearly always attending and often presiding 
at the meetings. 
The speakers at these gatherings were all agreed that with the with-
drawal of the Republican forces from the Colony and in view of the Re-
publics' peace offer to Britain on 5 March, the time had arrived to 
consider the terms of a settlement. They felt that they would be guilty 
of a dereliction of duty if they did not raise their voices against the 
move to deprive the Repub.lics of their independence for, as Dr. Beck 
pointed out at Tulbagh, silence would mean that they acquiesced in Lord 
Salisbury's verdict of annexation. 37 The British Prime Minister's speech 
of 9 November 1899, in which he had claimed that Britain sought no gold-
. fields and no territory, was frequently referred to and it was pointed out 
that the annexation of tre Republics would be inconsistent with this de-
claration. During the course of the conciliation meetings it also became 
apparent that many had questioned the wisdom of the ministry's policy of 
restr~int before th~ war. M.J. Pretorius, M.L.C., speaking at Middelburg, 
expressed the opinion that the party should have protested against the war 
34. South African News, 27 April.1900, 29 May 1900. 
35. Cape Argus, 27 March 1900, South African News, 28 March 1900. 
36. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 214; South African News, 26 March 1900, 
31 March 1900. 




~n parliament instead of keeping quiet. Not that he thought that it 
would have averted the war, but it would have put them right "as a 
matter of his tory", a point of considerable importance to the conci lia-
. . . 38 A f . b . . t~on~sts. s ar as can e Judged from the ~ncomplete reports 
available, the speeches at the meetings, although usually outspoken, 
\vere hot inflanunatory. The conc~liation party seems to have regarded 
it as a point of honour that they register their protest in a firm but 
constitutional manner and viewed against the background of animosity 
and excitement caused by the war they acquitted themselves creditably. 39 
The resolutions passed were usually similar to those adopted by the Cape 
Town committee. Occasionally local variations were added and many meet-
ings also adopted resolutions in favour· of the deproclamation of martial 
law and against the transportation of Boer prisoners of war to St. Helena. 
The Middelburg meeting passed a resolution condemning the recent attempt 
on the life of the Prince of Wales and several of the gathering concluded 
with a lusty rendering of "God s.ave the Queen". The resoluti.on adopted at 
a relatively small meeting at Vredenburg in the Malmesbury district on 9 
April, censuring Milner because he had "not succeeded in the execution of 
his duty in satisfying all parties, and that if a less partial position 
had been adopted by him towards the Afrikaner population of South Africa 
this war would probably have been prevented", was the only one of its 
k . d 40 ~n • 
. The Cape Town committee had offered to provide guest speakers for 
meetings ~n the ;ural districts and Hargrove in particular was in constant 
demand. He spoke at altogether twelve meetings, mostly in the western 
Cape but also further afield at Cradock, Humansdorp and George. H~ was 
ever~vhere received with great enthusiasm and his speeche·s were reported 
in glowing terms in the South African News and Ons Land. Several of the 
meetings which he addressed became quite lively, a problem which he seemed 
quite capable of handling. At Stellenbosch there were noisy interjections 
of "Proof! Proof!" from the back of the hall while he spoke, at George he 
was loudly heckled and at the Cradock meeting, which had the misfortune of 
coinciding with the day on which the report of the relief of Mafeking was 
38. South African Ne•vs, 20 Apr.il 1900 . 
.39. Davenport, Afrik~ner Bond, p. 214. 




received, unruly scenes ensued when crowds repeatedly burst into the 
41 hall to announce the good news. Wherever he spoke Hargrove tried to 
spur his audience on to greater action. At Robertson on 17 April he 
particularly deplored the Afrikaner's patience which, he maintained, they 
carried to the point of political inertia. He believed that they left 
too much to their leaders and he. urged that each individual should do his 
share. They should write to the press in Britain, Canada and Australia 
and even to individuals to correct the constant misrepresentations ·of the 
Jingos; they should establish an intelligence department in every town 
or village to assist in this task; they should challenge the allegations . 
of Boer atrocities on the battle field and above all they should.hold a 
people's congress to take up the resolutions which would have been dealt. 
with by the Bond Congress. He had at first regretted the indefinite 
pos tponeinent of the Bond's meeting but was now rather glad as it provided 
the opportunity for a more' representative gathering at Worcester, Welling-
ton or any other place which might be considered suitable. 42 There was 
no doubting Hargrove's enthusiasm for the cause and the idea of a people's 
congress was definitely one of his more practicable suggestions. 
One of the main objections raised by members of the peace party who 
disapproved of the conciliation movement, was that it would provoke the 
war party into re~aliating and that the heat generated in the ensuing 
exchanges would have exactly the opposite effect to that desired by the 
conciliators. In this respect their predictions proved correct for the 
conciliation movement was speedily countered by a movement in favour of 
annexation, although there is some doubt as to whether their opponents' 
activities were due entirely to the provocation of the conciliation party. 
An Eastern Province newspaper had already i~ December suggested that meet-
ings be organised throughout the Colony to urge Britain on no account to 
. . 43 
allow the Republics to retain their independence, and the first annexa-
tion meeting at Grahamstmvn on 17 Harch followed hard on the heels of the 
formation of the Conciliation Committee.and preceded any of the anti-
annexation meetings. 44 The municipalities of all the major centres of 
41. South African News, 23 Harch 1900, 27 April 1900, 21 May 1900. 
42. Ibid., 19 April 1900. 
.43. Ibid., 13 Dec. 1899. 




the Colony soon followed suit by pasHng resolutions in favour of 
annexation at their regular council meetings and churchmen of various 
denominations, including the Anglican Archbishop, hastened to ensure 
Hi1ner of their support for his policy. 45 An Imperial Vigilance 
Committee was formed in Cape Town under the 'presidency of Sir Gordon 
Sprigg and the activities of its· supporters soon gave rise to the type 
of utterances which men like Schreiner had hoped to avoid.· At a par-
ticularly unfortunate gathering·at Paarl on 28 Harch, for example, the 
·Dutch Reformed Church was accused of being responsible for the rebellion 
and it was suggested that all rebels be tried by special courts and dis-
franchised for life while ringleaders should receive even more exemplary 
treatment •. On this occasion Hargrove was labelled "a criminal who should 
be behind bars - a man in the pay of the Transvaal - a secr~t service 
. 46 fund man and a treasonmonger". More significant, however, than the 
!'lCtivities of the Paarl annexationists, was the meeting at Claremont on 
30 March at which James Rose Innes was the main speaker. As Innes was 
one of the Cape politicians most highly respected for his personal inte-
grity, his ·attitude on the war was bound to be of considerable importance·. 
Although he had for some time been a source of disappointment to his 
erstwhile political associates like Herriman and Sauer, he had so far 
remained more or less uncommitted; sitting on the fence, his opponents 
were later to call it. During the months preceding the war it had become 
clear that he differed from the peace ,party on several major points, but 
his attitude had been moderate enough for them to regard him as not en-
tirely lost to the cause and the South African News had even supported his 
suggestion on the eve of the war that a joint resolution be passed in the 
Cape parliament urging the Transvaal to concede a five year franchise 
scheme. 47 At Claremont, however, he supported the annexation of the 
_Republics on the grounds that there would be race hatred whatever the 
settlement was and that wha.t had been po.ssib le before the war was no longer 
possible after it; "what had been smashed could not be put together 
again". 48 "Isn't 'Innes's speech terrible?", lamented Olive Schreiner. 
45. Cape Times, 13 April 1900; South African News, 26 April 1900. 
46. South African News, 31 March 1900. 
47. Ibid., 26 Sept. 1899. 
48. Ibid., 31 March 1900; Harrison H. Wright, Sir James Rose Innes, 
Selected Correspondence, 1884-1902, p. 263. 
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"No consideration of what a right only what ~s expedient!". 49 The 
South African News agreed with this verdict. Being well aware what a 
valuable recruit Innes was to the war party, it pointed to his speech 
as the most significant event in the annexation campaign and several 
speakers at conciliation meetings took him to task for it. 50 The 
Vigilance Committee. organised a nation-wide series of meetings in favour 
of annexation to take place on 3 April and a mass meeting was held in 
Cape Town as part of this demonstration. The conciliators were even 
more surprised and disappointed when on this~ occasion Innes appeared 
on the platform with men of the most extreme views. At Claremont he had 
implied that he would have preferred to remain silent,.but that the agi-
tation being carried on throughout the Colo~y against annexation had 
-compelled him to raise his voice. Schreiner also blamed the conciliation 
movement for having provoked Innes into open support for the war party. 
"See how the meetings of the conciliation committee movement have 
raised a counterblast of tenfold greater force and effect from 
very many quarters. Those meetings, often promoted with the 
best intentions, have caused us to ~vitness and hear, not only in 
Cape Tmvn but throughout the country responsive scenes and utter-
ances. which might well have been spared, but which as counter 
demonstrations to Mr. Hargrove's movement will have much greater 
weight:- one innes is more potent than fifty Hargraves, -yet 
Innes would never, I think, have spoken as he did qad the contrary 
extreme movement not forced him to it" 51 
The events which accompanied the mass meeting ~n Cape Town further dis-
posed Schreiner to view the conciliationists and all they brought in their 
train with a jaundiced eye. The Cape Town meeting had assumed the pro-
portions of ,a major event, with a liberal display of bunting and such 
prominent personages as the Roman Catholic Bishop and the Anglican Dean 
of Cape Town reinforcing the usual assembly of Progressive politicians on 
a platform erected in front of the Town House on Greenmarket Square. All 
the principal bu.siness establishments closed down for two hours so that 
between 5 000 and 6 000 people attended the meeting and the whole affair 
ended on an unpleasant note with Schreiner being hooted and jeered at in 
b d f h . 52 I . h f . . the street y a crow . a ter t e meet~ng. t ~s t ere ore not surpr~s~ng 
49. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 3 April 1900. 
50. South African News, 2 April 1900. 
51. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to T.P. Theron, 16 April 1900 •. 
52. South African News, 4 April 1900. 
' \..: 
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that he questioned' the value of the anti-annexation meetings as~ con-
ciliatory force. 
In the Vigilance Committee the conciliation movement encountered 
an energetic opponent. Reporting at a special meeting on 1 May its 
organising and finance sub-commi.ttees claimed that 105 vigilance commit-
tees had been established and 110 meetings representing over 60 000 people 
had been held throughout the country. £900 had been raised so far and the 
literary committee was actively distributing pamphlets. 53 Beside these 
achievements the efforts of the Conciliation Committee paled into insig-
nificance. In discussing the progress of the movement the South African 
News, however, pointed out that unlike the supporters of the imperial 
party who lived in tmvns and .could be easily organised, many of those 
supporting the conciliation movement resided in rural areas where public 
meetings were rare and difficult to arrange. They also did not have at 
their disposal the unlimited funds of the Rhodesite party. Furthermore, 
on 10 April the military authorities had issued a proclamation prohibiting 
meetings of a political nature in districts under martial law and this, 
the South African News claimed, deprived the conciliation movement of sup-
port in at least fifty centres. This was an ~ssue on which they felt 
extremely sore as they believed that they had been deliberately victimised. 
The war party, because of its concerted action on_3 April was not affected 
by the prohibition, whereas the conciliation party which had been slower 
to move, had been able to hold only one meeting in a martial law area, 
namely at Philipstown on 31 March. 54 They. also complained that annexa-
tion meetings were ~n fact being .allowed in proclaimed areas and pointed 
to that which took place at Kenhardt on 28 April ·as an: example of "equal 
rights". 55 
If the conciliation movement was finding it uphill going in the 
Cape, news from England was equally disheartening. In March Percy Molteno 
reported that their resolutions -.;.;ere· being cabled to the press, but that 
they were being off-set by counter resolutions from the vigilance committees. 
By May they were _no longer being mentioned and were therefore having little 
effect upon the public eye, but he promised that the S.A.c.c. was doing its 
53. South AfriC:i:in News, 2 May 1900. 
'54. Ibid.,·6, _16 and 20 April 1900. 
55. Ibid., 30 April 1900. 
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best to advertise the results. He urged that their Committee should 
continue its work as it could do enormous good by encouraging and giving 
heart to those in the,C~lony who sympathised with it. 56 Charles Molteno 
also saw no hope of immediate success in th~ present temper of the English 
people. 
"The Conciliation Committee· can simply get as strong an expression 
of opinion as possible in favour of their resolutions, which will 
.be our protest against a great injustice. More than this it is 
impossible to do at the present time". 57 
The conciliation movement's campaign against the annexation of the 
Republics culminated in the People's Congress at Graaff-Reinet on 31 May. 
The idea of convening such a meeting had been present since the inception 
of the movement. It had been advocated by speakers at several of the con-
ciliation meetings and Hargrove in particular gave it his enthusiastic 
support. In mid-May he travelled to Graaff-Reinet with the Rev. Pienaar 
of Uitenhage and at a private meeting in the Afrikaner Bond Zaal arrange-
ments for the Congress were discussed and the invitation committee agreed 
58 
upon. It consisted of J.F. du Toit, M.L.C. (Midlands), J.H. Smith, 
M.L •. A. (Graaff-Reinet) and F~K. te Water (ex-M. L.A. and father of the 
cabinet minister). and twenty-one other leading inhabitants of the district 
with G.F. Smith ~s secretary. In announcing the convening of the Congress 
·the South African News pointed out that although meetings had been held 
throughout the Colony under the auspices of the Conciliation Committee it 
had been impossible to voice the feelings of the majority of the colonists· 
by a united demonstration. It emphasized that the gathering was not in-
tended to be one merely of delegates or specially nominated persons and 
urged all those.who sympathised with its aims to make every effort to attend. 
"We hope that the congress may be the means of opening the eyes of 
the people of Great Britain to the strength and reality of the 
sentiment in the Colony which is opposed to the annexation of the 
Republics" 59 
56. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 11 March 1900, 23 March 1900. 
57. M.P.C., C. Molteno to Betty Molteno, 5 April 1900. 
58. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Resident Hagistrate, Graaff-Reinet to Secretary, 
Law Dept., 18 Hay 1900. 




·Schreiner, still convinced of the undesirability of public meetings 
in the present temper of. the Colony, had advised against the summoning 
of the Bond Congress and strongly disapproved of the Graaff-Reinet meet-
60 ing. The issue led to a breach between him and Hofmeyr at the time 
when the Cabinet was on the verge of resigning because of the disagree~ 
ment between Schreiner and the majority of the South African Party on the 
proposed punishment of ~he colonial rebels. Schreiner maintained that 
Hofmeyr, in a letter to T.P. Theron dealing with the convening of a spe-
cial Bond Congress, had suggested that a popular congress should be sum-
moned which would adopt resolutions which could subsequently be endorsed 
61 by a Bond Congress without much discussion. Hofmeyr denied ever having 
said anything which could be interpreted as an approval of the Graaff-
Reinet Congress, but added that on the other·hand,. he did not "share the 
. 62 . 
Jingo abhorrence of that gathering". He, however, took umbrage when 
. 63 Schreiner insisted that he had in fact approved of~ People's Congress. 
There is little doubt that Schreiner's read~ng of Hofmeyr's attitude was 
.correct, for the meeting took place in the constituency of Te Water, 
Hofmeyr's intimate political associate, and T.P. Theron, the chairman of 
the Bond, sent a message to the secretary of the congress expressing his 
sympathy and support. However, at the subsequent meeting of the Bond 
Congress at Paarl on 15 June, when a resolution was passed giving the 
People's Deputation its blessing, a special amendment was added which made 
it clear that the Eond had not engineered the People's Congress and had 
. d . h . d. f d . 64 noth~ng to o.w~t the sen ~ng o the eputat~on. 
A considerable crowd assembled at the agricultural showground.s at 
Graaff-Reinet on 31 May, the p.roceedings beginning at ten ·in the morning 
and continuing almost unti 1 sunset. 65 There is no doub·t that in the 
course of the numerous and lengthy speeches many of the speakers got a 
good deal off their chests, but the proceedings remained orderly throughout. 
60. W.P,S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to T.P. Theron, 16 April 1900. 
61. Ibid., Schre{ner to Hofmeyr, 7 June 1900. 
62. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Hofmeyr to Schreiner, 7 June 1900. 
63. Ibid., Schreiner to Hofmeyr, 8 June 1900; Hofmeyr to Schreiner, 8 June 1900. 
64. South African News, 19 June 1900; Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 214. 
65. The South African News claimed that 2 500 people-were counted at the 
gates, the Cape Times reporter put t;:he number at I 500 and the Resident 
Magistrate at I 200. South African Ne\Y"S, 5 June. 1900; Cape Times, · 
I June 1900; W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Resident Magistrate Graaff-Reinet to 
Secretary Law Dept., 1 June 1900. 
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J .N .P. de Villiers ', head of the Worcester conciliation committee was 
elected to the chair and numerous messages from sympathisers who could 
not attend were read •. ' These included good wishes from Dr. Kolbe, Andrew 
Murray, J.H. Hofmeyr (moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church), Rev. A. 
Moorrees of Paarl, Dr. Beck, Charles Searle and several other members of 
parliament. The S.A.C.C. also s·ent a message of support which, however, 
66 
only arrived several days after the event. At the outset the meeting 
agreed that it represented the voice of the majority of the Cape colonists. 
It then proceeded to resolve that the war had been caused by the "un-
warrantable and intolerable" interference of the British Government in 
the internal affairs of the South African Republic and by the fact that 
the advice of the Cape ministry had been disregarded. It protested against· 
the deliberate misrepresentation of the situation ~n the Jingo press and 
pointed out the enormous difficulties experienced ~n attempting to ac-
quaint the British public with the true facts of the case. The meeting 
voted in favour of the unqualified independence of the Republics and re-. 
solved that, should they be annexed, the majority of the Cape colonists 
would work by every right and lawful means for the restoration of their 
independence. They also requested that all disputes between South 
African states be settled by arbitratiori and desired a voice in the selec~ 
tion of their Governor. The majority of the. speakers supporting these 
resolutions were of Dutch extraction; Olive Schreiner and Albert Cart-
wright, who attended on behalf of the Cape Town committee and Hargrove 
being the only English ones. The speeches revealed that the .Dutch colo-
nists felt it a keen insult that their ministry had been ignored and that 
they regarded the war as being directed against Afrikanerdom in general. 
When Andries Liebenberg of Victoria West declared that the war was intended 
to avenge Majuba and put the question: "Will it be possible to give the 
hand of friendship to men who have the blood of my brethren on their 
hands? II' he was answered with cries of "No' no II and loud applause s 0 that 
the chairman had to intervene to point out that the movement was aimed 
at conciliation and not at creating further division. In proposing the 
resolution regarding the advice of the Cape ministry, Albert Cartwright 
made liberal tis~:-:·of Percy Molteno's arguments in. support of the contention 
that the Cape Government was entitled to a voice in the direction of South 
African affairs. Olive Schreiner, who on this occasion said little, was 
66. South African News, 12 June 1900. 
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given a great ovation and Hargrove too was received with cheers. He 
addressed the meeting mainly on what he regarded as the best method of 
keeping the Empire together, emphasizing that it should be a free asso-
ciation of nations. The worst foes of the Empire were at present not 
·the Boers but those who set up the "howl for annexation". He was accord-
ed a special vote of thanks amidst loud applause and was asked to con-
tinue his agitation on.behalf of the Republics when he returned to 
England. 
The congress concluded by adopting the People's Petition and it was 
decided that a fund would be established under the superintendence of 
Andrew Murray in order to publish it as widely as possible in the British,. 
Canadian and Australian press. It was also resolved to send a deputation 
to Britain to present it to the British people and to make known the views 
of the colonists. A selection committee was appointed as well as a com-
mittee to administer a fund, to be raised by public subscription, to de-
fray the expenses of the deputation. The deliberations of the congress 
~vere reported in detail in the'South African News and Ons Land and were 
later published in pamphlet form as was a description of the event by 
Betty Molteno. 67· A sketch of the proceedings by Olive Schreiner sent 
to a friend in England appeared in the Morning Leader and was subse-
68 quently republished in the local press. 
The Graaff-Reinet eongress did not mark the end of the conciliation 
party's campaign against annexation. It was succeeded by a series of 
meetings organised by the women of the Colony, the majority of which took 
69 place between June and August. These meetings adopted resolutions 
similar to those passed at the regular conciliation meetings and many 
pledged their support for the fund for the People's Delegation. The 
wives of Dutch Reformed clergymen played a p~ominent role in this aspect 
of the movement and some of the meetings had a strong religious flavour. 70 
.67. South African News, 2 and 5 June 1900; Ons Land, 2 and 5 June 1900; 
M.P.C., 11Dutch Feeling in South Africa towards England", pamphlet 
printed from a letter by Betty Molteno. 
68. Ons Land, 21 July 1900. 
69. Meetings were reported at Knysna, Paarl, Cape Town, Middelburg, 
Worcester, Tulbagh, Victoria West, Porterville, Wellington, Ceres, 
Caledon, George~ Montague and Somerset East. 




Occasionally the wives of the chairmen of the local conciliation commit-:-
tees took the lead as did Mrs. J.N.P. de Villiers at Worcester and Mrs. 
A.B. de Villiers at Paarl. The activities of the Cape Town women had 
rather the nature of a family affair as most of them were bound together 
by long-standing friendships. Suchwas the case with Mary Sauer, Marie 
Koopmans de Wet, Caroline Murray·, Betty Molteno and her companion Alice 
Greene, Mrs. C.G. de Villiers and Anna Purcell, wife of the zoologist 
W.F. Purcell. Most of them were members of the Cape Town Conciliation 
·committee and had been associated since April with others like Mrs. A.I. 
Steytler, wife of the minister of the Groote Kerk, the senior Dutch 
Reformed congregation in Cape Town, .as members of the Ladies Clothing 
Committee for Prisoners of War. Their voluminous correspondence sheds a 
particularly interesting light on the women's contribution to the con-
ciliation movement. 
The first women's meeting took place at Wittedrift near Kynsna on 
31 May and this in turn inspired a gathering at Paarl on 27 June. 71 
These meetings at the Cape were also partly due to the example set ~n 
Eng land where a meeting of 3 000 w·omen in London on 13 June, under· the 
72 
auspices of the S.A.C.C., caused considerable comment. The meeting 
at Paarl, attended by 550 women, including delegates from several neigh-
bouring towns, was one of the largest and even Merriman, who strongly 
disapproved of women meddling in public affairs, regarded it as a sig-
nificant' illustration of a current moving the people. In sending a report 
of the meeting to Goldwin Smith he commented: 
"The speeches will give you some notion of ~he way in which thes·e 
women will bring up their children, and indeed anyone who looks 
below the surface may well be alarmed at the sullen spirit of 
dogged resoluti.on that is· taking hold of the young generation ••• 
They are convinced of the hopelessness of the justice of England 
and they almost ~vel come any fresh act of arbitrary power, because 
it hammers the people together and makes them more resolved for 
the struggle they look forward to" 73 
The most significant of the women's meetings took place in Cape Town on 
9 July under the chairmanship of Mary Sauer. It was attended by 1 500 
women including Olive Schreiner, who had come specially from Beaufort West 
71. South African News, 12 and 29 June 1900; Ons Land, 12 and 30 June 1900. 
72. South African News, 15 June 1900. 




and by the w~ves of Merriman and Schreiner who usually avoided such 
demonstrations. Marie Koopmans de Wet was. the only woman of note on the 
. conciliation party's .side who was not present and she contributed a 
·speech ~vhich was read by Mrs. A.I. Steytler and re.ceived with great enthu-
siasm. The highlight of the occasion was indubitably Olive Schreinerrs 
address in support of the resolution against annexation. In the course 
of it she proclaimed dramatically: 
" ••.• Unless England should immediately refute and reverse her 
entire course of action every farm-house which the British soldiers 
were burning down today was a torch lighting the British Empire to 
its doom, ever_y trench ~vhich the brave English soldiers dug was 
part of the tomb of England; every bullet which took.the life.of a 
South African found its billet in .the heart of the British Empire; 
· every political prisoner of South Africa who in his cell that night 
would dream of freedom would one day realise it in his own person or 
that of his descendants .•• South Afr1ca today lies torn, wounded 
and bleeding at the feet of.England. It was the hour of England's 
might; but the day would come when England-would know that for her 
the path of justice should have been the path of peace ••.• " 7 4 
H.W. Nevinson, war correspondent for the Daily Chronicle, later maintained 
that he had heard much indignant eloquence, "but never such a molten 
torrent of. white-hot rage". 75 It was received with loud and continuous 
76 
applause and inevitably provoked considerable comment ~n the press. 
Later an address by Olive Schreiner, read at the women's meeting at Somer-
set East, also turned that relatively insignificant gathering into an 
occasion of note ~nd resulted in its being accorded far more attention 
in the press thanwould otherwise have been the case. On that occasion 
she declared: 
. :--~. 
"Now the bond of affection and confidence that bound England .. to 
South Africa has snapped ••• Now England is dead to me •••• 
Never again while I live shall I hear the name of England spoken 
or see it ~vri tten but I shall hear a whisper - the Oppressor! 
Life's night begins, let her never come back to us; 
There would be doubt, hesitation and pain; 
Forced praise on our part, the glimmer of twilight; 
Never glad, confident morning again". 77 
74. South African Nevls,. 10 July I 900. 
75• Z. Friedlander, Until the Heart Changes, p. 55. 
76. Ons Land, 10 and 12 July 1900. The proceedings were also published 
as a pamphlet entitled "The Voice of South African Women for a 
Lasting Peace". 
77. From Brmvning's··"Lament for the lost leader". The South African News 




She admitted that ,the speech was "rather strong'i,butfound it a relief 
to have her full say. "Now is the time when one must cheer the spirits 
-- 78 
of the people up". 
The activities of the women supporters of the conciliation movement 
were welcomed as a counter to the League of Loyal Ladies which had been 
established in Cape Town early in March under the presidency of Mrs. H.M. 
Arderne. This was an extremely stylish organisation counting amongst 
its associates Prince Alexander of Teck, Lady Edward Cecil, Lady Charles 
__,___ 
Bentinck and Mrs. Hanbury Williams, wife of Milner's military secretary 
who, because of the High Comm,issioner' s bachelor status, usually acted as 
hostess at Government House. Branches of the League were established 
throughout the Golony and by the middle of July it had 3 000 members. 79 
As most of the branches habitually adopted resolutions expressing. their 
appreciation for Sir Alfred Milner's services to the Empire the South 
African News \vas quick to label it a "gubernatorial admiration society" · 
and the activities of the League of Loyal Ladies became the object of 
much mirth and derision in the columns of that paper. With undisguised 
relish it .contrasted the frivolous preoccupation of these "Loyal Ladies" 
with their elegant garden parties at which the High Commissioner was usual-
ly the main attraction, with the more substantial achievements of the women 
80 
of the conciliation party. While the League of Loyal Ladies enjoyed 
the High Commissioner's whole-hearted approval, the activities of the women 
of the conciliation party met with a decidely chilly reception. Ons Land 
underlined the significance of the fact that the Paarl meeting decided to 
by-pass the High Commissioner by forwarding their resolutions directly to· 
the People's Deputation in England, no doubt wishing to avoid a rebuff 
similar to that which they had encountered on presenting their peace peti-
tion. 81 On the occasion of the Cape Town meeting great offence wa,s 
caused by a message being delivered that no deputation would be allowed to 
march on Government House. The South African News indignantly enquired 
whether it was thought that the women intended assaulting the Governor and 
claimed that although Milner was always available to see deputations of Loyal 
Ladies, he could not even accord their opponents common civility. 82 
78~ O.S.P.~ 0. Schreinet to Betty Molteno, 7 Oct. 1900. 
79. South African News, 14 July 1900. 
80. Ibid., 30 June 1900, 9 and 24 Nov. 1900. 
81. Ons Land, 30 June i900. 






On submitting'reports of the Graaff-Reinet Congress to Chamberlain, 
Hilner made use of the occasion to express his opinion on the concilia-
tion movement in general. He believed that it made for 'mischief and 
mischief only". 
"The term conciliation is a curious misnomer, inasmuch as the 
leaders of the movement, wi.th the exception of Mr. Hargrove, 
are drawn exclusively from the more extreme members of the 
Afrikander party, while its programme consists of a direct 
negative to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and its 
arguments of abuse of that policy, and of its principal re-
presentatives". 
He accused the conciliators of encourag~ng the Cape Afrikaners to adopt 
an irreconcilable attitude, of refusing to recognise the facts of the 
situation and of holding the threat of perennial race hatred over the 
head of the Imperial Government. The movement was to his mind not spon-
taneous but "artificially produced by a certain class of politician" and 
fanned by the leader writers of Ons Land and the South African News. 
tater in the year, when Charles Molteno visited England, Milner wrote 
to Chamberlain describing him as "a particularly po~sonous person ••. 
a clever b.ut .•• malignant. rebel ••• a man to be watchedu. 83 These 
were censorious terms indeed to apply to the mild-mannered Molteno, who 
unlike his brothers, avoided the limelight and was .regarded by his 
associates as "reserved, but with a tremendous amount of sheer grit and 
common sense". 
84 Milner also drew Chamberlain's attention to "a very 
unpleasant and characteristic feature of the conciliation movement 
the threat to boycott the English in commercial relations". Although 
the tendency did no doubt exist in some of the rural communities it was 
an unjustified charge to. level against the conciliators whose leaders 
'certainly did not encourage the practice. Milner concluded his indict-
.ment of the movement with the accusation that they had broken the "truce 
of God" and held their violent and mischievous proceedings responsible 
f h f h . .. 85 or t e more extreme utterances o t e~r opponents. 
Milner's disapproval of the conciliation movement was no doubt 
strengthened by certain aspects of Hargrove's activities in South Africa. 
83. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 205. 
84. M.P.C., A. Cartwright to Betty Holteno, 2 M.;ty 1901. 
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On the occupation of Bloemfontein the Briti·sh army found amongst the 
captured documents a telegram from Kruger to Steyn dated 20 January 
whi.ch stated: .<. 
"A certainE.T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom 
Dr. Leyds formerly wrote that he had done much in Holland to 
work up the peace memorial to Queeri Victoria, has come here, 
so he says, from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range 
themselves openly on our side to make p'ropaganda in the Cape 
Colony provided an official declaration is given that the 
Republics only desire to secure complete independence ••• " 
On 13 April Milner approached Schreiner to secure an explanation from 
Merriman and Sauer and both ministers denied that they had ever given 
Hargrove any authority to use their names in the manner which he appears 
to have done or to communicate on their behalf with anyone in the Re-
publics. Milner felt that Hargrove owed them an explanation and on dis-
cussing the matter in the Cabinet Schreiner urged them to expose him 
publicly. 86 On being approached by Merriman, Hargrove maintained 
that neither of the ministers had been aware of his intention to visit 
Pretoria and that it was therefore absurd to infer that they had used 
him as an emissary. What he had in fact done was to recount to Kruger 
a conversation which he·had with Sauer in which he had asked him what his 
attitude would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw from 
colonial territory on condition that their independence be recognised. 
Sauer had replied that in those circumstances he would, ~n his personal 
capacity, urge the acceptance of the offer, and although he could only 
speak for himself, he thought that Merriman would do the same. Hargrove 
further asserted that he had assured Kruger that he had come in his indi-
vidual capacity, and the president 1 s telegram he explained, had probably 
been dictated in haste amidst the rush of other business which accounted 
for the more or less careless account it gave of the long conversation 
which. had passed between them.with Reitz acting as interpreter. Schreiner 
regarded Hargrove 1 s explanation as "laboured, lame and unsatisfactory". 
Milner agreed with him and, probably hoping to embarrass the ministers, 
expressed the desire that the full correspondence be published. Herriman 
and Sauer both felt that this would serve no useful purpose "beyond giving 
the politicians a morsel of that sort of scandal that they dearly love ~ •• ", 
v 






87 but could obviously not refuse. In the light of this incident it 
is not surprising that Merriman declined 'to be associated with the con-
ciliation movement. Sauer was less circumspect and although he himself 
did not become actively involved, he did not conceal his approval o·f 
the movement and his wife remained a prominent and active supporter. 
On becoming aware .of Hargrove's irresponsible behaviour, Schreiner 
had tried to intimate to supporters of the movement that all was not 
above board. In April, when H.P. Beyers, M.L.A. for Caledon, sought his 
advice on the matter, he wro.te to him: 
11 I think that thousands of our people are taking part in /-the· 
conciliation movement 7 with the best of intentions who do not 
quite understand the Inner history connected with it. Do you 
yourself, as a man of ripe judgment, consider that it is truly 
a conciliation movement?". 88 
When the blue book containing the compromising correspondence reached the 
Cape in August, Hargrove had already returned to England; he had departed 
on 20 June on the same ship as the People's Delegation. His associates 
were therefore left to explain themselves as best they could. The South 
African Nev7s tried to make light of the affair. While dealing fully with 
the rest of the blue book's contents, it declined to publish the major 
part of the Hargrove correspondence on the unconvincing pretext that it 
was of no particular importance. It adopted the strategy of placing great 
emphasis on Kruger's letter to Hargrove publishing the full text. The Cape 
Times later dismissed it as a "canting manifesto", but the South African 
News regarded it as "the one interesting feature of the matter" and in 
greater fairness to Kruger, declined to think that. it '~reathed either 
. 89 insincerity or hypocrisy". With regard to the rest of the correspond-
ence, it maintained that Milner had found a mare's nest and was exaggerat-
90. ing the significance of the affair. On ~argrove's lack of candour 
regarding his earlier association with Leyds ,' whose diplomatic posturing 
87. Cd. 261 , pp. 126-132, . 150. ·Correspondence re lei. ting to the Hargrove 
affair is t'o be found in the Schreiner papers in the S.A.L. and at 
U.C.T. and in the Merriman papers. See also Lewsen, Merriman Cor-. 
respondence, v. iii, pp. 187-191. 
88. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), H.P. Beyers to Schreiner, 17 April 1900; 
Schreiner to Beyers, 19 April 1900. 
89. South African Nev1s, 10 Aug. 1900. 








on the Continent was generally disapproved of by all leading Cape poli-
ticians, it preferred to remain silent. 
This was, however, not possible for long, for on 28 August Har-
grove's activities again made headline news when the Cape Times published 
a cable from the local correspon<;lent of the Daily Telegraph containing 
the st~rtling information that on seizing the offices of the Netherlands 
South Africa Railway Company at Pretoria, the British authorities had 
found evidence that the company, on instructions from Reitz, had paid 
Hargrove £1 000 for political purposes. The correspondent of the Daily 
Telegraph drew the conclusion that Hargrove was a paid agent of Dr. Leyds 
and that he had used the money to start the conciliation movement in Cape 
Town. The Cape Times hastened to make the most of this propensity which 
Hargrove's correspondence had for falling into the wrong hands, reminding 
the gullible South African News of its extravagant eulogies of Hargrove 
whom it had described as· "a high minded, courageous, independent English 
gentleman". In an editorial heavily laced with sarcasm i,t proceeded to 
examine all the inconsistencies in Hargrove's story and facetiously com~ 
mended him-for having kept his side of the bargain by using the £1 000 to 
buy signatures for the P'eople' s Petition •. He could, after all, simply 
have taken a ship back to Holland to renew his profitable acquaintance 
with Dr. Leyds. Remarks of this nature need not have troubled the lead-
ers of the conciliation party unduly, but the Cape Times concluded by 
drawing attention to a more serious aspect of the affair. It called upon 
Sauer to explain how he had become associated with a person "making money 
by incitement to sedition" and po~nted out, not unreasonably, that "it is 
difficult to believe that a minister of the Crown· associates himself with 
a peripatetic adventurer without knowing anything of his antecedents and 
objects 11 91 
On II September the matter was raised. in the House of Assembly by 
Col. F.X. Schermbrucker, who ostensibly required an explanation regarding 
the refun:d of part of the payment made for a special train which Hargrove· 
had chartered to take him part of the way to Dordrecht. This gave Sauer 
an opportunity to explain his relationship with Hargrove. He told the 
House that he had met him at a dinner party at the home of a well-known 




Cape To~vn personality, on which occasion Merriman had also been present. 
Hargrove had been introduced to him as a gentleman of position who was 
anxious to know something of the situation in the country and had made a 
favourable impression upon him. It had been mentioned that he was about 
to visit Dordrecht and a day or two later Hargrove had intimated, through 
a close friend of Sauer, that he.would like to accompany him. Sauer, 
seeing no harm in it, had agreed. After their return he did not see 
Hargrove again until he called on him at his office one day and, in dis-
cussing the war, enquired whether, if the Republicans withdrew from the 
Colony and asked for peace, Sauer would declare himself in favour of their 
retaining their independence, to which Sauer had replied in the affirma-
tive. He had not been aware that Hargrove intended visiting the Tr.ansvaal. 
During the ensuing debate the details of Sauer's ill-fated visit to Dord-
recht and Hargrove's doings .in the Transvaal were thrashed out at length. , 
J. Laing, in the light of the recent revelations, objected to Sauer vir-
tually giving Hargrove "a certificate of good character" by saying that 
he had impressed him as being a gentleman in every way. A lively exchange 
took place between Sauer and his critics, with Merriman supporting his 
friend by saying that Hargrove had struck him too as being a gentleman and 
evidently an enthusiast who was rather visionary in his ideas. He in-
sisted that Hargrove should not be condemned without having had an oppor-
tunity to explain himself and wished to know by what back-stairs intrigue 
the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph had obtained the information re-
garding Hargrove's alleged dealings with the NZASM. Several other speakers 
joined in the fray, and the consensus of opinion on the South African Party 
side ·of the House appeared to be that there was some doubt as to the accu-
f h . . f . 92 racy o t ~s ~n ormat~on .. 
On being confronted with the "Hargrove disclosures", which Milner 
confidentially informed Schreiner, were ~n substance absolutely true, 93 
the South African Ne~vs resorted to var~ous dodges to prove that the Cape 
Times report wa$ probably inaccurate, but ev~ntually committed itself to 
stating that it believed the story to be absolutely without foundation and 
94 that Hargrove's doings and character would bear any i~vestigation. 
92. Cape Hansard, 1900, pp. 385-390. 
93. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Milner to Schreiner,. 12 Sept. 1900. 




In October its discomfiture was, however, increased when it became known 
that J. van Kretschmar, director of the NZASM had, on being interviewed 
by the Transvaal Concessions Commission, confirmed the accuracy of the 
reports. He stated quite frankly that Hargrove had come to him from 
Reitz with the explanation that he intended working for peace in the 
interests of the Republic and that he would have travelling expenses to 
defray, a lot of publications to issue and books would have to be written, 
and for these purposes he asked for financial assistance. He explained 
that Reitz and Kruger had been unwilling to give him the money as they 
did not want the idea spread abroad in the Cape Colony or in England 
that state money was being used for such purposes. On being informed in 
writing that Kruger approved of Hargrove's activities, Kretschmar had 
provided him with the £1 000 \vhich he entere·d in the Company's books 
. f . . 1 .. 0 d . 95 
under the headLng o polLtLca cLrcumstances an _workLng expenses. 
This was in fact only one of several occasions on which the Company had 
acted as almoner for the Transvaal Governmept. The disclosures were 
·made all the more damaging by additional revelations that the company 
had actively assisted the Transvaal in prosecuting the war by, for ex-
ample, b loiving up bridges. On this occas{on the South African News was 
forced to admit that the charges against Hargrove were damning, but it 
stubbornly insisted that he was innocent and demanded an enquiry into 
96 the matter. On 26 October the editor received the following cryptic 
message from New .York: 
"Cabled you weeks ago. Find not sent. Shall return Cape deal 
attacks on spot. Facts rebound credit Africander cause. 
Publish. Hargrove". 
On this occasion the South African News further discredited itself· by 
insinuating that the message had been \vithheld by agents 'of the Colonial 
Office "for the purposes of the Chamberlain ring at the present general 
election". 97 The final instalment in the Hargrove affair appeared in 
January 1901 when the South African News reprinted from the Cape Argus an 
account of an interview with Hargrove which had appeared in the Boston 
Globe on 28 November 1900. On that occasion he had finally admitted that 
he had gone to South Africa because he was anxious for justice for the 
95. Cd. 624, pp. 41~42. 
96. South African News·, 16 Oct. 1900. 




Boers, sailing on the same ship as Buller two days after the delivery 
of the Boer ultimatum. He also recounted how, on returning to the 
Cape from the Transvaal he had called a meeting of leading Afrikaners 
and had shown telegrams from Presidents Kruger and Steyn to a committee 
of that meeting consisting of a newspaper editor, a member of parliament 
and a clergyman who certified to,. the others that he had documentary · 
proof that the Boer leaders were prepared tb come to terms to end the war. 
When this became known to the British authorities they tried to discredit 
98 him. YJith this the South African News discreetly drew a veil over 
Hargrove's activities in South Africa and he was not mentioned again. If 
he ever profferred an explanation of his conduct it was not of such a 
nature that it could be published. 
In themselves Hargrove's indiscretions constitute little more than 
a storm in a teacup and Davenport dismisses him as merely being a "tact-
less meddler". 99 But it must be borne ~n mind that although others 
like Albert Cartwright, as editor of the So.uth African News, made a far, 
more. sustained contribution to the conciliation campaign, in the eyes of 
contemporaries, the more colourful Hargrove was inseparably connected 
with the movement, which was frequently referred to simply as "Mr .. · Har-
grove's movement", and there ~s no doubt that after his departure it lost 
some of its momentum. Anything he did was therefore bound to reflect 
upon the conciliators and ~0 most people his behaviour must have appeared 
injudicious in the extreme. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that 
his actions also caused the integrity of his associates to be questioned 
and that his indiscreet behaviour to a certain extent discredited the 
movement, particularly in the eyes of English-speaking colonists of 
moderate views whose support was so eagerly sought. Milner's severe 
censure of the otherwise inoffensive Charles Molteno might have been 
prompted by Molteno's association with Hargrove. 
The question therefore inevitably arises whether leaders of the 
conciliation party at the Cape ~v-ere a~v-are of Hargrove's financial deal-
ings with the Transvaal authorities. It is clear that Cartwright and 
Charles Molteno knew of the letters he had in his possession for these 
had already been alluded to in a veiled manner ~n March. 100 In the 
98. South African News, 8 .Jan. 1901. 
99. Davenport, Af:t;'ikaner Bond, p. 214. 
100. South African News, 19 March 1900. .. 
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light of subsequent events the heading of the South African News 
editorial of 26 February announcing "Wanted, a Conciliation Corrunittee 
and £1 000", does seem to point to further complicity. There is, how-
lever, no clarity on the question. ~~en Charles Molteno informed his 
brother of their intention to establish a corrunittee, he did not mention 
Hargrove. In fact, he never referred to him at all, although this may 
be due to most of his correspondence for February and March being missing 
from the Molteno papers and also to the fact that he left for England on 
6 September and only returned to the Cape at the end of December so that 
he did not correspond with his brother during the period. immediately 
following the "Hargrove disclosures". Yet it ~s difficult to credit that 
apparently sensible and upright individuals like Cartwright and Holteno 
would knowingly have associated themselves with methods as questionable 
as those of Hargrove. This seems particularly unlikely ~n view of the 
indignation always aroused amongst members of the South African Party 
when accused of using Transvaal secret service funds to finance Cape 
elections and in the light of their constant denunciation of those 
Rhodesite politicians who were known to "have their price". The chief 
.exoneration of the local' conciliators is to be found in the fact that 
there is nothing to prove that Hargrove spent any of his Transvaal funds 
on the conciliation movement at the Cape, apart perhaps from paying his 
travelling expenses, which, it must be admitted to his credit, he insisted 
d f . h' f 101 I . . 'bl b on e ray~ng ~msel • t ~s pass~ e that these may have een con-
siderable for during his stay in Cape Town he resided at the Haunt Nelson 
Hotel, the most fashionable and expensive establishment in the city. 
The one aspect of the movement to which funds might reasonably have been 
devoted, namely Cartwright's proposed "printer's ink campaign", however, 
bore hardly any fruits. Although the South African News made a point of 
advertising and helping to circulate the anti-war literature which was 
being produced in large quantities in England by such organisations as the 
S.A.C.C., W.T. Stead's Stop the War Corrunittee and the Transvaal. Commit-
tee,102 as far as can be ~scertained, the Conciliation Corrunittee at the 
Cape undertook very little independent publishing. Apart from sporadic 
publications such as Olive Schreiner's "~\fords in Season", the proceedings 
101. South African News, 19 April 1900. 
102. For a discussion of this aspect of the war vide J.S. Galbraith,· 
"The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War", TheJOurnal of Hodern 
His tory, June I 952, Vol. XXIV, No •. 2. 
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of the Worcester Congress which took place in December and reprints of 
letters from a few of their regular correspondents, the conciliation 
movement's literary efforts remained confin·ed to the columns of newspapers 
103 
such as the South African News and Ons Land~ The South African News 
in particular, tried to reproduce as much as it could from S.A.C.C. pam-
phlets and for a short period in March and April published Stead's "War 
against War" as a weekly supplement. It also published Olive Schreiner's 
work "The African Boer" in eight instalments between 27 November and 29 
December after reviews in Britain had turned it down. But for a. more 
elaborate effort than this, funds appeared to be lacking. 
Although the conciliation party's ~ampa~gn against the annexation of 
the Republics evoked considerable response. in the Colony, albeit mainly, 
from the Dutch section of the population, it made very little impact in 
Britain as Percy Molteno's earlier reports indicated. The conciliators 
did, however, achieve their objective of having their views officially 
published. Several reports of meetings, forwarded to the High Commissioner 
by Cartwright in his capacity as secretary of the Cape Town Committee, 
were publi.shed in the July. blue book on South African af'fairs, 104 but 
these were accompanied by Milner's strongly condemnatory dispatch and 
were more than neutralised by the numerous counter resolutions in favour 
of annexation which appeared in the same blue book. Many of these came 
f 1 . . b d. f . d . . . C T d 1 h 105 rom re ~g~ous o ~es o var~ous enom~nat~ons ~n ape own an e sew ere, 
which had been the cause of renewed fulminations against the "Jingoism of 
these gentlemen of the cloth" in the columns of the South African News, 
106 
whose editor always displayed a particular sensitivity on that subject. 
The Dutch Reformed clergy cooperated actively in the conciliators' campaign 
against annexation, but the Church did not register a formal protest of its 
103. The pamphlets by local ,.,rriters were: "Another Tract for the Times" 
and 11Natural Laws and Miracles" by "Ignotus", a prolific contributor 
to the columns of the South African News, ,.,hom they described as · 
"a Dutch colonist'hailing from a little settlement in the Karroo" 
'vhose identity remained concealed. H. Rabinowitz was another fre-
quent contributor and two pamphlets of his, "Letters and Articles 
relating to the War between Great Britain and the South African 
Republics", were printed in 1900 and 1901 resp.ectively. 
104. Cd. 261, pp. 57-58, 92-94, 147-150. 
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own, although individual consistories such as those at Carnarvon and 
Alexandria did forward an appeal for the cessation of hostilities and 
1 . . . . h H. h C . . 107 I reso utLons agaLnst annexatLon to t e Lg ommLssLoner. n 
February a number of leading Dutch Reformed clergymen issued a manifesto 
entitled "The Dutch Reformed Church and the Boers" which was intended to 
dispel a number of misconceptions regarding the Republicans. 108 It 
set out to refute, at great length, the charge of an Afrikaner conspiracy 
against British rule in South Africa and also to disprove that the Boers 
in particular maltreated the natives or were opposed to missionary work. 
This manifesto was partly prompted by the fact that many clergymen tended 
to justify their support for the annexation of .the Republics by maintain-
ing that the Boers were particularly harsh in their treatment of the 
natives and that British rule in these territories was necessary to safe-
guard the interests of the native population. The manifesto was signed by 
nine clergymen who were members of the Synodical Mission Board and pro-
·fessors at the Theological Seminary. Milner forwarded it to Chamberlain 
who included it in the July blue book, 109 and the S.A.C.C. published it 
as a pamphlet. Percy Molteno reported that it had been distributed at a 
Liberal Federation meeting as well as being forwarded to all Members of 
110 . Parliament, but appeals of this kind or·any other made no appreciable 
impression on the British public. 
The first phase of the conciliation movement's campaign against the 
annexation of the Republics culminated, in a sense, in Merriman's speech 
Ln parliament on 24 September in support of. Sauer's motion favouring a 
limited independence for the Republics which was lost by two votes. After 
condemning the fact that the future of the Repubiics was being discussed 
by the most unsuitable persons on every conceivable platform except in the 
House of Assembly where it should properly be dealt with, Merriman went on 
to endorse the conciliators' warning that Britain ~vas jeopardising its own 
future in South Africa and supported their contention that it: would be im-
possible to extinguish the Republicans' desire for independence. But he 
concluded by pointing out that it ~vould be impossible for the Republics to 
revert to a condition of unqualified independence. 
' 
107. South African News, I Nay 1900; Cd. 261, pp. 2-3, 138. 
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"We must put down these foreign legations, these enormous 
armaments and must stop the process of making the Transvaal 
a burlesque first class power, but I believe there is a 
bright future for the Transvaal and Orange Free State if 
you adopt the principle of the protected state •••• That 
would give the Republics individual national existence which 
is all they want " 111 
Although the official programme "of the conciliation movement did not 
accord entirely with the line taken by Merriman, there were leading men 
in its ranks whose views did not differ very much from his. The editor-
ial which appeared in the South African News on the eve of the Graaff-
Reinet Congress, setting forth a number of concrete proposals regarding 
the future of the Republics, agreed virtually with every major point 
made by Merriman, although it did not advocate a qualified independence 
. 112 
for the Republics ~n so many words. The congress itself indicated 
its awareness of the di.fficulties it faced when it resolved that: 
" •••• Although v1e are well aware that such a settlement 
(unqualified independence) would not be approved at the present 
moment by the majority of English people, we hope that before 
it is too late they will become convinced of its wisdom" 
As the conflict wore on it became increasingly apparent that, if the 
conciliators were to make any impression upon the Imperial authorities 
they would have to moderate their attitude on the issue of Republican 
independence. 
111. Cape Hansard, 1900, pp. 47 8-484. The speech was later published 
as a S.A.C.C. pamphlet entitled "A Historic Speech against 
Annexation". (l'J'o. 56). 
112. South African News, 28 May 1900. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROTEST AGAINST THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 
AND ASSISTANCE TO ITS VICTIMS 
The campaign which the conciliation party conducted in favour of 
the Republics' retention of their independence constituted the major 
objective of the movement, but this was not the sum total of its acti-
vities. For the majority of Cape colonists the war was a real and 
personal catastrophe. On warning the Imperial Government of the dis-
tress which a conflict with the Transvaal would cause the conciliation 
party had repeatedly emphasized the close ·ties which existed between 
the people of the Colony and those of the Republics. They were not 
merely referring to. their common origin but also to the fact that nearly 
every Dutch family in the Colony had close relations who were burghers 
of the Republics and who would, in the event of war, be actively engaged 
in hostilities. The conduct of the war \vith·the devastation and suffer-
ing which it entailed, would inevitably have as fatal an effect on rela-
tions between the two races as the injustice of the object. for which it 
was fought. The conciliators were therefore anxious that, if such. a thing 
.were humanly possible, military operations should be conducted with a 
minimum of harshness and the assistance which they rendered to the victims 
of the war formed an integral part of the movement. It would have been 
an empty gesture had they confined themselves entirely to agitating for 
a political principle without attempting to alleviate the physical dis-
tress caused by the conflict. The situation was complicated by the war 
being carried into colonial terri tory. Although the Republican commandos 
caus·ed relatively little damage· many Cape colonists suffered severely in , 
consequence of th.e rebellion which occurred in the border districts . 
. When insisting that something be done to help the. Republican victi~s of 
the war the conciliators were on relatively firm ground for the humanitarian 
motive underlying this desire could not be questioned. But in attempting 
to alleviate the privations of their fellow colonists in the border areas 
their efforts were to a large extent confounded by the political issues 
involved. 
The question of providing aid for the Republican·- widmvs and orphans 
had already been· rais·ed at a caucus meeting of Afrikaner members of 




hostilities a fund Has established for this purpose. 1 The cormnittee 
administering it consisted of J.H. Hofmeyr. (chairman), C.P. Schultz 
(secretary) and C.C. de Villiers (treasurer). The latter, however, soon 
retired on account of· ill health and was replaced by D.J. de Villiers, 
sub-editor of Ons Land. At a meeting of women at Mrs. Koopmans de Wet's 
home on 16 October 1899 a ladies' cormni_t tee was established under her pre-
sidency to assist in raising sub-scriptions forthe fund with Mrs.C.C. de 
2 Villiers as treasurer. Charles Molteno immediately lent the fund his 
support and appealed to his brother to use his influence to raise subscrip-
tions in England. 3 Percy Molteno himself contributed generously but in-
formed his brother that as a result of the reverses suffered by the British 
army .the state of opinion in Britain was such that a public appeal was 
out of the question at that stage. He did however place Hofmeyr's com-
mittee in cormnunication with the Society of Friends which was anxious to 
render assistance to non-combatants. 4 The executive cormnittee of the 
Widows and Orphans Fund met regularly in the offices of Ons Land and the 
editor, F.S. Malan, always attended its deliberations. The fund -.;.;ras 
-therefore more intimately associated with Ons Land than with'the South 
African News but both Malan and Schultz were members of the conciliation 
cormnittee -and through them it liaised with the rest of the conciliation 
party. Being the first and the largest of the numerous relief funds, 
the Widows and Orphans Fund formed the nucleus of most of the others 
and the various cormnittees which later came into being to deal with 
different aspects of the war relief work, placed their finances in the 
hands of this committee. This was found to be the most convenient arrange~ 
ment for as the war progressed the suns involved assumed considerable pro-
portions and their administration called for great effort and responsi-
bility. C. de P. Chiappini acted as auditor for the committee. It was 
reported that when the war broke out an excited colonist approached 
Hofmeyr for advice on what the people should do and that he was told that 
the inhabitants of the Colony could pray and pay; pray for the early re-
storation of peace and pay their share into the relief funds. 5 There is 
I. South African News, 12 Oct. 1899; Ons Land, 14 Oct. 1899. 
2. J.H. Hofmeyr Papers (H.P.), Minute Book of the Working Committee for 
the administration of money and goods for the relief of Boers and their 
families, 17 Oct. 1899. 
3. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 18 Oct. 1899. --
4. Ibid., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 27 Oct. 1899, 1 I Nov. 1899, 2 March 
1900. 
5. South African News, 19 Dec. 1899. 
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no doubt that they'did so with liberality, though considerable assistance 
~.;as also received from Britain, America and Europe. 
The first disbursement which the fund made went towards ·defraying 
the expenses of five doctors who volunteered to do ambulance work with 
the Boer commandos and for this purpose the fund broadened its terms of 
reference to include the wounded as well as widows and orphans. The 
issue had first been raised by Dr. J.M. Hoffman, M.L.A. for Paarl, who 
convened a meeting at the town on 7 October 1899 to discuss the question 
of providing medical assistance to the Boers who, unlike the British 
forces, did not have an efficient Red Cross service co-operating with 
them. 6 His suggestion was taken up enthusiastically and public meet-
ings were held at several towns in the western Cape to open subscription 
lists for an ambulance corps. By 14 October Drs. Retnecke (Ceres), 
Viljoen (Grabouw) and Cilliers (Caledon) had already departed for the 
front, with Dr. Hoffman and an ambulance party of seventeen following 
later. 7 The first three proceeded to Bloemfontein where they met 
President Steyn and ~.;ere then attached to various commandos and Dr. 
Hoffman's party joined. the Phillipolis commando at Colesberg. Although 
these medical men were granted passes to proceed to the Boer lines it 
was clear that the military authorities did not approve of their acti-
vities and when Dr. Izaak van der Merwe later applied for leave to join 
them he was refused permission. On Milner's suggestion he then travelled 
by sea hoping to reach the Transvaal via Delagoa Bay, but was detained by 
the military authorities at Durban and only released on condition that he 
abandon his philanthropic mission. 8 The others were also beset by 
difficulties from the start. Ill health and domestic problems forced 
\0i lj oen to re.turn to the Colony in November. En route he was arrested 
by the military authorities at De Aar, but r~leased on parole on condition 
that he went straight back to his. farm. As a result of his having given 
his parole he had to obtain special permission from Milner before he could 
report back to the Committee. 9 Hoffman's party fared no better. 
· 6. South African Netvs, 9 Oct. 1899. 
7 •. Ibid., 17 Oct. 1899; H.P., Minute Book, 17 Oct. 1899. 
8. South African Netvs, 29 March I 90 I. 
9. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Report from A.J. Viljoen to the chairman of the 
Committee for the Transvaal and Free State wounded widows and orphans, 
15 Jan. 1900;· Milner to Schreiner, 23 Jan. 1900; H.P., Minute Book, 
23 Nov. 1899. 
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I 11 health forced him to go to Pretoria to convalesce, leaving the 
party in the hands of Dr. Cilliers. During his absence they were 
captured by the British at Springfontein and on some Mauser cartridges 
being found amongst their equipment, IO the ambulance was confiscated 
and its members bundled back to the Colony where Dr. Reinecke eventually 
tendered a verbal report to the .committee on 7 June. Hoffman only re-
turned to the Cape on 2 July to face considerable hostility in the House 
of Assembly where he was referred to as being "fresh from the enemy". II 
In view of the obstructiveness of the military authorities and seeing 
that well-equipped ambulances from Europe arrived to assist the Boers, 
the committee decided to reserve its funds for a more suitable purpose 
but ~ot before over £I 000 had been expended on this ill-fated gesture. I 2 
The misadventures of the ambulance party were, however, soon over-
shadowed by the concern felt for the Boer prisoners of war who began to 
arrive in Cape Town in increasing numbers once the British army, having 
recovered from its initial reverses, continued its advance to Bloemfon-
tein. .The prisoners were at first kept on board army transport ships in 
Simon Is Bay and in a small· camp established on the naval recreation ground 
at. Simons town, the wounded being acconunodated in military hospitals at 
Wynberg and at the docks. After the large increase in the number of pri-
soners following Cronje's surrender at Paardeberg a second camp was laid 
on at Simonstown and early in March another was established on the Green 
Point Common. With Cronje's men came the additional problem of disease 
13 for many of them had contracted typhoid during the defence of Paardeberg. 
As soon as the first prisoners of war arrived at Cape Town the press was 
inundated with letters from anxious relatives complaining about almost 
every aspect of their treatment. Many wrote directly to the Prime Minister, 
the strongest protests coming from persons who knew they had relatives 
among the prisoners. Particular anxiety was caused by reports that pri-
soners had been transported in open trucks and that several wounded had 
died in consequence. This elicited an official response from the officer 
10. It was hinted that these had been planted there by members of an 
Australian ambulance party which had camped nearby. 
11. H.P., Minute Book, 7 June 1900; South African News, 3 and 21 July 
1900. 
12. South African News, 29 March 1901. 
13. Ibid., 29 Jan. I900, 2 and 13 March 1900. 
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commanding lines of communication who admitted that' the first batch of 
prisoners taken by General Lord Methuen at the battle of Belmont had been 
conveyed in this manner, no other transport being available, but he denied 
that any of the wounded had died. 14 Schreiner also, while apologising 
15 
about the open trucks, confirmed that the alleged deaths were mere rumour. 
Further resentment was caused by. the fact that prisoners were at first 
frequently exposed to the jeers and insults of crowds at stations en route 
to Cape Tmvn and at the docks where they were transferred to the various 
camps and hospitals. On the occasion of an ambulance wagon in Cape Town 
being besieged by a hostile crowd· which its military guard could not fend 
off, an. aggrieved colonist wrote to the South African News.: 
"Now Sir, is not such a sight sufficient to raise resentment in 
the hearts of the most loyal Dutch colonists to see their kinsmen 
being thus treated without being able to render them help? 
Is not blood thicker than water? ••••. Let Britons remember that 
Dutchmen have hearts as \vell as they and are in no wise less jeal-
ous of their honour. Let those who are so sanguine that after 
this war a united South Africa will follow and that race hatred 
1..rill die out, remember that daily taunts and ill treatment are 
not easily erased from the mind". 16 
Schreiner had these incidents investigated and tried his best to soothe 
ruffled feelings. 
Hofmeyr and his coinmittee soon received numerous appeals on behalf of 
the prisoners, particularly for clothing. The Dutch Government contributed 
£500 and the Dutch Consul, B.H. de Waal, became a member 'of the committee 
for the purpose of disbursing the money, subsequently devoting much time 
17 to caring for the needs of the Boer prisoners. Payments were also 
at first made out of the Hidows and Orphans Fund but demands became so 
heavy that a separate fund.had to be created for the prisoners and on 7 
March a special appeal was made to the public for additional donations. 18 
Two days later Hofmeyr, Chiappini and D.P. Graaff called on Schreiner and 
through him elicited from the military authorities an acknowledgement that 
it was their responsibility to clothe the prisoners. 19 This was the first 
14. South African News, 15 Dec. 1899. 
15. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to S.T. Klapper,? Dec. 1899. 
16. South African News, 16 March 1900. 
17. H.P., Minute Book, 6 Dec. 1899; J.X.M.P., Agnes-Merriman to Sarah· 
Merriman, 15 June 1900. 
18. South African News, 29 March 1901. 
19. H.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to Hofmeyr, 20 March 1900. 
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·of the numerous deputations wh~ch besieged the authorities during the 
following tv7o months. The announcement that Cronje and his men were to 
be sent to St. Helena until the end of the war caused protests to come 
pouring ~n from all sides. A deputation of Dutch Reformed clergymen 
led by Andrew Murray called on Milner on 15 March to urge the authorities 
to desist from such a step .. At .,Stellenbosch, Wellington and Paarl 800 
women signed a petition po'inting out that the Boer prisoners would regard 
their removal to St. Helena as a punishment inflicted upon them and as 
an undeserved aggravation of the privations to which, as prisoners of war, 
they were necessarily exposed. The petitioners feared that the bitterness 
of feeling already existing would be intensified by this measure and re-
quested that the prisoners be confined where they would not be out of 
reach of their relatives and friends. Mrs. Koopmans de Wet got up a 
similar petition and Schreiner, who disapproved of the authorities' de-
.cision, gave them his official support. By then the conciliation movement 
.had got well under way and the matter was frequently raised at concilia-
tion meetings, at least seventeen of these passing resolutions condemning 
the deportation of the Boer prisoners. But although the conciliators 
found the military authorities most accommodating in other matters regard-
ing the prisoners, on the issue of deportation they were adamant and the 
. 1. d f ak h b f h . . 20 0 28 cone~ ~ators ha per orce tom e t e est o t e s~tuat~on. n 
March a deputation of fifty prominent men called on Schreiner to make 
further representations regarding the treatment of the Boer prisoners. 
They urged that those suffering from typhoid should be separated from the 
others, that the sick should not be shipped to St. Helena and that more 
facilities be provided for relatives to visit the men. This unwieldy de-
putation was reduced to more manageable proportions and it was arranged 
that a sub-committee consisting of James Molteno, Malan, Chiappini and. 
Rev. B. Marchand call on the mi 1i tary authorities. After a lengthy con-
sultation it ~vas agreed that all prisoners would be removed from the 
transports as soon as possible, that lists would regularly be published 
to indicate where prisoners were located and permits were granted to 
members of the relief committee and to several clergymen to visit the· 
hospitals and camps·at regular intervals. 21 Conciliation meetings in 
20 •. 
21. 
South African News, 19 and 29 March 1900, 3 
Malan, Marie Koopmans de Wet, pp. 205-206; 
Andrew Murray to Milner, 16 March 1900. 
South African News, 29 March 1900, 3 April 
3 April 1900. 
and 4 Apri 1, 1900; 
W. P ~ S • P. , ( S .A. L. ) , 
i 900; Ons Land, 
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the western Cape displayed a particular anxiety regarding the treatment 
of the Boer prisoners and the Ste llenbosch .and. Tu lbagh meetings appointed 
delegates to discuss the matter with Schreiner. Consequently another 
deputation of "influential and representative gentlemen" from Paarl, 
Stellenbosch, 1\Tellington, Tulbagh, Malmesbury and Caledon, led by j,S. 
Marais, M.L.A. for Paarl, called on the Prime Minister on 2 April to lay 
before him demands similar to those of the previous deputation. 22 
Schreiner, who was always most helpful ~n these matters, suggested that 
they establish a regular liaison with the relief committee and when com-
municating their demands to Colonel Trotter, the local chief of staff, 
he pointed out: 
"One can never forget' that many of our perfectly loyal subjects 
,have very close ties of kinship with many of the Republican 
prisoners, and any legitimate alleviations of the lot of the 
latter tell for much in aid of the wise policy of soothing the 
feelings of the Dutch people of this Colony". 23 
After the military authorities had overcome the initial difficulties in-
volved in accommodating large numbers of prisoners, 
outbreak of typhoid for which they had been totally 
ments ~vere placed on .a more satisfactory footing. 
aggravated by the 
24 
unpr·ep ared, arrange-
By mid-April most of 
the men had been removed from the transports, where the ships' surgeons 
admitted that the most unsatisfactory conditions prevailed, and additional 
hospitals had been established at Simonstm-m and Green Point. By the end 
of April the conciliators had also streamlined .their own organisation. 
On 20 April a general Ladies Clothing Committee for Prisoners of War was 
established which had the support of women like Mrs. Koopmans de Wet, 
Mary Sauer, Caroline Murray, Anna Purcell, Mrs. C.C. de Villiers, Yrrs. Hay 
·and Mrs. Beck as well as a galaxy of clergymen's wives. 25 This commit-
tee grew mainly out of the activities of the women of Sea Point and Green 
Point, who had initially under the leadership of the local clergymen's 
~vives constituted themselves into t~vo committees which undertook to make 
conditions more bearable for the men detained on the Green Point Common. 
Funds were raised independently but later assistance was secured from the 
Prisoners of War Fund to engage six nurses to care for the sick and wounded 
22. South African News, 3 April 1900. 
23 .. H.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to Col~ Trotter, 2 April 1900. 
24. South African News, 3 April 1900. 
25. c.c. de Villiers Papers, U.C.T~, (D.V.P., (U.C.T.)), Minute Book 




and to erect a depot near the new hospital to store gifts sent to the 
prisoners from Cape Town and other neighbouring towns. These were system-
atically distributed by the depot officer and Dr. Kolbe also worked in-
dependently to provide comforts for the sick and wounded. Throughout the 
military authorities welcomed this co-operation and afforded the workers 
every assistance. In April these committees became affiliated to form 
a general committee which established additional branches in Cape Town, 
Rondebosch and Woodstock each v7ith its own executive. Mrs. Stegmann 
became president of the general committee, Mrs. B. Marchand secretary 
and Yrrs. Roos treasurer. Having been first in the field the women of 
Sea Point and Green Point displayed a certain reluctance to relinquish 
their independence, but after some persuasion they were eventually pre-
vailed upon to part with their funds which were handed over to Hofmeyr's 
committee for administration as part of the Prisoners of War Fund from 
which the Ladies Committee received regular disbursements to defray their 
26 
e}l.-penses. The various branches worked independently, collecting funds 
and material and making clothing, with regular general meetings being 
held every month to co-ordinate their activities. 
In the ensuing months, as the number of prisoners grew, the task 
.of providing for their needs developed into a major undertaking. The 
Gentlemen's Committee, as Hofmeyr's committee was usually referred to, 
hired a special depot, staffed by two clerks and three labourers, at 
which goods were received, stored and packed for dispatch to the thirty-
two camps in the Cape and Natal and in St. Helena, Ceylon, Bermuda, India 
and Pprtugal. Later in the war the consignment of goods to overseas 
camps was prohibited, but ,the prisoners were allowed to .receive money 
instead. Under the direction of Andrew Murray most of the camps were 
provided Hith chaplains Hho had to undertake the duties of the "zieken-
trooster" of old as Hell as minister to the spiritual needs of the pri-
soners. An effort Has made to provide some sort of education for the 
large number of young boys .in the camps and committees in England and 
Holland assisted in providing such literature as Has permitted by the 
military authorities. Up to the end of 1900 the Gentlemen's Coilli!iittee 
devoted its efforts almost entirely to the Boer prisoners, the funds 
26. South African NeHs, 19 and 26 April 1900, 10 and 25 l'iay 1900; 
D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book, 27 April 1900. 
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received for the widows and orphans being invested for distribution 
after the war. By November £16 939 had been received for the prisoners 
27 fund of ~v-hich £10 470'had been expended. After that the needs of 
the prisoners ~.;rere dwarfed by those of. the women and children in the 
concentration camps. The pr1soners fund was, however, continued until 
the end of the war. ~~en it was· closed in August 1902 £18 157 had been 
received' of which £15 058 had been spent. In addition to this a further 
£37 075 had been forwarded to individual prisoners by the se~retary of 
. . 28 
the commlttee. Workers amongst the Boer prisoners came not only 
from South Africa, but also from Britain. Mrs. Alice Stopford Green, 
widow of the English historian and a friend bf the Chief Justice, went 
to St. Helena ~vhere Percy Molteno's generosity helped to alleviate the 
lot of the detainees and her friend Mary Kingsley, the well-known writer 
and African explorer, nursed the Boers,suffering from typhoid at Simons-
town, eventually succumbing to the disease herself. 29 
Apart from the British Government's decision to deport the Boer 
prisoners of war the conciliators'work in connection with them remained 
free from 'the acrimony which attended their efforts in other spheres. 
They found the authorities on the whole most co-operative and those en-
gaged in the relief work frequently praised the efforts being made on 
30 behalf of the prisoners. The imperialist party at the Cape also 
refrained from trying to'make political capital out of the matter although 
.there were occasions when controversy lay not far beneath the surface. 
Shortly after the Widows and Orphans Fund had been established the Cape 
Argus seized upon the fact that Schreiner's ~vife had contributed to it 
to point out that the Prime Minister had "indirectly" subscribed to the 
fund and maintained that this would encourage the Boers in their resist-
ance. This incurred the ~.;rrath of the South African Ne~vs as did its later 
. d l'k. h . 31 remark that the Boers were be1ng treate ~ore 1 e pets t an prlsoners. 
27. H.P., Minute Book, 15 Nov. 1900. 
28. H.P., Verslag en Overzicht van de Werkzaamheden van het Werkend 
Comite .•.• Aug. 1902, p. 15. 
29. Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 371; M.P., A. Stopford Green· to 
P.A. Molteno, 30 Aug. 1900, 24 Sept. 1900, c. 12 Oct.· 1900; 
Ons Land, 12 June 1900. 
·30. South African News, 13 March 1900, 13 April 1900. 




In February, when the electric lights at the Simonstown camp failed and, 
as a prearranged signal two shots were fired to warn the station from 
'ivhere the power was supplied, the Cape Argus turned this into an escape 
bid by some of the Boer prisoners, publishing a report with full parti-
culars as to the number of prisoners and guards .wounded in the attempt 
and embroidering it with additional details of the prisoners' misdeeds 
while on board one of the transports. When the camp commandant explained 
what had happened only. a half-hearted denial was published, 32 These 
were, however, minor irritations compared to the.incident which occurred 
in May and which had all the makings of a nasty row. On 3 May a Boer 
prisoner was shot by a sentry at the Green Point camp, apparently without 
reason. 
33 The verdict of the. inquest was that the prisoner had .been 
shot 1-rhile trying to escape and the private responsible was promoted to 
the rank of corporal. It was clear that the South African News was not 
satisfi.ed with the verdict but it refrained from making an issue of the 
matter, merely remarking that if the soldier's promotion had been un-
connected with the unfortunate incident it would have been as 'ivell for 
the military authorities to have stated this; a remark which the Cape 
Argus interpreted· as a "vile insinuation". The South African News 
eventually conceded that the sentry had merely been guilty of an error 
of judgment and, comparing his action to that of the policeman who shot 
34 Edgar, allowed the matter to rest there. 
The Boer inhabitants of the Republics were not the 'only ones to 
suffer privations as a result of the war. When it became apparent that 
a conflict was imminent a large number of uitlanders fled from the 
Transvaal, mainly to coastal towns such as Cape Tmm and Durban ~Vhere 
many were left destitute. After the middle of 1900 when Lord Roberts 
had confidently declared that the war was virtually over, but conditions 
remained such that the uitlander refugees could not return to the Trans-
vaal, their enforced presence in the Cape and Natal caused the authorities 
considerable embarrassment. r;n Cape Town the Rand Relief Committee was 
established which co-operated with the M~nsion House Fund to provide 
. 35 
assistance to these people. It was· tacitly accepted that the 
32. South African News, 8 and 13 Feb. 1900, 
33. Ibid., 4 May 1900. 
34. South African News, 28 May 1900, 
35. Ibid., 10 Oct. 1899. 
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uitlander refugees' were the responsibility of the imperialist party 
and the League of Loyal Ladies was left to minister to their needs while 
the women of the conciliation party concentrated their efforts on the 
Boer victims of the war. The Rand Relief Committee was dissolved ~n 
July 1901 after having assisted some 5 700· refugees. Its total expendi-
ture was £24 260 of which £6 000 was contributed locally. 36 
The problems which resulted from the activities of the military 
authorities within the confines of the Colony were far more complex 
than those arising out of the conduct of the war in the Republics for, 
as Milner pointed out, ~n the Colony it.was· ·virtually impossible to 
separate the political and military aspects of the conflict. 37 In 
theory the war was one between Britain and the Republics but the inva-
sion of the Cape by the Free State commandos meant that the Colony also 
became directly involved. Some colonists joined the volunteer forces 
which were called out on 16 October 1899 to defend their districts while, 
in the border areas, large numbers joined the invading commandos, thus 
creating a state of civil war. Contact between these opposing forces 
was, however, minimal. Schreiner, not wishing to antagonise the Free 
State, had resolutely refused to station colonial troops on the bo7"ders 
. and both the regular and volunteer forces were left scattered in small . 
38 
numbers throughout the Colony. The Imperial troops were concentrated 
in two forces under Gatacre and Methuen ~n the midlands and the north-
west so that the invaders were left a free hand in most of the border dis-
tricts and most towns were surrendered to them without a shot being fired. 
The actual fighting in colonial territory during 1900 was confined mainly 
to clashes between Republi,can forces and Imperial troops· along the major 
routes of advance. Thus, although the Colony could not be kept out of 
the war, it was spared the rigours of having to participate in a full-
scale conflict and the attendant evil effect which that v10uld have had on 
the already strained relations between the races. Although the Republicans 
usually left the loyal colonists unmolested as long as they undertook to 
remain neutral, a certain amount of damage to property was done, more often 
by the colonial Afrikaners who had joined the comm&~dos and were either 
36. South African News, 5 July 1901. 
37. LeMay, British Supremacy, pp. 45-46. 
38. Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, pp. 58-59. 
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. prompted by vindictiveness or could not resist the temptation to settle' 
old scores. 39 The more innocuous behaviour of the Afrikaners, their 
"swaggering about with. an air of authority"40 while the commandos were 
in control of certain districts also gave great offence to loyal British 
colonists and this was reflected in resolutions passed at many annexa-
tion meetings requiring severe p,enalties for the rebels.. The Tarka 
Farmers' Association, for 'example, adopted a motion demanding that re-
bellion be punished by the death sentence, confiscation of property, life 
imprisonment with hard labour or disfranchisement for life. 41 Contribu-
tors to the columns of the Eastern Province Herald added to this list 
suggestions that rebels should wear distinctive badges, carry passes or 
. 42 
even be banished from the Colony. 
By the end of March the Republican forces had withdrawn across the 
border and the majority of the rebels had surrendered, most of them be-
ing allowed to return to their farms until they could be dealt with by 
the authorities. The conciliation party was, however, extremely reluctant 
to admit that an extensive rebellion had taken place. The South African 
Ne1vs repeatedly warned its readers to take the nev1s of events on the border 
1vith a pinch of salt43 and at the end of April it was still urging "the 
extreme unwisdom of t~king seriously all the reports about the numbers 
affected by rebellion in the border districts". It be-lieved that it was 
in the interest of the imperialist party to exaggerate the extent of the 
rebellion "hence the reports in the Jingo press about 'thousands of Cape 
colonists rising', 'the Colony seet:hing 1vith rebellion' and so on ad 
nauseam. When the facts are published it will probably be found that 
throughout the Colony nothing like I 000 persons will be adjudged guilty 
f b 11 . " 44 N 1 1 d d . . f o re e ~on • • . umerous p eas 1vere a so a vance ~n extenuat~on o. 
the rebels' conduct. It was poi'nted out that they had been motivated by 
their overwhelming sympathy for their Republican kin and their conviction 
of the injustice ofthe war; that they had been provoked by the attitude 
of their opponents and by unjust treatment under martial law; that many 
39. Le May, British Supremacy, pp. 47-48. 
40. South African News, 21 Feb. 1900. 
41. II)'.P.S.P., (S;A~L.), E.J. Spurway to Schreiner, 19 May 1900. 
42. South African News, 26 March 1900. 
43. Ibid., 28 Nov. 1899. 
44. South African Ne1vs, 26 Apri 1 1900. 
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had acted ~n ~gnorance believing that they were obliged to obey the 
orders of the Free ·state commandants \vho exercised effective control in (:: 
their districts; tha·t the border areas. had been left undefended and 
that the Boers had compelled them to take up arms threatening them with 
confiscation of their property and other reprisals if they refused and 
that some had even been marched ·off to the Boer laagers under armed 
45 guard. Exaggerated as some of these excuses might have been, there 
was no doubt that the Afrikaners in the border areas had been placed in 
·a most trying dilemma and the conciliation party was anxious that they 
should not be too severely punished for their misguided actions. 
Inextricably linked with the difficulties created by the rebellion,· 
were the problems arising out of the declaration of martial law in the 
disaffected areas of the Colony. Milner had been anxious to use it as 
a means of preventing rebellion, but the ministry had agreed to it with 
the greatest reluctance, fearing that {t would have just the opposite 
effect. Between~· 16 October and 8 December martial law was, however, de-
clared in a11 the districts bordering on the Republics. 46 As it placed 
arbitrary power in the hands of the military authorities in order 'to en-
able them by extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of the country and 
to restore orde~ it inevitably lent itself to abuse. In the circumstances 
prevailing at the Cape this danger was greatly increased and during the 
war, no other measure within the Colony did more to exacerbate ill feeling 
between ·the races than the administration of martial law. The military 
authorities' lack of experience in this field combined with the suspicion 
with which many of them regarded the Dutch colonists superimposed upon the 
hostility of a large section of the English-speaking population, resulted 
in actions ranging from mere tactlessness to serious abuses of authority. 
The numerous petty indignities and inconveniences suffered under the system 
caused as much irritation as the more serious malpractices. Not a day 
passed without the columns of ne-.;.1spapers such as Ons Land and the South 
African News being filled with a recital of alleged grievances suffered 
45. South African Ne-.;vs, 25 April 1900, 17 May 1900; W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), 
A.S. duPlessis to Schreiner, 2 April .1900. 
46. The areas proclaimed were: Taungs, Vryburg, Barkly \·Jest, Kimberley, 
Herbert, De Aar, Steynsburg, Albert, Molteno, Aliwal North, Hodehouse, 
Glen Grey, Queensto-.;.m, Cathcart, Hay, Hope Tmvn and Philips town. 




under the administration of martial law. These included complaints 
that people were arrested simply because they had Dutch names, that 
arbitrary restrictions were placed upon their movements, that only the 
Dutch had to carry passes, that their mail was censored while that of 
their English neighbours was left untouched, that rewards were offered 
to informers, and that those und~r arrest were denied access to their 
legal advisers and that farmers were not allowed to sell their produce 
or to dra1v funds from the bank. 47 The greatest dissatisfaction was 
however caused by the fact that individuals were often arrested on slender 
or unreliable evidence, imprisoned for lengthy periods, often under the 
most distressing conditions, and eventually released without having been 
charged with any offence. In the interim their stock was commande~red 
and sold at unreasonably low prices, often to interested persons so that 
on their release the victims found that they had suffered gonsiderable 
pecuniary loss, many farmers complaining that they were ruined men. 48 
In cases where bread-winners were imprisoned.for long periods their 
families were often left without any means of support. Others emerged 
from prison to find that their property had been looted or destroyed. 
By June 1900 numerous reports of the distress being experienced by 
families in martial law areas had appeared in the press and suggestions 
h 1 b k . . d 49 J were made that steps s ou d e ta en to ass~st those ~n nee • .G. 
van der Horst, a partner ~n the same legal firm as Sauer, protested that 
although confiscation of property was prohibited by law the authorities 
were circumventing this by imposing heavy fines and that many persons were 
being pauperised by these measures. He pointed out that this was aggravat-
ing the poor white problem and that it was not justice but a social crime 
so 
against which the Church .and Parliament ought to protest. On 6 July 
Hofmeyr issued a formal appeal on behalf of the destitute ~n martial law 
areas. He pointed out, however, that the committee administering the 
Widows and Orphans and the Prisoners of vJar Funds already had its hands 
full and that it could not undertake additional responsibility. A separate 
fund '\vould therefore be .created under the control of the Rev. J. Roos, 
general secretary of the Dutch Reformed Church, and a small committee ·of 
47. ·South African News, 18 Dec. 1899, 1S Jan. 1900, 13 Feb. 1900, 8 June 190o:->, 
48. Ibid., 30 June 1900, 30 Nov. 1900. 
49. South African News, 2 June 1900. 
SO. Ibid., 6 June 1900. 
' 
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clergymen and others would be appointed to assist him. Funds would be 
distributed in consultation with local clergymen and branches of the 
Bond, but assistance svould not necessarily be confined to members of 
the Dutch Reformed Church. 51 This fund received less publicity than 
the others and did not equal the amounts raised for the Republicans. 
It did, however, receive dortations, even from England. Percy Molteno. 
had already in April contributed £100 towards assisting persons Lmproper-
ly arrested under martial law, and Rev. S.E. Gladstone, a son of the 
British statesman, wrote to Merriman commiserating with the plight of 
the Boer families and enclosing a donation from his parishioners ~vhich 
was gratefully acknowledged in the South African News. 52 By November 
·1900 the fund totalled £4 177. 53 
The strongest complaints against the administration of martial law 
came from Wodehouse and Aliwal North, the constituencies of Merriman and 
Sauer in both of which over three-quarters of the inhabitants had assisted 
54 the invaders. The conduct of the military authorities in these dis-
tricts was characterised by a greater degree of political vindictiveness 
than was present e lse~vhere. This was due to the fact that on the with-
drawal of the Free State forces these districts were occupied by Brabant's 
Horse, a volunteer corps of Eastern Province. farmers under the command of 
Brigadier General E.Y. Brabant, ex-chairman of the Cape branch of the 
South African League and M.L.A. for East London. 55 The o.fficer cominanding 
in the district was Major C.P. Crewe, the paid secretary of the League. 
Even before the outbreak of the war when Olive Schreiner wrote to her 
brother advising him not to do anything ~vhich would give Milner the oppor-
tunity of dismissing his ministry, she had urged: 
"If you do nothing else you keep the men out Hho would turn the 
full force of the Volunteers upon us. I myself am not afraid 
that we could not deal with the English troops except ~if_l 
they Here in the very largest numbers, but with a band of Eastern 
Province Volunteers it would be otherwise". 56 
51. South African NeHs, 6 July 1900; Ons Land, 10 July 1900. 
52. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 6 April 1900; Lewsen, Merriman 
Correspondence, v. iii, p. 221; South African News, ·23 July J900. 
53. South African News, 19 Nov. 1900. 
54. Snyman, Rebelleverhoor in Kaapland, p. 15. 
55. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. LLL, p. 139. 




The activities of ~rabant's Horse proved that her fears were not un-
founded. Major Crewe had been an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate 
for Alhral North during the 1898 election and his political opponent, 
P.J. de Wet, M.L.A. for Wodehouse, was one of the first to be arrested 
together \vith J .F. de Wet and D. de Wet. 57 It was reported that many 
of the most respected inhabitants of the district \vho had remained loyal 
were arrested and their stock confiscated and sold by public auction. 
As many of those not arrested were confined to their farms there was 
very little competition at the sales which. were conducted by J.V. O'Bri~n, 
a prominent member of the local branch of the League. The principal 
purchaser of the stock was a Mr. Clarke whom the South African News 
described as an "active Jingo". 58 Merriman, protesting vigorously 
against these proceedings, wrote to Milner who during March undertook a 
tour of inspection through the martial law areas, but received little 
sympathy. The High Commissioner regarded the seizure of the property 
of rebels-in-arms as a justifiable means of suppressing rebellion but 
di4 not think that it was being resorted to as punishment for past offenc-
59 O'Brien was one of the several Leaguesmen with whom Milner con-es. 
d h d . h . f b 1 . d. . 60 sulted at .Dor rec t regar Lng t1e prosecutLon o re e s Ln the 1str1ct. 
The resentment aroused by Cre\ve's activities was aggravated by the fact 
that men such as H.C. Hull, E.P. Solomon, H.L. Lindsay and George Farrar 
were appointed as legal advisers to the military authorities engaged in 
prosecuting the rebels. These men had all been connected with the Uit-
lander Council in the Transvaal and Farrar was one of the five who had 
signed the letter of invitation to Jameson before the Raid. 61 These 
measures smacked strongly of political revenge and Merriman condemned 
the activities of Crewe andBrabant "with their junta of 'reformers'" as · 
infamous and strongly urged upon Schreiner the advisability of having 
martial law withdra~~ from districts where military operations had ceased. 62 
The South African Ne-v1s, while admitting that all the men arrested were pro-
bably not innocent, regarded it as a disgrace that men like Cre>ve and his 
57. On being tried for treason, P.J. de Wet was acquitted, the other two 
were found guilty. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 100, 
178; Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 234. 
58. South African News, 29 March 1900. 
59. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 173-174. 
60. South African News, 30 March 1900; M.P., Sauer to P.A. Molteno, 
28 March 1900. 
61. South African Ne>-<s, 13 April 1900 • 
. 62. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 177, 198. 
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associates were employed ·for the purpose and registered a strongly-
63 
worded protest, In addition to the political bias of their acti-
vities, Brabant's Horse acquired a reputation for wholesale looting and 
destruction of property being termed the "Brabanditti" by the war cor-
respondent of the Daily Telegraph. It was reported that they "left a 
trail of misery and ruin from St~rkstroom to Dordrecht and from there 
. '64 . 
to Jamestmvn that being the country they covered" and letters such as 
that from a member of the force .which appea.red in the Graaff-Reinet 
. Advertiser confirmed that "loot '\vas 
It was, however, not only the Dutch 
65 plentiful and '\ve fared well" . 
who felt the heavy hand of Major 
Crewe. The Rev. David Ross of Lady Grey fell foul of the Major in May 
when he remonstrated with him about the requisitioning of his parishion-
ers' draught animals when they came to ''nachtmaal", having previously 
been assured by the military that they would not be molested. On 27 June 
he was arrested on a verbal charge of high treason and after twenty-four 
days in gaol was released on £3 000 bail but was forbidden to.leave the 
village. After.~ndergoing four preliminary investigations he was even-
tually in May 1901 informed that the Attorney-General declined to .Pro-
66 . 
secute. 
Proceedings such as these caused untold ill feeling and the con-
ciliation party was loud in its condemnation of the system under which 
they occurred. Merriman camp lained that: 
"Even worse than the war is this martial la'\v business. The scars 
left by the former will be skinned over but I doubt whether any 
time will obliterate the memories of the scorn and insult that 
have been dealt out to the Dutch, who have remained amid great 
temptation loyal to their duty or the vindic·tive manner in which 
the sins of those who were led astray have been visited on their 
heads". 67 
The conciliation party was fortunate tha~ during 1900 martial law stifled. 
criticism in only a part of the Colony and they ,'\vere still in a position 
to make their voices heard. Martial law formed a major topic of discussion 
at conciliation meetings and at many of these resolutions were passed 
63. South African News, 30 March 1900, 28 April 1900. 
64. Ibid., 20 Aug. 1900. 
65. South African News, 30 March 1900, 27 Sept. 1900, 3 Jan. 1901. 
66. Ibid., 1 May 1900, 29 June 1900, 20 May 1901. 




condemning arbitrary arrests and requesting the military authorities 
to shmv more consideration in apprehending suspects. The deproclamation 
of martial law in evacuated areas was strongly urged and occasionally 
resolutions requesting an amnesty for rebels were appended. It is not-
able that speakers at the conciliation meeting at Philipstown, which was 
1.n a proclaimed are.a, \vere more ,concerned with airing their grievances 
under the system than with protesting against the annexation of the Re-
publics. A committee was appointed to investigate what could be done to 
assist persons who -v1ere being kept under arr·est and it was authorised 
~ . 68 
to apply even to the Supreme Court 1.f necessary. The conciliation 
committee at Stellenbosch also forwarded a special protest to the Prime 
:t-1inister objecting to the procedure being adopted by the military tri-
69 
. bunals. After the People's Congress at Graaff-Reinet had concluded 
its formal business several speakers recounted their harrowing experiences 
under martial law and at its Paarl Congres·s the Bond registered a strong 
. . d d . d d . . . d . . . 70 protest aga1.nst J..t an . eman e an enqu1.ry 1.nto J..ts a ml.nJ..stratJ..on. 
Speeches at the women's meetings were particularly strong on the subject. 
At Cape Town Mary Sauer condemned the indefinite imprisonment of suspects 
.without trial andput in a plea for an amnesty for rebels. AliceGreene 
travelled to Ceres specially to speak in support of a similar resolution 
there. 71 In her dramatic address to the womeri of Somerset East Olive 
Schreiner animadverted upon the fact that "the honourable uniform of the 
British officer was pawned to civilians, that masquerading in that. guise 
they might avenge themselves upon their political enemies". 72 On the 
occasion of the Cape Town meeting a deputation of women from Paarl and 
Wellington applied for an interview with Milner to request the withdrawal 
of martial la\v, but were informed that the High Commissioner could not 
see them. and that they •vould have to submit their request in writing. 
This response was interpreted as yet another 1.n the series of snubs which 
the women of the conciliation party received at the hands of the author-
. . G . H. 73 1.t1.es at overnment ouse. 
68. South African Nev-rs, 6.April 1900. 
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70. Cape Times, 2 June 1900; Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, pp. 220-221. 
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72. South African News, 19 Oct. 1900. 





Cenci liators at the Cape also provided their allies in England 
with as much information as they could on martial law abuses in order 
to have these brought, to the attention of the British public and in the 
hope that influential persons in England might intercede with the 
authorities for some of the accused. Thus Percy Molteno was kept abreast 
of the situation through the columns of the South African News and letters 
from his brothers and he used the information he received in the press 
and also to get questions asked in the House of Commons. Sauer appeaied 
to him to see if he could get anything done about the activities of Crewe 
and Brabant in his constituency and the South African News urged friends 
of those who considered 'themselves wronged to make the facts of each case 
.public at once in order to strengthen the hands of those \vho were at viork 
. h .. h 1' 74 '1 . d h 1n t e Br1t1s par 1ament. In Apr1 Percy Molteno reporte t at ques-
tions put in the House appeared to have borne some fruits· 1n the release 
of persons arrested and in better precautions being taken to guard against 
the abuse of authority.· 75 Merriman corresponded regularly with James 
Bryce and John Morley and the latter used his influence to have the case 
of O.S. Vermooten, one of Merriman's constituents, brought to the notice 
of Lord Ro.berts. L·eonard Courtney also assured Merriman that they were 
doing their utmost to pub licise the arbitrary conduct which was taking 
place under the shelter of martial law. 76 In May John Ellis and two 
associates sent J.M. Robertson to the Cape to investigate the situation 
and to supply them with accurate information on martial law and censor-
ship "with a view to helping some of us here who view \vith grave concern 
this drift towards unconstitutional and high-handed breaches of the right 
of self-government which is pretty certain to follow on this lamentable 
war". Robertson travelled to the Cape \vith Vincent vari der Byl who had 
been visiting England and Ellis \vrote to Schreiner requesting him to give 
77 Robertson \vhat assistance he could. Percy Molteno advised his brother 
to do the same and Charles Molteno introduced Robertson to the Merrimans. 78 
74. · M.P., Sauer to P.A. Molteno, 28 March 1900; South African News, 10 
March 1900. 
75. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Holteno, 6 April 1900. 
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In 1901 Robertson published the letters vJhich he had written to the 
press between June and October 1900, describing the situation in the Cape 
and Natal, in book form under the title Wrecking the Empire. 
The co~ciliation party's agitation against martial law made little 
impression upon the military authorities. If their representations were 
to have any effect they would have to come from the Cape Government. 
From London Percy Molteno, impatient and critical as ever, inveighed 
against the inaction of the ministry. In January he did not mince his 
words when he told Herriman: 
"You cannot rid yourselves of your constitutional responsibility 
by handing over defence to the Imperial authorities. You must 
protect the rights of your people and guard their interests 
otherwise you fail in the one and only reason for your existence 
as a minis try". 79. 
He warned that should the Dutch feel that they were being handed over to 
the tender mercies of the military they might be driven to desperation 
and perhaps even revolt and he insisted that the ministry should remain 
in consultation with the. military authorities on the measures being taken 
. h 1 . d d . . 80 s h . . 1. in t e proc a1me 1str1cts. c re1ner and h1s colleagues, 1ke Rose 
Innes after them, were subjected to much undeserved criticism on this 
score as the representations 'tvhich they made to Milner and the military 
authorities were not publicly known. They were anxious to mitigate the 
harshness of martial la~ as much as possible and were particularly in-
sistent that the operation of the civil courts should not be unnecessarily 
interfered with. At th~ir instigation Judge W.H, Solomon was in February 
seconded to the mil~tary authorities to preside over important treason 
trials. 81 Schreiner also urged the withdrawal of martial law from cer-
tain -districts, but found both Milner and the military unco-operative in 
82 this regard. Constant complaints against the system prompted 1-Iilner, 
accompanied by the Attorney-General, to undertake a tour of the proclaimed 
districts, in order to investigate the situation on the sppt. He was ap-
palled by 'tvhat he found, but 'tvas. offended not so much by the alleged in-
justices which were being perpetrated, although he admitted that there was 
reason for complaint, as by the administrative chaos which prevailed. 
79. H.P., P.A. Holteno to Merriman, 3 Jan. 1900. 
80. Ibid.~ P.A. Holteno to C. Holteno, 26 Jan. 1900. 
81. LeMay, British ·supremacy, p. 56; Van Heyningen, Milner and the 
Schreiner Ministry, pp. 97, 101. 
82. W.P.S.P., (S~A.L.), Schreiner to Milner, 14 May 1900. 
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His efforts were therefore mainly directed towards infusing some order 
and consistency into the activities of the military authorities. 83 
The conciliation party's strongest hope of securing redress of their 
grievances lay in the fact that their representatives in parliament could 
refuse to pass legislation indemnifying persons for acts done under mar-
tial law until a corrnnission of enquiry had been appointed. Percy Molteno 
repeatedly urged them not ~o lose sight of this. In February he told 
James Ho 1 teno: 
11Remember you have to be asked for an act of indemnity for all 
that is done. You must give Hilner and his crew a fright and 
show them that their action will be dangerous for themselves 11 • 84 
Three months later he was still advising Charles Holteno to, 
11Remember about the committee on Martial Law, arbitrary arrests, 
seizure and sale of stock and give no act of indemnity until 
you have fully inquired and know what has occurred and are in 
a position to remedy it. No one can object to this course. it 
is perfectly reasonable that you should know what has been done 
before you condone it". 85. 
The conciliation party . therefore felt understandably aggrieved ~vhen 
Schreiner resigned on 13 June, shortly before parliament was due to meet, 
and during the session took his seat on the cross-benches thereby de-
priving them of their majority in the House of Assembly. Schreiner's 
resignation was caused by the fact that his ministry could not agree on 
the penalties which should be imposed upon the rebels. Sauer, Herriman 
and Te Water admitted that the ringleaders would have to be punished but 
were in favour of a wide amnesty for the rank and file. The other members 
of the ministry, particularly Richard Solomon, felt that the rank and file· 
should suffer some penalty for their offence. The case in favour of amnesty 
was ably put by Merriman in a minute which urged the Imperial Government 
to follow the example set by Lord Durham during the rebellion in Lower 
Canada in 1837-38. 86 The dissenting members of the ministry reluctantly 
endorsed the minute ~n order to preserve the unity of the Cabinet, Schreiner, 
however, felt that: 
83. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, p. 104; 
Headlam, Milner/Papers, v. ii, p. 106. 
84. M.P., P.A. Molteno to J. Molteno, 15 Feb. 1900 •. -
85. Ibid., P.A. Molt~no to.C. Molteno, 17 May 1900. 




"If it should be that·the Imperial Government take a different 
vie\v and propose the enforcement of a period of political dis-
franchisement upon those \vho have taken up arms against the Queen, 
- I shall greatly regret the loss of an opportunity for strength-
ening the position of England in the hearts of the Dutch subjects 
of Her Majesty in this Colony, but I shall feel bound to secure 
the passage of the necessary measure". 87 
He believed that this \vas a matter in which the colonial parliament could 
merely petition as the granting of an arnnest;y was an Act of Grace which 
the Queen exercised on the advice of her ministers but which could not 
be demanded by the Cape Government. \fuen Chamberlain insisted on a 
period of disfranchisement for the rank and file Schreiner therefore found 
himself out of sympathy with the rest of the South African Party which re-
garded such a step as a measure of vindictive political persecution. By 
disfranchising the rebels the Dutch would be deprived of political·power 
and the position of the two parties in parliament \vould be reversed. 
Merriman and Hofmeyr both pointed out that the measure would create a 
class of Dutch 'helots' and the 'latter added that if this were done "I 
\vould indeed despair of seeing in my lifetime anything like harmony or good 
88 feeling between the two European races of the Colony". As the majority 
of his party refused to support him, Schreiner had no choice but to resign. 
Milner had welcomed the difficulties created by the rebellion to rid him-· 
self of what he regarded as the disloyal section of the ministry .and to 
ensure that political power at the Cape would for several years be 1n the 
hands of the imperialist party. He was in fact strongly in favour of sus-
pending the Colony's constitution believing it an impossible state of 
affairs to maintain self-government in a colony where the majority of the 
·population was hostile to Britain. Ch_amberlain, however, opposed ·such a 
drastic step and effectively curbed Milner's more extreme inclinations al-
though he did not shrink from using the threat that the constitution might 
b . b s h . 89 be suspended to r1ng pressure to ear on c re1ner. Milner had hoped 
to keep the prime minister in office with a reconstructed ministry but 
Schreiner refused to join hands with the opposition against his erstwhile 
. . . 90 
assoc1ates. Sprigg was therefore called upon to form a government and 
87. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner toR. Solomon, 27 April 1900. 
88. Ibid,, Hofmeyr to Schreiner, 22 May 1900; LeMay, British Supremacy, 
p. 68. 
89. LeMay, British ·supremacy, pp. 56-57, 69. 
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Innes accepted the vital post of attorney-general, feeling that it was 
not the time to refuse the request because of minor differences v7i th 
91 Sprigg. 
The conciliation party found Schreiner's behaviour most disconcert-
~ng and although they outwardly adopted a moderate attitude towards him, 
many privately expressed their strong disapproval and disappointment. 
Percy Molteno reflected the general reaction of the party when he com-
mented: 
"The more I think about Schreiner's whole action ~n all this 
matter the more fatal and unfortunate it seems. He has sold 
you at a moment when you could have brought about some change 
for the better in the treatment of the martial law districts 
and could have condemned all the illegal and unconstitutional 
acts which have gone on while your parliament was not sitting. 
He has deserted you in the face of the enemy and helped Milner 
when he most needed help and now has resigned and divided your 
party and so aided ·Milner once more" .. 9.2 
Merriman remarked that they. had been "basely betrayed" by their friends 
and his wife reported: 
"The Dutch party are scandalised by Mr. Schreiner's action and 
.say he has forfeited all claim as the leader. They say he has 
put them in a false position in the eyes of the English publ{c 
who will naturally say 'These Dutch people are so extreme ~n 
their views that even their ·ex-leader says they have gone too 
far for him and he has resigned':". 93. 
Olive Schreiner found herself placed in an unenviable position by her 
brother's stand. She reported that the British party at Beaufort West, 
where she was living at the time, would have nothing to do with her 
because they regarded her as~ a "Bonds-woman" and the Dutch also shunned 
) . 94 
her as they believed her to have sided with Schreiner aga~nst them. 
·The South African News Has at first reluctant to admit the true 
nature of the difficulties within the cabinet and accused Chamberlain of 
at last having sutceeded in intriguing the Schreiner ministry out of 
office. 95 Once it could no longer blind itself tb the facts of the 
91. Wright, Rose Innes Correspondence, p. 266. 
92. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 11 July ~900. 
93. J.X.M.P., Agnes Merriman to Julia Merriman, 22 June 1900. 
94. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to Francis Schreiner, c. July 1900. 
95. South African News, 21 June 1900. 
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situation it refrained from directly criticising the late Prime Minister, 
but it did reprint articles ·from Ons Land and the Midland Ne\.;rs condemning 
Schreiner's conduct. 'In discussing the proposed Indemnity and Special 
Tribunals Act, which stipulated that the rank and file be tried by special 
commissions and be disfranchised for five years, it drew attention to the 
fact that it was virtually identical to the legislation suggested by 
Schreiner and commented: 
11 
••• a more vindictive measure was probably never framed in a 
country supposed to be governed on rational and common-sense 
lines • . . How any man in Parliament \-7ho sincerely desires 
racial conciliation, or tolerable social relationships in the 
districts more directly affected, can vote for such a Bill 
passes our comprehension". 96 
In October, when Schreiner became involved ~n an undignified wrangle 
with his electoral committee over his decision to hold a referendum in 
his constituency to ascertain whether he should resign, the South African 
Ne\vS eventually openly criticised him for his conduct announcing that the 
time had come for the party to choose between its principles and its 
friends. 97 After Schreiner's resignation F.S. Malan was elected un-
opposed to· fill the vacancy. 
Although Schreiner's defection with his eight "Adullamites"98 robbed 
the South African Party of any chance of preventing the passage of the 
Treason Bill they put up a spirited struggle aga{nst it in Parliament in 
the hope of modifying some of its clauses. Merriman and Sauer, their 
tongues no longer "grievously clogged by office" \vere the main spokesmen 
for the party. They aimed in particular at narrowing dmm the terms of 
the amnesty, maintaining that Parliament should not indemnify anything 
which smacked of malice or revenge such as the acts of political spite 
perpetrated by Farrar and his associates. Amendments to this effect were, 
however, defeated ari.d an attempt to narrow down the Act's definition of a 
ringleader suffered a similar fate. 99 Both Charles and James Molteno 
spoke against the Bill, the "ratter making much of the fact that Chamber-
lain had on 25 July, somewhat disingenuously, said in the House of Commons 
.. :-~ 
96. South African News, 20 July 1900. 
97. Ibid., 21 Sept. 1900, 25 Oct. 1900. 
98. One of these was Charles Searle whose support of the conciliation 
movement had been highly valued. 
99. Cape Hansard, 1900, pp. 290-297, 450-455 •. 
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that he had not brought any pressure to bear on the Schreiner ministry 
with regard to the disfranchisement of the rebels. James Molteno pointed 
out that this broke dmm the main argument by which Schreiner justified 
his support for the Bill and expressed the opinion that the Treason Bill 
had probably been born in a railway carriage during Solomon and Milner's 
tour through the martial law districts the previous March. 100 
On the first day of the sesHon Merriman tabled a motion· calling for 
the deproclamation of martial law. This gave the parliamentary spokesmen 
of the conciliation party the opportunity to bring complaints of abuses 
under the system into the open and several stormy debates on the subject 
took place. James Molteno, living up to his reputation as the enfant 
terrible of the House, was much to the fore in taking General Brabant to 
task for the la~vless behaviour of his volunteer force and several heated 
exchanges ensued with the member for East London refuting Molteno t·s accu-
sations at great length. 101 The speeches made by N.F. de Waal and S.A. 
du Plessis were subsequently published by th~ S.A.C.C. as a pamphlet entitled 
"Martial La\v and Conciliation, being the Experiences of two Hembers of the 
Cape Parliament". Herriman's motion, although amended to call for the 
withdrawal of martial law only in districts where it was not indispensable 
f .. - . . h 1 b f 102 for the success o m~l~tary operat~ons was, owever, ost y our votes.· 
Sauer's motion calling for a select committee to enquire into the adminis-
tration of martial law resulted in a lengthy argument as to the suitability 
of a select committee for such a purpose. Sprigg expressed himself in 
favour of a commission to enquire into the matter "when a fitting time 
arrives". Innes thought the complaints against martial law were greatly 
exaggerated and rejected a select committee on the grounds that it would 
lead to a partisan wrangle. Both Solomon and Schreiner accused Sauer of 
introducing the motiori merely to obstruct the passage of the Treason Bill 
·-:--
and it was ultimately defeated by eight votes, the cross-benches voting with 
the Government. 103 An extremely acrimonious debate ensued when ~erriman 
moved what amounted to a vote of censure against Milner for having published 
correspondence of his in a blue book without consulting him. The 
iOO. South African Ne,vs, 18 Aug. 1900. 
101. Cape Hansard, 1900, pp. 30-31, 36-37, 161-166. 
102. South African NeHSp 16 Aug. 1900. 




- 1 1 3  -
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  i n c l u d e d  a  l e t t e r  t o  P .  J .  d e  W e t  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  i n t e r -
c e p t e d  b e f o r e  i t  co~ld r e a c h  i t s  d e s t i n a t i o n .  O n  t h i s  o c c a s i o n  S c h r e i n e r  
a l s o  v o t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  m o t i o n  a n d  M e r r i m a n  l a t e r  d e s c r i b e d  h i s  c o n d u c t  
a s  
1 1
i n e x p l i c a b l e  a n d  i n e x c u s a b l e " .  
1 0 4  
D e s p i t e  t h e s e  m a j o r  s e  t b a c k _ s  t h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  p a r t y  d i d  s c o r e  t v 1 o  
m~nor v i c t o r i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  s e s s i o n .  M u c h  d i s c o n t e n t  h a d  b e e n  c a u s e d  b y  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w h i l e  D u t c h  c o l o n i 1 ? t S  w e r e  a r r e s t e d  f o r  t h e  m o s t  t r i v i a l  
. o f f e n c e s  u n d e r  m a r t i a l  l a w  E n g l i s h  t r a d e r s  i n  t h e  b o r d e r  a r e a s  w h o  h a d  
f r e e l y  a n d  o p e n l y  t r a n s a c t e d  b u s i n e s s  - . ; . ; i t h  t h e  i n v a d i n g  f o r c e s  h a d  b e e n  
1 1  d  
•  I  0 5  n h  S  •  •  .  
a .  o w e  t o  e s c a p e  prosecut~on. w  e n  a u e r  ra~sed t h e  m a t t e r  ~n t h e  
H o u s e  I n n e s  a t  f i r s t  p r e v a r i c a t e d ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  E n g l i s h  l m v  h a d  
n e v e r  b e e n  v e r y  c l e a r  a s  f a r  a s  t r a d i n g  w i t h  t h e  e n e m y  w a s  c o n c e r n e d .  
H e  e v e n t u a l l y  c o n c e d e d  t h a t  m a n y  c a s e s  o f  v o l u n t a r y  t r a d i n g  w i t h  t h e  e n e m y  
h a d  b e e n  b r o u g h t ·  t o  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  a n d  p r o m i s e d  t h a t  t h e s e  w o u l d  b e  i n v e s -
t i g a t e d  a n d  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e r s  w o u l d  b e  p r o s e c u t e d .  
1 0 6  
T h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  
p a r t y  a l s o  r e c e i v e d  s o m e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  
. o f  c e r t a i n  n e ' t v s p a p e r s  i n  s o m e  m a r t i a l  l a w  d i s t r i c t s .  D u r i n g  1 9 0 0  ~he· 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i d  n o t  p l a c e  a  g e n e r a l  p r o s c r i p t i o n  o n  - . ; . ; h a t  i . t  r e -
g a r d e d  a s  u n d e s i r a b l e  p u b l i c a t i o n s  b u t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  - . ; . ; e r e  g r a d u a l l y  p l a c e d  
o n  p a p e r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  O n s  L a n d  a n d  a  f e w  o t h e r  D u t c h  
j o u r n a l s .  T h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e - . ; . ; s  w a s  f i r s t  p r o h i b i t e d  
i n  N a t a l  i n  A p r i l  a n d  a  s i m i l a r  o r d e r  f o l l o w e d  i n  t h e  F r e e  S t a t e  i n  M a y .  
B y  A u g u s t  i t  h a d  a l s o  b e e n  s t o p p e d  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t s  o f  A l i w a l  N o r t h ,  B a r k l y  
W e s t ,  H a y ,  H e r b e r t ,  K u r u m a n ,  M a f e k i n g ,  T a u n g s ,  V r y b u r g  a n d  K i m b e r l e y .  
\ \ T h e n  a  p r o t e s t  w a s  r e g i s t e r e d  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  o n  1 6  A u g u s t  t h e  H o u s e  v o t e d  
u n a n i m o u s l y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a  r e s o l u t i o n  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b e  r e q u e s t e d  t o  
r e s t o r e  t h e  r i g h t  o f  circulatio~ t o  a l l  n e - . ; v s p a p e r s  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  p r o h i b i t e d  
.  .  1  1  
1 0 7  
A  h  1  h  .  · .  d  
1 . n  mart~a a w  a r e a s . ·  .  m o n t  a t e r  t  e  m 1 . h t a r y  h a  ,  h o w e v e r ,  o n l y  
y i e l d e d  i n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  a l l · o w  r e p r i n t s  o f  n e H s p a p e r s  c o n t a i n - .  
i n g  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  r e p o r t s  t o  c i r c u l a t e  i n  p r o c l a i m e d  a r e a s .  T h e  S o u t h  
A f r i c a n  N e t v s  p o i n t e d  - o u t  t h a t  t h i s  w a s  h a r d l y  a n y  c o n c e s s i o n  a t  a l l  a s  t h e  
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  b u s i n e s s  h a d  b y  t h e n  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  a n d  
1 0 4 .  M . P . ,  M e r r i m a n  t o  P . A .  M o l t e n o ,  2 3  O c t .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 0 5 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  2 6  J u n e  1 9 0 0 ,  1 4  J u l y  1 9 0 0 ,  1 6  A u g .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 0 6 .  I b i d . ,  3  a n d  5  S e p t .  1 9 0 0 .  ·  
1 0 7 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  1 7  A u g .  1 9 0 0 .  
~ 
\ /  
'  
'  
- 1 1 4  -
r e m a r k e d  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  h a d  " a  s h o r t  w a y  \ v i t h  P a r l i a m e n t s " .  
1 0 8  
W h e n  M e r r i m a n  a g a i n  r a i s e d  t h e  m a t t e r  i n  t h e  H o u s e  S p r i g g ' s  a n s w e r  w a s  
e v a s i v e  a n d  n o  f u r t h e r  co~cessions c o u l d  b e  o b t a i n e d .  
1 0 9  
T h e  c o n c i l i a t o r s  a l s o  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  t h e  c e n s o r s  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e i r  distributio~ o f  a n t i - w a r  l i t e r a t u r e .  O n  2 8  F e b r u a r y  
t h e  c u s t o m s  a u t h o r i t i e s  s e i z e d  a  b a l e  o f  p a m p h l e t s  c o n s i g n e d  t o  t h e  
S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  t r e a s o n a b l e .  T h e  m a j o r -
i t y  o f  t h e  p a m p h l e t s  w e r e  b y  W .  T .  S t e a d  b u t  t h e r e .  w e r e  a l s o  a  f e w  c o p i e s  
o f  F . W .  R e i t z ' s  " A  C : e n t u r y  o f  W r o n g "  a m o n g s t  t h e m .  M o s t  o f  t h e  p a m p h l e t s  
w e r e  e v e n t u a l l y  r e t u r n e d  a f t e r  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  e x a m i n e d  b y  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
a t  G o v e r n m e n t  H o u s e  b u t  R e i t z ' s  t r a c t  w a s  w i t h h e l d  a n d  f o r \ V a r d e d  t o  t h e  
a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l  f o r  a  d e c i s i o n .  
1 1 0  
I n  a n  . a n g r y  l e a d e r  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  
N e w s  d e m a n d e d  t o  b e  i n f o r m e d  o n  w h o s e  a u t h o r i t y  t h i s  h a d  b e e n  d o n e  a n d  i t s  
i n d i g n a t i o n  w a s  i n c r e a s e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  o f f e n d i n g  p a m p h l e t  w a s  a l -
l o w e d  t o  b e  f r e e l y  c i r c u l a t e d  b y .  o t h e r  b o o k s e l l e r s  i n  t h e  c i t y  a n d  a f t e r -
~ards m a d e  i t s  a p p e a r a n c e  i n  t h e  P u b l i c  L i b ; a r y .  
1 1 1  
A s  t r e a s u r e r - g e n e r a l  
M e r r i m a n  \ v a s  i n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  c u s t o m s  d e p a r t m e n t ,  b u t  h e  h a d  o b v i o u s l y  n o t  
b e e n  c o n s u l t e d  f o r  a s  s o o n  a s  t h e  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  s e i z u r e  o f  t h e  p a m -
p h l e t s  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e \ v s  h e  w r o t e  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t o r  o f  
c u s t o m s  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  t h e  d u t y  o f  h i s  d e p a r t m e n t  t o  s t i f l e  
.  .  d  d  .  f "  .  d " .  .  .  1  1 1 2  
o p 1 n 1 o n  a n  e p r e c a t 1 n g  t h e  u s e  o  R u s s 1 a n  m e t h o  s  1 n  a  B r 1 t 1 s h  C o  o n y .  
I n  D e c e m b e r  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s  r e c e i v e d  m o r e  s e v e r e  t r e a t m e n t  w h e n  t w o  
b a l e s  o f  t h e  p a m p h l e t  " W h a t  i s  n o w  b e i n g  d o n e  i n  S o u t h  Afric~" w e r e  d e -
s t r o y e d  b y  t h e  cu~toms d e p a r t m e n t  o n  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  t h e  a t t o r n e y -
, g e n e r a l  w h o  j u d g e d  i t  t o  b e  a  s e d i t i o u s  l i b e l .  T h e  p a m p h l e t  c o n s i s t e d  o f  
a  l e t t e r  f r o m  a  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r  s e r v i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a  g i v i n g  d e t a i l s  o f  
t h e  b r u t a l  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  a r m y  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c s · a n d  c o n d e m n i n g  
t h e  p o l i c y  o f  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  s u r r e n d e r .  
T h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e \ v S  p o i n t e d  
o u t  t h a t  t h e  l e t t e r  h a d  a p p e a r e d  f r e e l y  i n  t h e  l o c a l  E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e  p r e s s  
a n d  p r o m p t l y  p u b l i s h e d  i t ,  f o l l o w i n g  i t  u p  b y  a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  s a m e  v e i n  b y  
t h e  s a m e  w r i t e r  a  d a y  l a t e r .  
1 1 3  
O n  t h i s  o c c a s i o n  t h e  e d i t o r  w a s  n o t  
p r o s e c u t e d ,  b u t  a t  a  l a t e r  d a t e  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  \ v e r e  t o  a c t  m o r e  s t r i n g e n t l y .  
1 0 8 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e \ · l s ,  1 9  S e p t .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 0 9 .  I b i d . ,  2 0  S e p t .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 1 0 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  1 2  M a r c h  1 9 0 0 ;  M . P . ,  C .  M o l t e n o  t o  P . A .  M o l t e n o ,  
8  H a r c h  I  9 0 0 .  
1  I  I .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  1 3  M a r c h  1 9 0 0 ,  7  A p r i l  1 9 0 0 .  
1 1 2 .  L e w s e n ,  M e r r i m a n  C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  v .  i i i ,  p .  1 7 2 .  
J  1 3 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  2 8  a n d  2 9  D e c ,  1 9 0 0 .  
- .  
' - '  
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- 1 1 5  -
O n e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  C a p e  T o w n  c o n c i l i a t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  
w a s  t o  a d v i s e  t h o s e  • . . r h o  h a d  s u f f e r e d  i n  p e r s o n  o r  p r o p e r t y  d u r i n g  t h e  w a r  
a s  t o  t h e  b e s t  m e t h o d  o f  o b t a i n i n g  r e d r e s s .  I t  w a s  p r o b a b l y  d u e  t o  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  m e n  w h o  w e r e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m i t  t e e  a n d  v 7 h o  h a d  
h a d  m u c h  f i r s t - h a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  c a v a l i e r  t r e a t m e n t  o f  m a n y  s u s -
p e c t s  b y  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s . ,  t h a t  t h i s  v l a S  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c o m m i t -
t e e ' s  p r o g r a m m e .  J a m e s  M o l t e n o ,  H e n r y  B u r t o n  a n d  V i n c e n t  v a n  d e r  B y l  
a l l  d e v o t e d  m u c h  o f  t h e i r  t i m e  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  w a r  t o  a s s i s t i n g  t h o s e  t - J h o  
h a d  b e e n  c h a r g e d  w i t h  h i g h  t r e a s o n  o r  o f f e n c e s  u n d e r  m a r t i a l  l a w .  T h e y  
a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  a c t e d  i n  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  c a p a c i t i e s  a s  l e g a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  
a n d  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  u n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  c o r o m i t t e e ,  
.  .  
b u t  t h e y  n e v e r t h e l e s s  c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  s o m e  s m a l l  m e a s u r e  t o w a r d s  all~ying 
t h e  i l l  f e e l i n g  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h i c h  m a n y  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  h a v , . .  
i r . g  t h e i r  g r i e v a n c e s  r e d r e s s e d .  H e n r y  B u r t o n  w a s  f i r s t  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  d e -
f e n d i n g  f o r t y - o n e  r e b e l s  c a p t u r e d  o n  S u n n y s i d e  f a r m  i n  t h e  D o u g l a s  d i s t r i c t  
a n d  b r o u g h t  t o  t r i a l  i n  C a p e  T o w n .  M u c h  s y m p a t h y  w a s  f e l t  b y  t h e  c o n c i l i a -
t o r s  f o r  t h e s e  p r i s o n e r s ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  w h o m  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  c o m e  f r o m  t h e  
p o o r e r  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h e y  a r r i v e d  i n  C a p e  T o w n  i n  s u c h  a  b e -
d r a g g l e d  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  W i d o w s  a n d  O r p h a n s  F u n d  h a d  t o  
p r o v i d e  t h e m  w i t h  m o r e  s u i t a b l e  c l o t h i n g .  C  . P .  S c h u l t z  o r g a n i s e d  t h e  c o l l e c -
t i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d e l i c a c i e s  a m o n g s t  t h e m  s o  t h a t  R i c h a r d  S o l o m o n  
w a s  e v e n t u a l l y  m o v e d  t o  c o m p l a i n  t o  S c h r e i n e r  t h a t  i t  w a s  u n s e e m l y  f o r  s u c h  
o p e n  s y m p a t h y  t o  b e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t o w a r d s  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  j o i n e d  t h e  Q u e e n ' s  
e n e m i e s .  
1 1 4  
M e r r i m a n  t h o u g h t  t h e i r  t r i a l  a  s c a n d a l  a n d  B u r t o n  c a u s e d  
s o m e t h i n g  o f  a  s e n s a t i o n  b y  r e f u s i n g  t o  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  t h e  d e f e n c e  w h e n  
h i s  r e q u e s t  t h a t  t h e  h e a r i n g  b e  p o s t p o n e d  u n t i l  f u r t h e r  w i t n e s s e s  w e r e  
' 1  1  d  1 1 5  
ava~ a b  e ,  w a s  t u r n e d  o w n .  I n  M a r c h  B u r t o n  a n d  V a n  d e r  B y l  ~vere ~n-
s t r u m e n t a l  i n  b r i n g i n g  t h e  c a s e s  o f  t h r e e  c o l o n i s t s  c a p t u r e d  n e a r  B e l m o n t  
a n d  t r e a t e d  a s  p r i s o n e r s  o f  w a r  b y  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  
p r o t e s t a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t s ,  b e f o r e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  w i t h  
1  1 6  
t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  m e n  ~vere r e l e a s e d .  V a n  d e r  B y l  o n  s e v e r a l  o c c a -
s i o n s  a p p r o a c h e d  M i l n e r  q i r e c t l y  o n  b e h a l f  o f  p e r s o n s  a r r e s t e d  b y  M a j o r  
C  
d h
.  .  .  .  1 1 7  
r e w e  a n  ~s assoc~ates, o n e  c a s e  be~ng t h a t  o f  P .  J .  d e  \ o l e  t ,  M .  L . A .  
1 1 4 .  W . P . S . P . ,  ( S . A . L . ) ,  T r a n s l a t i o n  o f  a  r e p o r t  i n  O n s  L a n d ,  2 5  J a n .  1 9 0 0  
a n n o t a t e d  b y  S c h r e i n e r  a n d  S o l o m o n .  
1 1 5  • .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  2 4  A p r i . l  1 9 0 0 ;  ·  S t r y d o m ,  K a a p l a n d  e n  d i e  O o r l o g ,  
p .  1 9 3 ;  L e w s e n ,  M e r r i m a n  C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  v .  i i i ,  p .  1 8 8 .  
1 1 6 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e , v s ,  9  a n d  2 3  M a r c h  1 9 0 0  . •  
i l 7 .  I b i d . ,  2 4  M a y  1 9 0 0 ,  2 3  J u l y  1 9 0 0 .  
\ ;  
. . . ,  
- 1 1 6  -
l f t 1 e n  S a u e r ' s  f e l l o w  m e m b e r  f o r  A l i w a l  N o r t h  w a s  u n e x p e c t e d l y  a r r e s t e d  
f o r  h i g h  t r e a s o n  i n  C a p e  T o w n  o n  2 6  J u n e ,  J a m e s  M o l t e n o  a p p e a r e d  o n  h i s  
b e h a l f ,  t h e  a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l  u l t i m a t e l y  d e c l i n i n g  t o  p r o s e c u t e .  
1 1 8  
T h e  T r e a s o n  B i l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  s p e c i a l  c o u r t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t w o  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  j u d g e s  a n d  a n  a d v o c a t e  o f  t e n  y e a r s '  s t a n d i n g  t o  t r y  r i n g l e a d e r s  
a n d  t h i s  c o u r t  b e g a n  i t s  p r o c e e d i n g s  a t  C o l e s b e r g  i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 0 0 .  
J a m e s  M o l t e n o  a n d  H e n r y  B u r t o n  f o l l o w e d  t h e  c o u r t  i n  i t s  p r o g r e s s  t h r o u g h  
t h e  C o l o n y ,  d e f e n d i n g  m a n y  o f  t h o s e  b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  i t  o n  c h a r g e s  o f  h i g h  
t r e a s o n .  
1 1 9  
A l t h o u g h  M o l t e n o  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  o n  M i l n e r ' s  . " S t a r  
C h a . - n b e r  l i s t "  a f t e r  t h e  f r a c a s  o v e r  t h e  " D o m i n i o n  o f  A f r i k a n d e r d o m "  h e  
d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e d  a n y  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
h  
.  1  1  . d .  .  1 2 0  
~n t  e  mart~a a w  ~str~c.ts. 
D u r i n g  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  1 9 0 0  m a r t i a l  l a w  a b u s e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  
g r a v a m e n  o f  t h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  p a r t y ' s  c o m p l a i n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  
w a r .  B u t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  w a r  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c s  h a d  a l t e r e d  s i n c e  t h e  
m i d d l e  o f  t h e . y e a r .  H a v i n g  f a i l e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e s e  
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  t h e  · B r i t i s h  a r m y  r e s o r t e d  t o  p u n i  t i v , e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  b y  N o v e m -
b e r  t h e  b u r n i n g  o f  6 0 0  f a r m - h o u s e s  h a d  b e e n  o f f i c i a l l y  r e c o r d e d .  
1 2 1  
T h e s e  m e a s u r e s  e v e n t u a l l y  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  h e r d i n g  o f  w o m e n  a n d  c h i l d r e n  
i n t o  " c a m p s  o f  r e f u g e "  a n d  b y  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  y e a r  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  a g a i n s t  
t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  t h e  C o l o n y  w a s  c o m p l e t e l y  d v 1 a r f e d  b y  t h e  
o u t c r y  a g a i n s t  t h e  m e a s u r e s  b e i n g  t a k e n  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c s .  ·  T h e  S o u t h  
A f r i c a n  N e w s  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t :  
" T h e  m o s t  c a l l o u s  a n d  t h e  m o s t  i n d i f f e r e n t  r e a d e r  e v e n  o f  s u c h  
t e l e g r a m s  a s  t h e  c e n s o r s  a l l o w  t o  b e  p u b l i s h e d  m u s t  h a v e  s h u d d e r e d  
a t  t h e  r e i t e r a t i o n  d a y  a f t e r  d a y  a n d  w e e k  a f t e r  w e e k  o f  t h e  s t o r i e s  
o f  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  b y  f i r e  o f  t h e  h o m e s t e a d s  a n d  a t  t h e  a c c o u n t s  
o f  t h o s e  ' s t r o n g  m e a s u r e s '  ~·lhich L o r d  R o b e r t s  h i m s e l f  i n  a  r e c e n t ·  
d i s p a t c h  d e c l a r e d  t o  b e  ' r u i n o u s  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y  '  . • • .  i n  n o  ~·lar i n  
m o d e r n  t i m e s  h a s  t h e r e  b e e n  s u c h  a  w a n t o n ,  r u t h l e s s  a n d  u n n e c e s -
s a r y  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  a s  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  i n  t h i s  H a r  
w h i c h  E n g l a n d  t h r o u g h  h e r  s t a t e s m e n  t e l l s  t h e  c i v i l i s e d  w o r l d  i s  
b e i n g  w a g e d  f o r  e q u a l  r i g h t s  f o r  a l l  c i v i l i s e d  m e n  s o u t h  o f  t h e  
Z a m b e s  i " .  
1 1 8 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  2 7  J u n e  ! 9 0 0 ,  6  S e p t .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 1 9 .  M o l t e n o ,  D o m i n i o n  o f  A f r i k a n d e r d o m ,  p p .  2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ;  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  
1 5  D e c .  1 9 0 0 ,  1  F e b .  1 9 0 1 ,  1 0  J u n e  1 9 0 1 ;  L e w s e n ,  H e r r i m a n  C o r r e s -
p o n d e n c e ,  v .  i i i ,  p .  2 7 1 .  - -
1 2 0 .  M . P . C . ,  J .  M o l t e n o  t o  B e t t y  M o l t e n o ,  1 8  O c t .  1 9 0 1 .  
1 2 ! ,  L e M a y ,  B r i t i s h  S u p r e m a c y ,  p .  9 0 .  
< ,  
' ,  
- 1 1 7  -
I t  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  m e r e l y  p r o l o n g  t h e  s t r u g g l e ,  " t h e  
h i s t o r y  o f  w h i c h  ~.;ill b r i n g  t h e  b l u s h  o f  s h a m e  t o  t h e  f a c e  o f  g e n e r a t i o n s  
o f  E n g l i s h m e n  a s  y e t  u n b o r n " .  
1 2 2  
S i r  H e n r y  d e  V i l l i e r s  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  
m o o d  o f  t h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  p a r t y  w h e n  h e  t o l d  M e r r i m a n  " I  c a n n o t  t r u s t  m y -
s e l f  t o  w r i t e  a b o u t  t h e  d o i n g s  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
M y  f e a r  i s  
t h a t  t h e  m i s d e e d s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d a y  w i l L  h e r e a f t e r  m a k e  a  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
.  1 2 3  
o f  t h e  r a c e s  u t t e r l y  i m p o s s i b l e " .  
T h e  w o m e n  o f  t h e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  p a r t y ,  w h o  h a d  a l r e a d y  a t  s o m e  o f  t h e  
a n t i - a n n e x a t i o n  m e e t i n g s  d e p l o r e d  t h e  m e a s u r e s  b e i n g  r e s o r t e d  t o  i n  t h e  
R e p u b l i c s ,  t o o k  t h e  l e a d  i n  o r g a n i s i n g  a  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  
d e v a s t a t i o n .  M e s d a m e s  K o o p m a n s  d e  W e t ,  A .  I .  S t e y t l e r  a n d  J .  R o o s  o f  C a p e  
T o w n ,  ! Y f . . r s .  A . B .  d e  V i l l i e r s  o f  P a a r l  a n d  M r s .  J . H .  N e e t h l i n g  o f  S t e l l e n -
b o s c h  c o n v e n e d  a  m e e t i n g  w h i c h  t o o k  p l a c e  a t  P a a r l . o n  1 0  N o v e m b e r .  · P r e -
s i d e d  o v e r  b y  M r s .  R o o s ,  t h e  g a t h e r i n g  o f  2  0 0 0  w o m e n  p a s s e d  r e s o l u t i o n s  
c o n d e m n i n g  t h e  b u r n i n g  a n d  p l u n d e r i n g  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  a n d  t h e  d e p o r t a -
t i o n  a n d  i m p r i s o n m e n t  o f  h o m e l e s s  > v o m e n  a n d  · c h i l d r e n  a s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  
u s a g e s  o f  m o d e r n  w a r f a r e .  T h e  s p e a k e r s  e x p r e s s e d  t h e i r  s o r r o w  a t  s e e i n g  
B r i t a i n ,  s u p p o s e d l y  t h e  m o s t  C h r i s t i a n  o f  n a t i o n s ,  c o m m i t t i n g  s u c h  d e p l o r -
a b l e  d e e d s .  I n  a n  a d d r e s s  r e a d  o n  h e r  b e h a l f  M r s .  K o o p m a n s  d e  W e t  s t i g m a -
t i s e d  B r i t a i n ' s  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  H a g u e  C o n v e n t i o n  a s  " s h e e r  h y p o c r i s y " .  
1 2 4  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  w o m e n  h o p e d  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o t e s t  w o u l d  f o c u s  a t t e n t i o n  o n  
t h e  p l i g h t  o f  th~ir c o m p a t r i o t s  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c s ,  t h e y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  n o t  a l t e r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  m a t e r i a l l y  a n d  m o r e  p r a c t i c a l  s t e p s  " t v e r e  a l s o  
t a k e n  t o  alleviat~ t h e  l o t  o f  t h e  v i c t i m s .  I n  t h e  C a p e  T o w n  L a d i e s  C o n n n i t -
t e e  f o r  t h e  P r i s o n e r s  o f  W a r  t h e y  h a d  a  r e a d y  m a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d :  t h i s  
b o d y  h a d  a l r e a d y  a t  a  m e e t i n g  o n  2 1  S e p t e m b e r  r e s o l v e d " t h a t  i t s  " t v o r k  w o u l d  
i n  f u t u r e  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  v l o m e n  a n d  c h i l d r e n .  
1 2 5  
I t  a l s o  
l e n t  i t s  s u p p o r t  t o  a n  a p p e a l  d r a w n  u p  b y  M r s .  N e e t h l i n g  o f  S t e l l e n b o s c h  a n d  
s i g n e d  b y  f i v e  o t h e r  c l e r g y m e n ' s  w i v e s ,  c a l l i n g  u p o n  t h e  w o m e n  o f  E u r o p e  
a n d  A m e r i c a  t o  r e n d e r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  d e s t i t u t e  R e p u b l i c a n s .  
1 2 6  
A  c o p y  
1 2 2 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e " t v S ,  6  N o v .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 2 3 .  J . X . H . P . ,  D e  V i l l i e r s  t o  M e r r i m a n ,  2 1  N o v .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 2 4 .  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  1 2  N o v .  1 9 0 0 ;  O n s  L a n d ,  1 3  N o v .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 2 5 .  D . V . P . ,  ( U . C . T . ) ,  M i n u t e  B o o k ,  2 1  S e p t .  1 9 0 0 .  
1 2 6 .  I b i d . ,  M i n u t e  B o o k ,  1 9 .  O c t .  1 9 0 0 ;  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  N e w s ,  1 6  N o v .  1 9 0 0 . ·  ·  




of this appeal ~.,ras sent to Percy Molteno who forwarded it to Kate 
Courtney and close co-oper~tion was subsequently established between 
the Ladies Committee in Cape Town and the two major relief organisations 
. . . . 127 ~n Br~ta~n. These were the South African Women and Children's Dis-
tress Fund of which Percy Molteno was a committee member and with which 
Emily Hobhouse was associated and. the Boer Women and Children's Clothing 
Fund. Frederick Markarness's wife was a member of the latter committee 
which liaised with the Cape Town organisation mainly through Miss E.D. 
Bradby and Mrs. H. Chitty, both friends of Emily Hobhouse. The latter 
had been in correspondence ~.,rith Betty Molteno and Caroline Murray some 
months before she came to South Africa in December and during her stay ~n 
128 Cape Tmvn she was a guest of the Murrays. An intimate friendship. 
developed bet~.,reen Emily Hobhouse and the Molteno sisters who formed the 
main link bet1.,reen he;r and the Cape Tm.,rn committee without whose assistance 
her task of alleviating conditions in the concentration camps would have 
been a great deal more difficult. On a suggestion from Kate Courtney the 
Cape Towr, comn1ittee persuaded Lady De Villiers to preside over its activi-
ties, and she appears, during the ·latter part of the war, to have been 
. 1 . 1 d . . 129 I d . ' . h act~ve y ~nvo ve ~n ~ts work. n ren er~ng ass~stance to t e women 
and children the Ladies Committee. operated in the same ~t.7 ay as it did when 
first dealing with the Boer prisoners of war. The women were responsible 
for collecting and dispatching goods to the various camps but their finances 
were placed in the hands of the commit tee originally established to administer. 
the Widows and Orphans Fund and which, ~n December, opened a separate fund 
for the detainees in. the concentration camps. 130 The Cape Tmm 1vomen co-
operated with numerous committees established in various tmvns throughout the 
Colony, usually under the leadership of clergymen.rs wives, which assisted 
in collecting clothing and foodstuffs for dispatch to the Republics. 
The ca,.-np established at Port Elizabeth, being in the Colony, initially 
attracted the most attention. The conciliators felt that if its inmates 
were there merely as refugees, the authorities should have· no objection to 
127. M.P., Kate Courtney to P.A. Molteno, 11 Dec. 1900. 
128. A.R. Fry, Emily Hobhouse, p. 89. 
M.P., Emily Hobhouse to P.A. Molteno, 17 Jan. 1901. 
129. M.P., Statement to the subscribers to the South African Women and 
Children's Distress Fund, p. 3; M.P.C., EH/5, Record of goods sent 
to the concentration camps. ' 
130. H.~., Minute Book, 13 Dec. 1900. 
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their being placed with families ~n the Colony who were prepared to ac-
commodate them. At a meeting on 16 November the Ladies Committee appoint-' 
ed Mesdames Roos, Steytler, Stegmann and Purcell to act in conjunction vlith 
James Molteno and Rev. B. Marchand to secure the release of these women. 
On 19 November they applied to the military authorities to allow the women 
to be housed with friends in.the Colony. 131 Innes at once approached 
Milner on the subject pointing out that the increase ~n the unrest and 
discontent in the Colony was mainly due to the feelings aroused by the 
deportation of these women. He was fully alive to the inconvenience of 
releasing them on parole but thought the risk and danger of keeping them 
shut up even greater. Milner, although disapproving of the behaviour of 
the military authorities, thought that a preposterous and partly hypocritical 
fuss ~vas being made about the treatment of the women. He informed Innes: 
"I regret that I entirely differ from you in your view that it 
would be a lesser evil to spread them over the country to carry 
far and wide the tale of their woes, much exaggerated. 
The idea that we can disarm the hostility of the Afrikaner, 
\vhile the struggle continues by any concession or any leniency, 
is in my opinion pure 'will of the 'ivisp'. Leniency is all very 
well, when the fight is over. But inasmuch as the fight, 'ivhile 
it las.ts, necessarily involves a number of acts, which can and 
'ivill be laid hold of to inflame feeling, it is absolutely idle 
to give up any point from a desire to be conciliatory11 • 132 
The military authorities subsequently informed the Ladies Committee that 
the women would be allowed to live in the town of Port Elizabeth if they 
could not be cared for in the camp, but that they would not be permitted 
133 to go to other parts of the Colony. 
The Cape Dutch Reformed Church also protested against the conduct of 
the \var. Apart from the devastation of the Republics additional concern 
was caused by the fact that clergymen were being forced to sign the oath 
of allegiance or forego their stipend which, in the Free State, was paid 




the Cape Town and Tulbagh presbyteries and commit tees were appointed to con.-
135 
sider the interests of the suffering congregations in the Republics. 
i31. D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book, 16 Nov. 1900; South African Nmvs, 
6 Dec. 1900 •. ·· 
132. Wright, Rose Innes Correspondence, pp. 266-268. 
133. South African Nevls, 6 Dec. 1900 • 
. J34. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. ~~~, pp. 237-238. 





At the instigation of a number of leading western Cape clergymen a meet-
ing of between thirty and forty ministers of the Dutch Reformed Chu:ch 
took place at Stellenbosch on 29 and 30 November. An address was framed 
condemning the \var and the manner in which it was being conducted. It 
pointed out that the banishment of ministers of religion from their con-
gregations, the destruction of property and.the deportation of women and 
children was contrary to articles 44-47 and 50 of the Hague Convention. 
A deputation presented the address to Milner on 7 December, He undertook 
to forward it to the Queen but expressed his doubts as to whether the mili-
•tary authorities would ,accede to their request that persons be allowed to 
. . . h R b 1' h f h ff . h 136 v~s~t t e epu ~cs to assess t e extent o t e su er~ng t,ere. 
The volume of protest against the conduct of the war continued to grow 
until it culminated in the People's Congress at Worcester on 6 December. 
The object of the congress was to receive the report of the People's Depu-
tation137 and to discuss the lamentable condition of South Africa. 
Organised this time by F.S. Malan, with D.S. de Villiers as secretary 
of the invitation committee doing a great deal of preliminary work, the 
Worcester Congress was a much more elaborate affair than its prede~essor 
at Graaff-R~inet. 138 Meetings >vere held in towns throughout the Colony 
to elect delegates to attend the congress and F .J. Centlivres was deputied 
to arrange with the railway department for a number of special trains to 
Worcester as well as reduced fares for those attending the congress. Here 
the conciliators, however, found their arrangements obstructed by the 
Government which strongly disapproved of the congress and gave instructions 
that no special facilities were to be granted over and above those provided 
f b h 1 '1 1 . 139 Th f bl' or y t e genera ra~ way regu at~ons. e tense state o pu ~c 
opinion in the Colony was in fact causing considerable alarm. Milner ac-
cused the Bond party "journalists •••• and parsons ...• en tete" of doing 
everything it could to excite the feelings of the people and referred to the 
"carnival of mendacity" which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in the 
Colony. He thought it just a toss of the coin whether there would be a 
136. South African News, 5 and 13 Dec. 1900; Cd. 547, pp. 18-21. 
137. For a discussion of the People's Deputation see below ch. V. 
138 .. For D.S. de Villiers' correspondence see IVorcester Volkskongr~s 
Papers, S.A.L. 
139. South African Ne>vs, 28 and 29 Nov. 1900. 
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conflagration or not and did his utmost to pressurise the ministry into 
declaring martial law in the western and central districts of the Colony 
in order to prevent th~ Worcester Congress "and much other mischief", but 
140 
without success. Milner's alarm was shared by Merriman who told 
N.F. de Waal that he regarded "this vmmen and children business" as the 
last stra'\v and dreaded the result it might have. 141 He did not think 
the Horcester Congress would do much practical good and at a meeting of 
South African Party supporters on his farm at Stellenbosch on 1 December 
he counselled moderation so as not to exacerbate the ill feeling already 
existing between the races. He told the gathering that he did not pro-
pose to attend the congress so as to avoid insinuations that it was 
engineered by politicians r'ather than being the spontaneous outcome of 
the feelings of the people and Sauer agreed that it would be wise to avoid 
. . 142 
the meet~ng. De Haal, however, thought that ~n the circumstances 
"any opportunity for people to relieve their pent up feelings should be 
_looked upon as a sort of safety valve". 143 T.P. Theron, chairman of the 
Bond, regarded the meeting with "fear and trembling". He too accused the 
ne>vspapersmen of having worked up the sentiments of the people to such a 
pitch that many had lost sight of the dangers which might accrue from at-
tracting thousands of their most rabid spea~ers to a meeting to be conducted 
"tvithout fixed or approved rules. He believed the congress to be "a waste 
of energy and means, without any hope of returning to the Republics their 
independence. Suppose the thousands of pounds spent by the people attend-
ing the congress, in railway fares etc .. were spent upon the unfortunate 
144 WOmen and Children What a bleSSing it WOUld be tO them II • 
Despite the disapproval and anxiety with which some of their leaders 
viewed the event over 10 000 supporters of the conciliation movement from 
ninety-seven districts, representing 120 000 people, attended the Worcester 
· Congress. Notwithstanding earlier indications of dissent both Sauer and 
T~P. Theron appeared on the platform with such staunch conciliators as Olive 
Schreiner and her husband, Dr. Beck, J.A. van Reenen, F.J. Centlivres, 
140. Headlam, Milner Papers, v. n, pp. 171-172, 174; Cd. 547, p. 57. 
141. Lewsen, Herriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 239. 
142~ South African News, 3 Dec. 1900. 
143. J.X.M.P. ,.~.F. de Waal to Merriman, 27 No~. 1900. 
144. J.X.M.P., T.P: Theron's observations on Merriman's letter of 




Rev. B. Marchand and Dr. Kolbe. Jacob de Villiers, who had presided over 
the Graaff-Reinet Congress, again took the chair. 145 The atmosphere 
'ivhich prevailed at Worcester was decidedly less moderate than at the pre-
VLous gathering and the presence of a battery of Canadian artillery sup-
ported by the New South Wales Lancers on the hills surrounding the tovm 
did nothing to improve the temper of the crowd. Sir Henry de Villiers had 
tried to dissuade his brother fr~m presiding at the congress only to be 
told by Jacob de Villiers that he had no intention of letting the meeting 
down and that the attempt to overawe the people by a display of military 
force had made him even more determined to persevere. The Chief Justice 
was sufficiently concerned to write to Chamberlain leaving no doubt as to 
what he thought of the latest blunder at the Cape: 
11 
•••• the height of tactlessness, not to use a stronger term, 
was attained 'tvhen a few days ago a body of Colonial troops was 
sent to Worcester with the avowed object of being prepared for 
any emergency which might arise out of a Congress about to be 
held there ••• The number of troops sent is too small to 
frighten the people, but it is quite large enough to indicate 
to them the profound distrust with which they are regarded by 
the authorities. Believe me that this is not the way to deal 
with the Dutchmen of this Colony. No people are more easily 
led by kindness and trustfulness but no people are with greater 
difficulty driven or overawed •••• " 146 · 
The reaction of the South African Ne\vS had little Ln common with the measured 
tones of the Chief Justice. It pointed to the large number of prominent 
and respected men who attended the congress, "And upon a meeting of such 
a character, a Governor and High Commissioner paid £8 000 a year by the 
taxpayers of this Colony ••• had· the monumental impudence to turn a battery 
of Maxim guns! Fast, fast indeed are vle becoming a second Ireland". 147 
Thus, v.1ith ·the Canadians and Australians on guard at a discreet dis-
tance, the Worcester Congress recorded its solemn conviction that the 
highest interests of South Africa demanded a termination of the war 
"with its untold misery and horror as well as the burning of· 
houses, the devastation·of the country, the extermination of 
a white nation~li ty and the treatment to which 'tvomen and 
children are subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting 
legacy of bftterness and hatred, >vhile seriously endangering 
the future relationship betv1een the forces of civilization 
and barbarism in South Africa". 
145. South African News, 8 Dec. 1900; Ons Land, 8 Dec. 1900. 
146; Walker, Lord de Villiers, pp. 378-380. 




It aga~n called for the retention of their independence by the Republics 
and further desired a full recognition of the right of the people of the 
Colony to manage their o~vn affairs, recording its grave disapproval of Sir 
Alfr.ed Hilner's policy in this matter. In conclusion it resolved t:hat a 
deputation consisting of M.J. Pretorius, M.L.C. (Middelburg), P~ Kuhn, 
M.L.A. (\vorcester), Rev. W.P. de Villiers (Carnal?Von), P,J, Marais 
(Tulbagh) and P.W. Michau (Cradock) should call upon the High Commissioner 
to bring the resolutions officially to the notice of the British Govern-
ment. 
Despite the chairman's admonition to the speakers to moderate their 
language, Cronwright...:Schreiner did not scruple to refer to Milner as a 
curse to South Africa and a disintegrator of the Empire. He was called 
to order by the chairman but loudly acclaimed by the audience. Speakers 
from Worcester and Hanover agreed that Milner ought to be recalled and 
the motion censuring him was carried amidst enthusiastic cheers. In an 
address read on his behalf the Rev. D.P. Faure deprecated the fact that 
barbarities, which it was commonly thought had been outlived by the 
Christian ~rorld, were revived at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Dr. Kolbe, in the course of a provocative speech, expressed the op1n1on 
that locally the much lauded British constitution had come to mean "the 
government of South Africans by the military for the uitlanders". He 
suggested to his audience that, while always keeping within constitutional 
limits, they should make South Africa "the most uncomfortable corner in the 
Empire" until their gr1evances had been recognised and redressed.· At the 
end of the meeting there was a great clamour for Sauer who, when umvilling-
ly pushed to the fore, explained that he had attended merely to demonstrate 
his sympathy and not to speak and confined himself to proposing a vote of 
thanks to the chairman. 148 
The deputation which called on Milner on 1 I .December to present the 
resolutions of the congress, found him as unyielding as ever and the inter-
view could not have been a pleas·ant experience for either of the parties 
·concerned. W.P. de Villiers, who acted as main spokesman for the deputa-
tion, emphasized the fact that the congress had not been a pleasure jaunt 
148. South African News, 8 Dec. 1900; Ons Land, 8 Dec. 1900. . 
Reports of the-congress reprinted from these newspapers appeared 





but that the large attendance was due to the people's desire to see the 
Republics retain their independence and to their great anxiety regarding 
the fate of the women and children in the Republics. Milner, however, 
made it clear that, what he termed their menacing protests against·the 
war, \vould have no effect upon British policy. He regarded their allu-· 
sions to the conduct of the 'ivar .as being characterised by aggressive 
exaggeration and intimated that he did not think that further resistance 
on the part of the Repub lies was any longer justifiable as the object of 
that resistance could not by any possibility be attained. In his opLnLon 
the agitation in the Colony.was merely encouraging the Republican forces 
to persevere in their hopeless struggle. In his reply to the deputation 
Chamberlain confirmed the. tenor of Milner's observations. 149 
The Horcester Congress was the last opportunity which the concilia-
tion party had to stage a concerted protest against the war. In the 
middle of December the Republicans invaded the Colony for a second time 
and the imperialist party \vas quick to blame this on the Worcester Congress 
'i.Jhich, they maintained, gave the Boers the impression that they could ex-
pect assistance in the Colony. As a result of the invasion, martial law 
.was proclaimed throughout the Colony with the exception of the ports and 
the native territories. During the remainder of the war the conciliation 
party's activities were increasingly restricted and its path \vas beset· 
with difficulties and frustration. 




APPEALS TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE-
The conciliation party ·intended from the. outset that its voice 
should not be confined to the Cape Colony. At the. Graaff-Reinet Con-
. gress it resolved that delegates be sent to put its case to the people 
of England. This deputation was, however, preceded by various other 
members of· the conciliation party, of whom the most notable was Samuel 
Cronwright-Schreiner. · He was the pioneer who first braved the hazards 
of hostile public opinion in Britain. Known thus far mainly as the hus-
·band of Olive Schreiner, his valiant, if somewhat ill judged, crusade 
in support of the Boer cause earned him recognition in his own right • 
. :~-
He came of 1820 Settler stock and had been educated at St. Andrew's 
College, Grahamstown, where he imbibed all the anti-Dutch prejudices 
peculiar to the predominantly English-speaking Eastern Province. On 
becoming a farmer he, however, acquired a knowledge of the Dutch lan-
guage and character and came to appreciate their "many splendid quali-
ties". 1 His own forthright personality probably to a certain extent 
. 
accounted for his admiration of the more simple virtues of the Boers. 
Cronwright-Schreiner gained his first political experience as founder 
member and secretary of the Cradock Farmers' Association and from the 
outset he held pronounced anti-capitalist and therefore anti-Rhodes views. 
These were confirmed by his experiences while living in Kimberley and 
Johannesburg after his.marriage to Olive Schreiner. Both he and his wife 
were strongly influenced by the ideas of J .• A. Hobson, the journalist and 
economist, with who_m Cronwright-Schreiner became acquainted during his 
first visit to England_ in 1897 and whose book The War in South Africa he 
regarded as the best treatment of the subject which had appeared to date. ' 
Hobson came to South Africa in 1899 as correspondent for the Manchester 
Guardian and while in Johannesburg he saw much of Olive Schreiner and her 
husband. With the advent of the war they dec.ided to leave Johannesburg 
and when hostilities broke out Hobson suggested that Cronwright-Schreiner 
become the Manchester Guardian's war correspondent with the Boers. After 
some consideration he turned this offer down and Hobson then asked him 
to accompany him to England "to tell the British public the truth about 
South African matters". 2 Cronwright-Schreiner had already refused a 
1~ S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, The Land of Free Speech, p. xix. 





similar invitation from Montagu White, for, unlike Hargrove, he was 
most punctilious in these matters and thought it improper to be asso-
ciated with the Transvaal Government in such a venture. His only objec-
tion to Hobson's suggestion was that he could not afford the expense, 
and.when Hobson guaranteed half the sum involved, Cronwright-Schreiner 
agreed to go. Leaving Olive with her brother and his family in Cape 
.Town, he sailed for England on 10 January 1900. 
In issuing his invitation Hobson had no doubt been convinced that. 
Cronwright-Schreiner would be able to render the Republican cause some· 
service in England. Hobson believed him to be particularly fitted for 
the task as he was not 'associated with any political party and was "a 
recognised pro-native man and a Johannesburg Outlander of pure British 
blood". 3 On the other hand he was totally unknown in England where 
he was frequently, and perhaps at times wilfully, mistaken. for being a 
Boer., one paper referring to him as "the Boer husband of Olive Schreiner". 4 
His nephew, G.C.M. Cronwright, later described him as being "humourless," 
rigid and assertive", 5 and although a most·determined man, these ·quali-
ties might have counted against his being a persuasive public sp.eaker. 
He arrived in England just as the tide started t1lrning in favour of the 
British army in South Africa and the public, elated at the news of the 
first major successes, was in no mood to give a fair hearing to an emis-
sary denouncing the war. Yet even those most ·pessimistic ab9ut his pros-
pects of success did not anticipate 'the violent public antagonism which 
he encountered. 
Despite adverse conditions Cronwright-Schreiner experienced no dearth 
of invitations .to ·address meetings and he eventually decided to place 
arrangements ·in the hands of the S.A.c.c. and. Stead's Stop the War Committee 
in London which\mdertook to organise a lecture tour in conjunction with 
their local branches in various centres. While these arr~ngements. were 
being finalised Cronwright-Schreiner spoke at meetings in and around London, 
and as the press had not yet had the opportunity to incite public opinion · 
3. Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free S2ee ch • P• 4. 
4. Ibid., p~ !"62. 




against him, he wa~ in most cases given a favourable reception. The 
conference of Liberals in London was the first major ga~hering which he 
addressed, the procee.dings being characterised by "enthusiastic qnanimity 
and a stalwart spirit" which were to be in short supply during the rest 
f h . . 6 h' f 11 f . o ~s campa~gn. T ~s engagement was o owed by a success ul publ~c 
meeting at Mansfield House settlement run by Oxford graduates amongst 
the working men in Canning Town. The next day he spoke at a meeting at 
Hastings at which a branch· of the S.A.C.C •. was also founded. Although 
the proceedings passed off without undue interruption, this meeting was 
the first to attract a hostile crowd which required a detachment of 
police to keep it in order. At his next appearance, at Leicester on 20 
February, it became clear that there was an organised plot to disrupt the 
meeting which eventually ended in pandemonium. Despite these auguries 
of future troubles he was given a cordial reception by the students of the 
two major universities. At Oxford he was the guest of the Fabian Society 
which was also addressed by Hobson and at.C~mbridge he participated in one 
of the debates of the Union, meeting there H.S. van Zyl, vice-president 
of the Union, whose brother, Dirk van Zyl·, was M. L.A. for Clanwilliam. 7 
Cronwright-Schreiner opened his tour of the provinces with an enthu-
siastic meeting at Bradford but thereafter conditions deteriorated rapidly. 
. . . 't! 
At his next meeting enough opponents gained .entry· to the hall to make 
themselves obnoxious and a few days later at Glasgow, where Ll~yd. George 
was his fellow speaker and J. Keir Hardie, head of the Independent Labour 
Party, devoted himself to ·organising an energetic defence of the h·all 
· against an onslaught by a hostile crowd surging about outside. 8 By this 
time Cronwright-Schreiner had become familiar with the deafening render-
ing of "SoldieiS of the Queen" and other patriotic airs which were to follow 
him .around England like a refrain. The riot at Glasgow was, however, miid 
compared to the reception he got the following day at Edinburgh •. Here the 
crowd, composed mainly of students incited to fever pitch by the strongly 
imperialist newsp~per the Scotsman, prevented him from even entering the 
hali where the meeting was to be held. In the course of a prolonged struggle· 
he was extremely::' roughly handled and eventually rendered unconscious, 
6. Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, P• 11. 
7. J.X.M.P., H.S. van Zyl to Merriman, 18 Jan. 190(~-
8. Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, p. 66·. 
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escaping to safety, only through the intervention of a few valiant sup-· 
porters. An associate subsequently compared his treatment at ·the hands 
of the mob to that o~ ~horde of carnivorous animals worrying a carcass. 9 
Although Cronwright-Schreiner's ·activities received relatively little 
attention in the Cape press, this incident created enough of a stir to be 
accorded a mention in Ons Land which scathingly referred to it as a demon-
stration of "gelijke rechten". 10 
The violence spread from Glasgow and Edinburgh to Dundee, where the 
Rev. Walter Walsh, author of the pamphlet "An appeal from Philip Drunk 
'to Philip Sober", had invited Cronwright-Schreiner to speak. The Dundee 
meeting had to be abandoned at the last moment and the angry crowd, 
baulked of its prey, wreaked vengeance upon Walsh's house, breaking 
several windows. In view of these disturbances several successive meet-
ings were cancelled. At York the ·brisk trade in rotten eggs, soft fruit 
and other even more objectionable missiles and the appearance of posters 
announcing: "Britons! A Boer is among you, Remember Majuba!" convinced 
the conveners of the unwisdom of proceeding with their meeting. 11 
The S.A.C.C. at Scarborough, under the leadership of Joshua Rowntree, a 
member of the well known Quaker family, was. however not to be deterred with. 
the result that the Rowntree cafe at which an "at home" was to have been 
held was wrecked by the mob which afterwards werit on the rampage through 
the town, attacking other Rowntree.business premi'ses and private homes so 
that the military had to be called out. to q.uell the disturbances. Cron-
wright-Schreiner and Hobson were surreptitiously hustled out of tOwn by 
the police in a closed cab the following morning~· Although the Scarborough. 
disturbance was one of the worst which took place during his v~sit Reuter 
merely telegraphed a mild report of the affair to the Cape, bearing out 
Cronwright-Schreine.r Is contention that the ·press invariably minimised the 
. 1 d d ' h' ' d h' 12 I ' f VlO ence an row y1sm w 1ch accomp.anle lS appearances. . n v1ew o 
the fact that his tour had by then degenerated into a rout, he returned to 
London where, in the welcome peace and quiet :of Hobhouse's drawing. room, 
he addressed an appreciative audience composed of women supporters of the 
9. Cronwright.,..Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, p. 87. 
10. · Ons Land, 3 J. March 1900. 
' .. · 
11. Cronwright~pchreiner, Land of Free Speech,· p •. 1.73. 
12. South .African News, 14 March 1900. 
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conciliation movement. On 22 March a special meeting was held under the 
chairmanship of Leonard Courtney to discuss what could be done to vindi-
cate the right of free speech. Cronwright-Schreiner declared himself 
prepared to take the field again on the understanding that the meetings 
were well organised and carried through to the finish and it was therefore 
decided that a second tour of the Midlands and the North would be ar-
. 13 
. ranged. While in London he had the opportunity of addressing numerous 
· small private meetings and was feted by several leading Liberals including 
•. 
John Ellis, James Bryce and C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian. 
On 21 April he addressed a congress of Liberal delegates at Penistone," 
largely through the intervention of H .• J .·Wilson, who had been compelled to 
abandon an earlier meeting at Shefffeld but· was determined that Cronwright-
Schreiner should be given a hearing. While in London he also attended one 
of his most successful meedngs, that held at Battersea under the auspices 
of the local Stop the War Connnittee. This gathering was a.rranged as a 
deliberate challenge to the imperialists and careful organisation plus the 
fact that it took place in a working men's area.ensured its success. 
Cronwright-Schreiner's denunciation of the capitalists was no doubt doubly 
welcome to an audience composed mainly of suppor.ters of the Labour Party and 
he in turn warmly praised the splendid lead which organised labour had 
given the otherwise deluded British nation· on the issue of the war. At 
Battersea Cronwright-Schreiner's fellow speaker was Vincent van der Byl, 
a.member of the Cape Town conciliation committee who was in England for a 
brief visit in the company of Harry·currey, another Cape conciliator. Van 
der·Byl 'was a nephew of Merriman's.wife who reported that he had enlisted 
under the banner. of the S.A.C.C. and was speaking daily "at drawing· room 
meetings, public .meetings, Christian Society meetings and in the parks on 
Sun.days, addressing the 'masses' from a tub!" 14 At Batter sea he was 
enthusiastically. received and loudly cheered when he announced that he had 
.., 
'" 
not a drop of E~glish blood in him. 15 Although Van der Byl wished to 
accompany Cronwright-Schreiner on his second northern tour other engagements 
prevented this 16 and he was only able to attend the meeting held at Manchester 
13. Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, p. 237. 
14. J.X.M.P.; Agnes Merriman to Sarah Merriman, 15 June 1900. 
15. South Afrfcan News, 6 June 1900. 
16. For a report of Van· der Byl's speech at a peace meeting in London on 




under the auspices of the Women's Liberal Association on 7 May. Admis-
sion to the meeting was by·ticket only and the support of a sympathetic 
police force prevented it from becoming the occasion of another violent 
. ' 
demonstration. 
Cronwright-Schreiner's second tour commenced with a meeting at Edin-
burgh on 18 May. In view of the disastrous failure of the first attempt 
the Stop the War Committee was all the more determined that he should be 
hea~d in the city. Elaborat~ precautions were taken to prevent a recur-
rence of the violence which had wrecked the previous meeting. Tickets 
. bearing the thumb print.of the secretary of the meeting to prevent their 
being forged, were privately distributed and the meeting was publicly 
announced only the day before it was due to take place. The result was 
that although the gathering numbered only 450 the resolutions were success-
fully carrie~ and Cronwright-Schreiner and his associates, by exercising a 
little ingenuity, managed to escape unscathed from the hostile mob that 
gathered outside the.hall. 17 The next meeting at Aberdeen was, however; 
not so successful. A crowd of between 20 000 and 30 000 besieged the hall 
and inside it opponents turned the meeting into a shambles. 18 The rest 
of the tour was abandoned as Cronwright-Schreiner judged it impossible to 
proceed in the teeth of the unprecedented public excitement aroused by the 
news of the relief of Mafeking •. He was invited t.o participate in ·the large· 
women's meeting in London scheduled for 13 June but decided that it would 
be wiser not to do. so. By then the strain of his harrowing experiences 
. . 
had begun to take its tol1 of his health and, having come to the conclusion 
that he had done all he could, he sailed for the Cape on 7 July, much dis-
illusioned with the "unmanly 11 behaviour of the British peopl~. 
Although W.T. Stead expressed the opinion that his tour had turned 
out better for t;he ·cause than if he had been allowed to speak everywhere 
without interruption, 19 the fact that Cronwright-Schreiner had caused a 
public furore qid'not mean that he had necessarily accomplished anything. 
He invariably found the. imperialist party lamentably ignorant on the real 
causes of the wei!• and equally unwilling to be enlightened. Opponents of 
17. Cronwright~Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, pp. 310-325, 
18. Ibid., pp. 326-362. 
, ~ 
19 •. O.S.P., W.T. Stead to Cronwright-Schreiner, 16 March 1900,, / ~,. 
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the. war were gener.ally much better informed on the situation in South 
Africa and he therefore found himself preaching mainly to the converted. 
·The press was almost .unreservedly hostile and, except in a few newspapers, 
·he was seldom accurately reported. He was particularly scandalised by 
the fact that the British police, except in a few instances such as at 
Scarborough and Manchester, tended to sympathise with the crowds and 
turned a blind eye to the havoc which they wreaked. To his mind the 
. 
one cheering factor in this catalogue.of di~asters was to be found in 
the "sound" attitude ·of organised labour in England. 
On his arrival at the Cape Cronwright-Schreiner was met by a special 
resqlution expressing the appreciation·of the Afrikaner members of parlia• 
ment for the great service he had rendered '.'in the interests of the restora-
tion of peace on righteous princip.les in South Africa'·'· 20 It was an-
nounced that under normal circumstances he would have been accorded a 
public banquet, but as so many families had been. plunged int9 mourning by 
the war this was felt to be inappropriate. A special meeting of the South 
African Party was, however, held on I August with T.P. Theron in the chair, 
Merriman and Sauer both in attendance, and Hofmeyr as the main speaker. 
In moving a vote of thanks to Cronwright-Schreiner, Hofmeyr praised him for 
having s·tuck to his guns so nobly under the most trying conditions, but 
expressed his scepticism as to the efficacy of arguing with the British 
. h b. . f . . h . . d' . 21 nat1.on on t e su .JeCt o the war 1.n 1.ts present yper-sensl.tl.ve con 1.t1.on. 
After spending some time in Cape Town with-members of his family who, 
to his distress ~~·disapproved of his support of the Boer cause, 22 Cronwright-
Schreiner retired to Hanover where Olive at that time foupd the air most 
conducive to her health. There, with his characteristic-regard for the facts 
of the case, he recorded virtually a blow by blow account of his experiences 
in England in a volume ironically entitled The Land of Free Speech. Attempts 
to have the work published in England in 1901 failed in the h:ce of hostile 
public ~pinion .and it eventually saw the light only in 1906. 
The next m~jor onslaught on the twin bastions of prejudice and ignorance 
20. South African News, 31 Juiy 1900. 
.-
21.. Ibid., 3 Aug. 1900. 
22. O.S.P., Olive Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 11 Dec. 1900. 
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in England was made by the "People's Deputation sent by the Graaff-Reinet 
Congress. This gathering appointed a committee consisting of Jacob de 
Villiers, Albert Cartwright, J.H. Smith, M.L.A. for Graaff-Reinet, J.H. 
Marais, M.L.A. for Stellenbosch and R.H. Mohr of Uitenhage to select the 
23 delegates. . A second committee consisting of Professor C.J.F. Muller 
of Stellenbosch, Rev. A. Moorrees of Paarl, Rev. D. Rossouw of George, 
Charles Molteno and N .F. de Waal was to administer ·the fund which was to 
finance the mission. 24 The People's Deputation, which arrived in 
England the day before Cronwright-Schreiner's departure, could have learnt 
.much from him, yet neither the delegates nor those at the Cape responsible 
.for organising the undertaking appear _to have drawn upon his experience • 
. This may have been due to ignorance of the difficulties he had encountered,· . 
for unlike his successors, his activities received hardly any mention in 
the local press. Percy Molteno, who saw a good deal of him in England 25 
and who, as a member of the S.A.C.C., was familiar with the hazards of 
campaigning in support of the Boer cause also remained strangely.silent on 
the subject of his v~sit when communicating with his correspondents at the 
Cape. As Cronwright-Schreiner had not yet returned to the Cape when the 
deputation ~eft they had little means of ascertaining the intricacies of 
the situation in England. On the other hand Olive Schreiner frequently 
passed her husband's letters on to friends such _as Mary Sauer, Anna Purcell 
and Betty Molteno. The latter was in regular communication with Charles 
Molteno to whom she presumably mentioned the subject and who might therefore 
have been better informed than most. On hearing of the proposed deputation 
Percy Molteno at on.ce wrote to his brother ·charles: 
"If possible it is very important to have men with English names ••• 
Several political people have spoken to me about it - the pr.ejudice 
here is so violent that I fear that they will not give a hearing 
to any delegates or report their speeches when made. Currey would 
be ·a good de legate". 26 
This letter, however, arrived too late to have any effect, for by then it 
had already been announced that the deputation would stand under ·the leader-
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the. other members ,being three farmers; R.P. Botha of Richmond, P.L. du 
Plessis of Cradock, and D.J. de Wet of Prince Albert who was to act as 
· secretary. The Rev~ .A. Moorrees was to accompany the deputation as an 
ff . . 1 d . 27 . . uno 1c1a a Vlser. He had at f1rst doubted the w1sdom of his joining 
the delegates as there was some evidence of opposition to this step amongst 
his parishioners. On seeking Andrew Murray's advice in the matter he re-
ceived a reply in which Murray revealed that he too had been approached to 
join the deputation• Although he had not been able to do so he told 
Moorrees that he would be glad if he would go and gave the venture his 
blessing. 28 The selection committee appears to have been motivated in 
its choice of delegates by a desire to. show the British people that the 
farmers of South Africa were little different from those in any other part. 
of the Empire. The South African News thought the congress had been wise 
to send men who would speak of matters as they presented themselves to 
the average Boer of the Colony and hoped they would be able to· dispel some 
of the falsehoods which the Jingoes had spread about the "Boers". It 
placed great emphasis on ·the fact that the· delegates were going as indivi-
duals to speak to the British taxpayer. "it is for the deputation talking 
as plain men to plain men, speaking from heart to heart, to convince John 
Bull of the injustice and. impolicy of using a giant's strength in ·a way 
29 
savouring of tyranny". These were admirable intentions but reveal a 
somewhat naive conception of the situation awaiting the delegates in England. 
The London corre.spondent of the ·South African News . (probably Percy Molteno) 
made the best of.matters and later reported that the delegates had made a 
very favourable impression on those who met them in London, "their simple· 
earnestness and~sincerity distinguishing them from the ordinary colonial. 
politician who comes over here". 30 Emily Hobhouse, in .describi~g Professor 
De Vos remarked that his "saintly bearing and old-world dignity" made a deep 
impre.ssion. She thought he resembled a prop~et of old who had stepped out 
of the Old Testament into their modern garish world. 31 There.can be no 
questioning the dedication of the delegates, but it is a moot ·point whether 
three relatively unsophisticated farmers and a pious scholar were the most 
suitable men to embark upon the rough and tumble of a campaign such as that· 
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which awaited them.. On their own admission: they were very much at sea 
in a country which they had never visited before and where they knew no 
one • The extent of · .. their ignorance regarding local conditions. is revealed 
in DuPlessis' remark that he at first addressed meetings in Dutch until 
he discovered that he could make a stronger impression when "speaking in 
the vernacular". 32 Furthermore, any resemblance to the average Boer, 
far from being_an asset was, in the_present temper of the mass of the 
English _people, a most serious liability'· a point on which Cronwright-
Schreiner could have enlightened them. 
The deputation sailed from Cape Town on board the Tantallon Castle 
on 20 June with Har.grove and his wife as fellow passengers. Although 
they never mentioned Hargrove in their reports, it is possible that he 
assisted them during their visit for both Percy Molteno and Emily. Hobho;use 
f h . . . . . . h h d . ' 33 Am re er to ~m ~n pass~ng ~n connect~on w~t t e eputat~on. ongst 
those who attended to wish them well were Charles Molteno. as chairman of 
the conciliation committee and Jacob de Villiers as chairman of the Graaff-
Reinet Congress. The delegates took with them the People's Petition which, 
at that stage, had secured 40 000 signatures,. some lists still being in 
' . 1 . 34 c~rcu at~on. · 
The deputation had a foretaste of things to come when a "boel Afrikaander-
h.aters" made life unpleasant for them on board ship with a display of petty 
malice and on their arrival in. South~pton they found that the Daily Mail 
had been publishing '"gruwelijke onwaarhede" abo~t them. 35 It alleged 
that both Moorrees and De Vos had sons ~ho had turned rebel and were fight-
ing with the Queen's. enemies; that the delegates had refused to uncover 
their heads when the national anthem was played; that they had refused to 
preach from a pulpit draped in the Union Jack and that Moorrees, as head of 
the Dutch Reformed Church had held meetings at which prayers had been offer-~ 
ed for the success of the Boer arms. When they wrote to the paper denying 
36 these charges only a fragment of their letter was published. Shortly 
32. South African News, 20 Oct. 1900. 
33. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 11 _July 1900; A.M.P., Emily Hobhouse 
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after their arrival in London a reporter from the Daily News called on 
them and the fact that this "vermetelen en onbeschaamden heer" received 
short shrift at the hands'of the delegates did not prevent his paper from 
publishing a lengthy statement which they were alleged to have ma4e toge-· 
37 ther with "nog vele lasterlijke dinge" about them. This was but the 
beginning of the campaign of calumny in the press. Like Cronwright-
·schreiner they were rarely fully or accurately reported, whereas the major-
ity of newspapers were prepared to publish scurrulous attacks upon them. 
~ter the first day in their London hotel the proprietor asked them to 
leave as the other guests had conceived a great dislike of them, especially 
/ 
as two of them bore the 'same names as the Boer generals Botha and De Wet • 
. Two woman supporters of the conciliation conuni ttee set about finding alter-· 
native acconunodation for them and were turned down at twelve establishments 
before they found a private hotel under German management which was pre-
38 pared to put them up. On the other hand they received a warm welcome 
from leading pro-Boers.' They were met at. Southampton by Percy Molteno of 
whose unfailing kindness and consideration they spoke very highly, and in 
London they were welcomed into the homes of the Hobhouses and the Bradbys 
where they addressed drawing room meetings. They spent approximately 
twelve days in London meeting leading Liberals like Campbell-Bannerman, 
James Bryce, Sir Charles Dilke, Dr. Clark, C.P •. Scott, Massingham and 
W.T. Stead. 39 They decided ag~inst trying to secure an interview with 
Chamberlain as they feared that ·a rebuff in that· quarter would-prejudice 
the British public.against them. 40 Despite being_advised to join hands 
with the existing pro-Boer orga~isations, they decided to adhere strictly 
to the instructions of the Graaff-Reinet Congress which stipulated that 
they should act independently. Although they were prepared to accept 
assistance from sympathisers they declined to appear on the platform of any 
particular party or organisation. The London correspondent of the South 
African News complained that they were being hampered by their interpreta-
tion of their instructions. He reported tha_t a prominent politician was 
anxious to get them. to address a select assembly of parliamentarians in a 
conunittee room of the House of Conunons and pointed out that since their 
mandate was to ~ppeal to the people of England it was only reasonable that 
37. Ons Land, 30 Oct. 1900. 
38 •. SouthAfricanNews, 11Aug. 1900, 200ct. 1900. 
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they should address themselves in the first instance to such accredited 
representatives of'the people as were willing to hear them and afterwards 
41 
seek as large and various a public as they could. It was however de- . 
cided that, as Moorrees was not an official member of the deputation, he 
would have greater freedom of action; a somewhat artificial distinction 
as his expenses were paid out of the same fund as those of the other dele-
gates. The S.A.c.c. had specially organised a big meeting to be held in 
the Queen's Hall London on 18 July with Leonard Courtney in the chair to 
welcome the delegates and it was greatly disappointed when their instruc-
tions did not permit them to attend. Moorrees, however, agreed to speak 
and was give~ an enthusiastic welcome by the large audience composed 
. 42· 
mainly of sympathlser.s. Treading the same path as Croilwright-Schreiner, 
he next spoke, on 21 July at Bradford with Leonard Courtney again .attending 
the meeting. As the deputation had decided to concentrate on the pro-
vinces before speaking in London, they began their tour with a meeting in 
Manchester on 26 July. De Vos .took the chair and Botha and De Wet both 
43 delivered "flinke toespraken". The meeting was public and encountered 
hardly any opposition. From Manchester they proceeded to Leeds, Liverpooi, 
Oxford, Bristol, Bath, Blackburn, Newcastle, Rockdale, Huddersfield, Yeadon, 
44 Arnside and Edinburgh before returning to London. De ~vet, as secretary, 
·usually travelled on ahead to make arrangements for their meetings and the 
deputation did not always appear as a·group. Individual members often ad-
, dressed meetings, especially the smaller ones, and Moorrees frequently· 
branched off on his own. He was the guest of Lord and Lady Hobhouse at 
their country house in Somerset and Emily Hobhouse, who took a great interest 
iri their work, assisted· him in organising.his meetings in the west of 
England. 45 In order to bring the People's Petition to the notice of the 
British public the deputation had it printed and distributed. 46 At their 
meeting in the Lancashire manufacturing· town of Blackburn the petition, 
printed in bold type, was hung in various pa~ts of the hall where it could 
be read by all and the resolutions passed at· the People's Congress were 
41. M.P., P.A. Mofteno to. C. Mo.lteno, 11 J~ly 1900 • 
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· printed on slips and distributed to the audience before the meeting 
began. 47 In all, the deputation addressed fifty meetings, about eight , 
of these being large .g~therings. One of the most successful was. that at 
Edinburgh, hitherto virtually an impregnable stronghold of the imperial-
.. 48 
LSts. Although the deputation appears to have had a slightly more 
favourable reception than Cronwright-Schreiner, 49 they encountered much 
the same problems as he had. They experienced consi(jlerable difficulty 
in hiring halls owing to the proprietors' fear that their property would 
be damaged but more frequently because of hostility towards their mission. 
They were often jeered at as being Boers and they reported "het moeilijkste 
/ 
was dikwij ls he t Engels che pub liek er van te doordr.ingen dat wij geen 
. 50 Vrijstaters of Transvalers · zijn". Although they were at first given 
a fair hearing, they soon began to experience their share of hooting, his• 
sing, organ-grinding and stone-throwing. 51 At Stanningly they were 
pursued through the streets by an angry crowd, the venerable Professor De 
Vos, losing his silk hat in the process, having to clamber over a wall 
behind a sympathiser's house to escape. 52 When De Wet tried to address 
an open air meeting near Huddersfield he again had to beat a hasty retreat. 
At Pudsey~ he reported: "hebben zij met steenen, stokken en verrotte 
eieren naar ons geworpen ••• Maar dit was ~og het ergste niet. Te Yeadon 
••• hadden zij ons bijna vermoord". 53 Like Cronwright-Schreiner before 
them they frequently found it necessary to secure the services of a number 
· of sturdy indi vidua·ls ·to purge the meetings of their rowdy element in order 
54 to be able to carry them through succes~fully. 
After two months in the field the deput:ation ·decided that it would be 
wiser to terminate its activities. Although they had encounter_ed many 
sympathisers they eventually had to admit that time and .sentiment were 
against them and that they were lnaking little impression upon the mass of 
·the British people. They came to the conclusion that the people did not 
• I 
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by the press or had an uneasy conscience on the subject. As the annexa-
tion of the Republics was assured and the war was believed to be virtually 
over, many wished to·put the matter behind them and public attention was 
.being diverted by the coming British general election and by the Boxer 
rebellion in China. The election in fact caused feelings to·run so high 
that it became virtually impossible to hold meetings and a large one 
scheduled to take place in London on 28 September had to be abandoned. 55 
Emily Hobhouse was greatly disappointed at their decision and appealed 
to both De Vos and Moorrees not to give up their work. Even if the 
others returned to the Cape she and Kate Courtney hoped that Moorrees 
.would stay on and work wit~ them in his personal capacity. 56 She also 
referred to the fact that a number of Rhodesite delegates were to be sent 
from the Cape and urged Moorrees and his associates to remain in England . 
to counteract their influence. The delegates, however, indicated that 
they would not alter their decision and she reluctantly had to accept 
this. "I am very sorry about all this", she wrote, "but being a woman I 
like the last word and being obstinate also I cling to my opinion that it 
is a mistake to stop - that great good is being done and 'that three months 
longer would be costly yet less so than sending a fresh delegation later. 
However so be it"-. 57 .· The deputation therefore rounded off its visit 
with a few smaller meetings in London and after a brief stay on· the Conti-
nent, returned to the Cape in October; an official report of its activi-
. 58 
ties appearing towards the end of November. 
As the deputation had been dispatched by a.people's congress, it was 




The Worcester Congress was therefore convened, although the 
being felt in the Colony at the conduct of the war in the Re-
probably as potent a factor inspiring the meeting as the desire 
to hear the delegates' report. Cronwright-Schreiner, who was one of the· 
main speakers at the congress, dwe 1 t at length on the experi~nces· of the 
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delegation, comparing them to his own. As they had all been like St. · 
Paul "in perils oft", 60 they could sympathise with one another and R.P. 
Botha in turn proposed,a special vote of thanks to Cronwright-Schreiner 
whom he warmly commended as having proved a true friend in his people's 
hour of need. 61 
It is difficult to assess the effect of the deputatio·n 's visit to 
England. They were themselves not clear as to what they expected to 
achieve. In their report they declared: "Wij ve.rkeerde in den waan dat 
dit volk, zoo het slechts met de· waarheid werd bekend gem.aakt, een andere 
gedragslijn in deze zaak zou volgen ••• ",but later in the same document 
they admit: "Wij hebben ook no.oi t verwach~ dat onze arbeid voor het 
tegenwoordige veel vrugt zal dragen". They became convinced that the 
influences pitted against them, particularly that of the press, were so 
powerful that if the British public.were to be influenced in· any way, the 
conciliation party would have to set to work "op meer systematische en 
kragdadige wij se" and that another deputation, at a more auspicious time, 
would be able tci benefit much from their experience. On the whole the 
mission therefore·. appears to have constituted nothing more than a valiant 
gesture which ac~ompli.shed very little. The delegates did, however, return 
with certain imp.ressions of the English people which they communicated to . 
their compatriots at the Cape. Some of these confirmed the more ·~.mfavour-
.able picture already existing in the Colony. DuPlessis; for example, 
spoke of the callousness of the British public and said ·that they regarded 
the war as a piece of business to be pursued to the end irrespective (;f 
whether it was just or not. 62 The deputation also drew attention to the 
fact that although they had encountered great ignorance on the situation in 
South Africa they had also met a considerable body of well informed persons 
so that the attitude of ·the British public could not be excused simply by 
63 . 
saying that they had been misled by the press. The delegates were great-
ly disappointed at the weakness of the Liberal Party and condemned in par-
ticular the attitude of the Liberal Imperialists whom they regarded as being 
· 60. The comparison is Merriman's, vide Lewsen, Merriman Correspondertce,-
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neither fish nor flesh. But their impressions were not exclusively 
.bad, for they had been pleasantly surprised to find how many people con-
demned the war and to see how much was being done in support of the Re-
publi"can cause in Britain. At the Worcester Congress De Vos paid tribute 
·to the efforts of the pro-Boers, remarking: "Die namen van die menschen. 
zulle in eere worden ge~ouden door ons tot in leng te van dagen 11 • 65 
Moorrees, who could not attend the congress, wrote to the chairman: 
"Niets heeft mij en mijne mede-deputanten meer getroffen dan de groot 
toewijding waarmede een klein getal mannen en vrouwen in _Engeland voor de 
zaak des rechts ijveren en alles daarvoor veil hebben". He thought 
Leonard Courtney parti~ularly deserving of praise, pointing out that he 
and his wife had suffered much popular odium and that he had sacrificed 
his seat in Parliament as a result of his stand. He therefore suggested 
that the congress ~ccord Courtney a special vote ·of thanks and the resolu-
' . d b h' ' d 'd 1 ' 66 D ' h t1on propose y 1m was carr1e am1 st ace amat1on. esp1te t ese 
mitigating factors there is however little doubt that it was the .British 
nation's lack of sympathy with the Boers which at. that stage made the more· 
lasting impression especially in' view of the harsh measures then being re-
sorted to in the Republics. 
Their opponents did not allow the conciliation party's deputation to 
67 go unchallenged. and the Vigilance Committee dispatched a number of dele-
. . 
gates of its own to England. The first group consisted of T·.L. Schreiner, 
brother of the prime minister, and the two clergymen J.C. Harris and J.S. 
Moffat •. 68 Shortly after the outbreak of the war Theo Schreiner had 
caused considerable indignation amongst the conciliators by publishing an 
account of a conversation he had with Reitz·seventeen or eighteen years 
before in which Reitz .was alleged to have acknowledged the existence of a 
deep-rooted Afr~kaner _conspiracy to oust Britain from South Africa. 69 
Theo Schreiner and his sister Henrietta Stakesby. Lewis, who parti.cular.ly, 
condemned the Boers for their alleged harshness towards the natives, both 
64. Ons Land, 8 Dec. 1900. 
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became active supp'orters of the imperialist party, thereby adding to the 
troubles of the much divided Schreiner family. The original deputation 
of the Vigilance Committee was reinforced after the khaki election by four 
70 more delegates, L. Zietsman, A. Wilmot, J.W. Jagger and J.D. Duncan. 
They were received in official circles and accorded an interview with 
Chamberlain. There was, however, little for them to do, for as Duncan 
reported to the Kimberley branch of the South African League in March 1901, 
they found the British Government thoroughly conversant with the require-
ments essential for the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa. 71 
They did, however, go to some lengths to _repudiate the People's Deputation 
· and later the Merriman-Sauer mission as not representing the opinion of the 
1 1 1 · h c 72 Wh h h T' f . · · oya co on1sts at t e ape. en t ey wrote tote 1mes.re ut1ng a 
letter by Professor DeVos which.had appeared in that paper, the People's 
w 73 Deputation dismissed their activities as "echt verkiesings geschetter • 
Shortly after the departure of the People's Deputation Charles Molteno 
arrived in England for a private visit. He had sailed from the Cape on 6 
. September on the same ship as Hofmeyr who went to. Europe to try and recover 
' 
his health. Molteno had intended spending most of his time on the Continent "' ... , 
74 
and ~eant to return to the Cape early in November. However, when.he 
found that he had the chance of meeting manY. English parliamentarians he 
decided that it would be a great-mistake not to make use of the opportunity·. 
to try and influence them in the. right direction: He therefore postponed 
his departure until after the meeting of the English parliam~nt •. To Betty 
Mo~teno he wrote: 
"There is considerable feeling here against the shameless way the 
war is being c·onducted and I have great hope that some change may 
be brought about in public feeling. Personally I feel that it is 
too late for the Dutch as a whole ever to forgive their treatment 
but one can only work in the hope that some good may come of it" 75 
While he was in London the question of James Molteno's disagreement with 
Milner over the· '.'dominion of Afrikanderdom" ·affair was raked up again and 
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been guilty of a breach of etique.tte by publishing the contents of a pri-
vate conversation. He pointed out that Milner's interview with James 
·Molteno had be~n of a public nature as Molteno had called upon him as the 
representative of the caucus of the South African Party, and he quoted Sir 
Edward Clarke's opinion in support of this view. 76 With Percy Molteno's. 
assistance his brother was able to meet several leading Liberal politicians 
including Campbell-Bannerman, James Bryce and Sir William Harcourt and he 
addressed numerous meetings such as the Lib'eral Federation at Newcastle and 
the League of Liberals in London. 77 He also tried to secure an interview 
with Chamberlain b~t his request was not acceeded to. 78 Percy Molteno 
reported that his brother made an excellent impression on -all the statesmen 
he met and that his speeches were well-received by those he had the oppor-
tunity of addressing, 79 but from the people he·met it is clear that Charles 
Molteno, like his predecessors, ·spent most of his time preaching to the 
converted. 
Towards the erid of 1900, with public opinion in the Colony inflamed 
by the depredations of the British army in the Republics _and with the 
Worcester Congress in the offing, Merriman wrote to N.F. de Waal in a state 
of considerable alarm suggesting that something be done to give.the people 
a lead. He had serious misgivings about .the outcome of the Worcester Con-
gress fearing that it would take little to turn the people into some fool~ 
ish course which-would lead to further misery. "Can we who are their 
leaders, do nothing? Or are we to sit and watch the flood of resentment 
always swelling until it breaks its banks?" He suggested that the South 
:0:" 
African Party should meet at some central place such as Beaufort .. west or. 
Cradock to set forth their grievances in a Grand Remonstrance whi~h should 
then be presented at the Bar of the House of Commons. This, he felt, would 
be an official representation of the colonists' views which would carry far 
. 1 . d . w . 80 more we~ght than reso ut~ons passe at a meet~ng such as that at orcester. 
N.F. de Waal and T.P. Theron both favoured the suggestion though neither· 
seemed very hopeful of success. Theron regarded it as the last door still 
76. M.P., C. Molteno to Editor of the London Times, 21 Nov. 1900. 
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open to them; "but ••• will we with the present state of feeling in 
England and here, ever be able to reach the handle of that door? Cannot 
the Government in England with its strong majority prevent us from ever. 
reaching the Bar of the House? ••• ". 81 Merriman broached the subject 
publicly at a meeting of South African Party supporters at Stellenbosch· 
on 1 December and it was also briefly considered at the Worcester Con-
gress. 82 In view of the general approval with which the suggestion 
was received Merriman and Sauer issued ·a confidential circular on 13 
December inviting members of the South African Party to discuss the mat-
. . 93 
ter at a meeting in Cape Town on· 7 January 1901. At the meeting 
Merriman experienced some difficulty with the more extrem~ members of the 
· party who were bent on demandin& unqualified independence for the Repub-
lics. During the recent parliamentary session Merriman had made it clear 
that he regarded a limited independence as the most the Republics could 
hope for from Britain and he now firmly refused to be associated with a 
demand which the British Government would not for a moment entertain. 
He eventually succeeded in winning the party over to his point of view 
and it was resolved that he and Sauer should go to England to bring the 
true state of affairs in South Africa and the probable consequences of the 
situation to the attention of the British Government, Parliament and 
people. Hofmeyr~. who was then in Germany would be asked to join the depu ta.;. 
tion. 84 ~erriman intended to act on the assumption that Britain would 
not reverse the annexation of the Republics. He therefore proposed that 
they urge the British Government not to impose Crown Colony rule on the· 
conquered Republics as was the intention, but to substitute·for this an 
immediate federation of South Africa on the Canadian model which· would 
85· 
.leave the Republics internal autonomy under their own flag. 
Merriman embarked upon the mission in a pessimistic mood regarding it 
86 
as "a forlorn hope but a duty which I think is laid upon me". Hofmeyr, 
who was dispirited and in poor health, was so convinced of the hopelessness 
f . f . . . d s 87 d . h. · o the~r quest that he re used to JO~n Merr~man an auer an Ln LS 
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letters to them he' proceeded to ra~se a host of difficulties. He pointed 
to the enormous gulf which existed between Britain and the Republics, with 
the one side demanding unconditional surrender.and the other insisting on 
complete independence. What would happen, he asked Merriman, if they ac-
cepted terms from the British Government and the Republics refused them? 
He poured cold water on Merriman's suggestion of internal autonomy for the 
·Republics within a South African Federation. In his opinion Britain 
·would never agree to a settlement which would give the Boers any real 
power, 
"Under the specious motto of 'equal rights for all white men' ,,, 
things would be so arranged that the Boer would be outvoted at 
the very outset ana would be made 'underdog' by the millionaires 
in the sacred name of 'Republican Equality'. I for one would · 
rather see him goVerned direct from Downing Street (where 
Chamberlain will not be in perpetual power) and by a British 
Governor (who·will not always be a Milner) instead of being 
hoodwinked and sucked dry by a Brummagem President and Volks-
raad", 88 
Although Hofmeyr followed Merriman and Sauer's progress with keen interest 
they therefore had to content themselves with advice from afar. 
On their arrival in Englan~ Merriman and Sauer received.a wa~ welcome 
from opponents of the war. Throughout their visit it was Merriman who acted 
as ·the main spokesman, Sauer keeping somewhat in the background. Their 
mission was to be very different. from those which preceded it. Not only 
were they men of standing; eminently fitted to plead the Republics' case, 
but ·they also had well established contacts with leading public figures and, 
as the official representatives of the people of the Colony, they were far 
more likely to secure the ear of those in authority. In tending to appeal 
first to the British. Government, then to parliament and, as a last resort, 
to the· public, ~hey were at the outset careful to avoid contact ·with organi-
~·· 
sations suc,h as the S.A.C.C. iest it prejudice their chances of a hearing. 
in official circles. They also tried to steer clear of the press,, no easy 
task with numerous persistent reporters besieging them. ~9 Merriman soon· 
came to the conclusion that they would have eve·n greater difficulties than· 
they had anticipated "for though many are full of fear and dislike of this 
88. Le~sen,'Mer.riman Co~respondence, v. iii, pp. 260-261. 







war they do not see how to end it and keep up the feeling with brave 
words". 90 This was certainly the case with Chamberlain who, although 
privately most conce.rned about the situatio~, gave no inkling of his 
misgivings during the interview which Merriman had.with him on 18 
February. Merriman therefore gained a somewhat ·distorted impression of 
the Colonial Secretary whom he thought "a most ignorant self-sufficient 
person". Of all the Colonial Ministers he had met he found Chamberlain 
91 the "most absolutely ~nsympathetic in mind and manner". Merriman's 
protestations against the evil effe~ts whicli CroWn Colony rule would 
have in the Republics apparently made no impression on Chamberlain who 
put the seal on their interview by making a jarring speech in the House 
of Commons the same evening in which he dis.missed the suggestion of imme-
. diate self-government for the Republics as .the most inept, childish, ridi-
culous and impractical proposal ever made. For good measure, and. no doubt 
with his eye on some of the Liberals. and other offending radl.cals,. he add-
ed a warning that the country would never forgive a party which attempted 
to frustrate the objects with which the war had been undertak~n. 92 
Sauer, who also had an interview with Chamberlain, made as little headway 
as Merriman and.they therefore turned their attention, without much hope, 
to securing a hearing in parliament. Since their arrival in England they 
had spent a great deal of time "dangling after the official Liberals" 
· whose suppo·rt was essential if they were to be heard at the Bar of the 
House. But although they found them personally most hospitable an'd sym-
pathetic they received little concrete support. Despite indications that 
a change was coming over public opinion, the Liberals in parliament re-
maineddisunited and timid, with Campbell-Bannerman reluctant to risk 
another rupture with the Liberal Imperialists. 93 After a month in Eng-. 
land Mer·riman was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the Liberal , 
Party did not intend making South Africa a parliamentary question and he 
complained to Bryce that,·~as they could get no reply from the leaders· of 
the Party, even the prospect of being able to make an application to be 
heard at the Bar of the House seemed remote. 94 Further delay was occa-
sioned by the f;:1ct that. Merriman and Sauer's activities coincided with the 
90. Lewsen, Merriman Corres12ondence, v. iii, ·p. 262. 
91. Ibid., P• 263. 
92. Lewsen, Merriman Corres12ondence, v. iii, p. 264. 
93. Ibid., PP• 268-269. 
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negotiations between Botha ·and Kitchener which took place at Middelburg 
between 28 February and 16 March. While these were pending they held 
their hand in order 'to avoid prejudicing a possible agreement. 95 
Campbell-Bannerman thought the time for intervention had not yet~come, 
b d . d h b h . h h . . . h d 96 ut a v1se t em to e on.t e spot w1t t e1r pet1t1on at t e rea y. 
When the Middelburg negotiations came to nought, it was decided that 
Sir Robert Reid would present their petition in parliament and this was 
done on 25 March. As they.had anticipated the Government returned a 
polite but firm refusal and declined to make the matter the subject of a 
debate. 97 It was then rumoured that one of the Irish Nationalist mem-
bers would temporarily r·esign his seat in"favour of Merriman so as to give 
.him a chance to be heard in the House of Commons. The South African News 
took over the report from the Standard, but Merriman dismissed the idea as 
absurd. 98 
The Government's refusal to give them a hearing in parliament cleared. 
the ground for Sauer .and Merriman to appeal directly to the British public. 
This was a task which they ·determined to embark ~pon with greater circum-
spection than their predecessors. Merriman thought that it would not do 
"to make oneself and the cause ridiculous by a campaign like Cronwright-
Schreiner 's" and he told a reporter that he had no intention of travelling 
about stirring people up in an o~jectionable way:· 99 The two delegates 
received numerous invitations to speak at various places and a.good deal 
of contradictory a4,vice. Keir Hardie was partic~larly anxious that they. 
should not 
"run helter-skelter all over the. country speaking at badly 
arranged and in some cases poorly attended meetings with a 
chance of their being broke up .and which have no influence· 
on public opinion". 
He suggested that t~ey confine their efforts to a few carefully 'Planned 
100 and really impressive gathe.rings. · They in fact began their series 
95. · Lewsen, .Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 278. 
96. Ibid., p. 2:}7. 
97. South African News, 27 and 30 March 1901. The S.A.C.C. ·published 
their petition in pamphlet form (No. 69). 
98. South African News, 3 April 1901. 
99. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 287; South African News,· 
2 April 1901. 




of public appearan'ces with a defiant gesture, with Merriman bearding 
Chamberlain in his den by speaking at a meeting in Birmingham on 17 April. 
His reception was indi~ative of the change which was coming over public 
opinion. The meeting organised by the local Democratic League was com-
pletely public. Out of an audience of over 1 500 there were only forty 
dissentients and Merriman was actually cheered as he drove off in a cab 
after the meeting, an occurrence which would have been unheard of a year 
before. 101 On 24 April Merriman and.Sauer both addressed the annual 
general meeting of the League of Liberals in London, ~erriman in parti-
102 
cular delivering a forceful and strongly pro-Boer speech. Two days 
later he spoke at a meeting organised by the Young Scots Society in Edin-
burgh. Keir Hardie had been strongly oppo~ed to Merriman's undertaking 
this engagement, for he feared that the students, incited by the Scotsman, 
103 
would repeat the Cronwright-Schreiner escapade. H.S. Swinny, secre-
tary of the S.A.c.c., however, seemed to favour the idea forhe pointed 
out that if Merriman could succeed at Edinburg~ it would mean that he co~ld 
get a hearing virtually anywhere else. 104 The meeting did in fact turn 
out to be a most· lively affair. As the Young Scots had been refused any 
other venue the meeting was.held in the Waverley Market, a building cap-
able of acconnnodat{ng 15 000 people. The audience numbered about 3 000 
and included a large number of opponents who did their utmost to disrupt 
• the proceedings. The Young Scots were, however, not to be thwarted and ' 
set about ejecting the disturbers in a most determined fa'shion, with the 
result that for the first half hour scenes ensued which,' according to 
Merriman, resembled a football match rather than a public meeting. Once 
the rowdy element had been removed Merriman was given a fair hearing and 
he returned to London well pleased at the success with which he had 
'If h h ' II • d. b h 105 On 28 A '1 . d s 'b h aug t · t e enemy ~n E ~n urg • pr~ Merr~man an auer ot 
addressed an audience of 2 000 at the Mansion House settlement in Canning 
Town, where Cronwright-Schl;"einer had previously received a sympathetic 
' . 106 hear~ng. Despite these successes Merriman remained despondent for 
101. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 288-9; South African 
~, 10 May 1901. 
102. South African News, 15 and 22 May 1901. 
103. J.X.M.P., Keir Hardie to Merriman, 18 April 1901. 
104. Ibid., Swinny toMerriman, 20 April1901. 
105. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v •. iii, pp. 293-294; South African 
News, 29 April 1901. 
106. I,.ewsen-; Merriman Correspondence,- v. iii, p. 294; South African News, 




he felt that they'meant little as long as the official Liberals remained 
apathetic. Since his arrival he had become increasingly disillusioned 
with the Liberal politicians whom he felt were sinning against the light. 
"They sit by and see all kinds of iniquity perpetrated, smoothing ·over 
their consciences with the salve that they are 'keeping the party toge~ 
ther "'. 107 He was disgusted by the fact that they evidently seemed to· 
regard the artificial .unity of the Liberal Party as of far greater im-
.Portance than the abnegation of ·all Liberal principles which their South 
108 African policy carried with it. Although Ja~es Bryce was in favour 
of the delegates speaking at several moremeetings, Merriman came to the 
conclusion that the majority of Liberals regarded them as "troublers in 
I 111 d ld b 1 d h 1 109 . srae an wou e g a to see t em eave. . 
During their visit Mer.riman and Sauer came in for their fair share 
of obloquy in the imperialist press. Their opponents even went so far as 
to rake up Sauer's misadve.ntures with General Gordon in Basutoland in 1882 
and the Dordrecht incident remained a fertile source of abuse and misrepre-
sen~ation. 110 They were, however, fortunate that the Daily News, which· 
. under the editorship of ·E.T. Cook had taken a firm imperialist line, had 
. recently been recaptured by the Liberals so that there was a leading 
. 11 1 
London newspaper which would report them favourably. R.C. Lehmann, 
editor of the Daily News, sent the prominent journalist H.W. Massingham, 
. late editor of the Daily Chronicle, to interview them 112 and Sauer made 
use of this forum to publish a caustic atta~k on Lord Selborne's.mis-
f f d · h · h t f rebels. 113 statement o acts r~gar ~ng t e pun~s men o 
Merriman and nis wife left for Germany on 3 May· as the guests of E.A. 
Lippert, the Transvaal concessionaire then living in Hamburg, and Merriman 
only returned to England at the beginning of June to complete the last of 
107. J.X.M.P., Merriman to Goldwin Smith, 2 May· 1901. 
108. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, P.• 295. 
109. Ibid., pp. 295-296.· 
... 
' 
110. South African News, 27 March 1901. For the Dordrecht incident see above pp.49-50 
111. J.X.M.P., P.A. Molteno to Merriman, 18 Jan. 1901; Agnes Me·rriman 
to Julia Merriman, 16 Feb. 1901; Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, 
v. iii, ~. 290. . 
~· 
112.· Sout'h African News, 25 Apri 1 1901; reprint of article from Daily 
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his engagements. By then Milner had arrived in England to receive a 
tumultuous welcome and a peerage, which Merriman regarded as an outrage, 
. . . 
and the attitude of the Liberal Party appeared.to have become even more 
ambivalent. One·of the last meetings to be addressed by both Merriman 
and Sauer was that at Battersea, that stronghold of opposition to the war 
where Cronwright-Schreiner and Vincent van der Byl had previously encoun-. 
d . h h ' ' . 114 A 1 ' h d 1 d ·tere sue an ent us~ast~c recept~on. arge meet~ng was sc e u e 
·to take place at Queen's Hall to round off their visit, but as they felt 
that the other speakers engaged for the occasion were men of too extreme 
views who were also frowned upon by Leonard Courtney and other leading 
conciliators, Merriman and Sauer were .not enthusiastic about the venture. 
Sauer, however, agreed to attend and, as had been anticipated, the meeting 
was marred by organised rowdyism. 115 The delegates sailed for Cape Town 
. . . 1 f. h . . . 116 d on 22 June, both d~sappo~nted w~th the resu t o t e~r ~ss~on an 
Merriman in particular feeling thoroughly disillusioned with the land of 
his pirth. 
Their mission might, however, not have been as abortive as they 
. thought. Hofmeyr, who had been wont to write in ·the most ~essimistic 
terms, sent them some encouragement on the eve of their departure. 
"To be sure you and Sauer did not succeed in bringing about a 
revolution in English Jingoistic thought and feeling, nor effect 
quite what you expected when you came over. But you must have 
succeeded iri shooting rays of light in many a dark place, ·and 
converting waverers {jou must h·av:=,,7 confirmed in the faith man.y 
a true believer in need of some stiffening of the political 
backbone". 117· 
Merriman and Sauer had indeed, during the extensive round of entertainments 
arranged for them: by their friends, had the opportunity of speaking pri-
vat~ly to virtually every Liberal politician of note and also to. some lead-:-
ing men in the opposition camp. They had both made a very favourable ~m-
. pression, Campbell-:-Bannerman describing Merriman ·in particular as··"a most'· 
• • II 11 8 I . . bl h h . . fl . tak~ng and effect~ve envoy •. t ~s possl. e t at t e~r 1.n uence 
114. J.X.M.P., Merriman to Agnes Merriman, 3 June 1901. 
115. Ibid., Agnes Merriman to Julia Merriman, 14 June 1901; Merriman to 
W .P. Byles, 19 June 1901; South African ·News, 11 and 17 July 190 I. 
116. South African News, 24 June 1901. 
117. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. 299·. 
118.· Tl;lid., p. -274;-" M.P., P.A. Molteno to c. Molteno, 2 March 1901. · 
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combined with the sensation caused by Emily Hobhouse's revelations re-
garding the concentration camps might have "invigorated the opposition to 
the war" 1 19 as was evidenced in Campbell-Bannerman 's "methods of barbarism" 
speech. There was little public reaction in the Colony to the negative 
outcome of the Merriman-Sauer mission for the paralysing grip of martial 
law stifled the expression of OP,inion and the impact of the second invasion 
upon the Colony caused people to become disheartened ·and preoccupied with· 
their own misfortunes. 
· From the beginning of 1900 to the middle of 1901 there had been a re-
gular flow of visitors from the Cape to England and opponents: of the war 
there were kept in constant contact with opinion in the Colony. Taken as 
a whole the results of the .conciliation party's appeals to the English 
people's sense of justice and fair play were, however, disappointing. The 
disillusionment felt at the outcome of their efforts is epitomised in 
Charles Molteno's connnent from England at the end of November 1900: "The 
old England we were taught to believe in ••• is a myth and we have to adjust 
. 120 
our ideas accordingly". 
119. This was the op1n1on of the London correspondent.of the South 
African News, .·11 July 1901. 





·THE STIFLING OF CRITICISM 
The extension of martial law which resulted from the second invasi'on 
of the Colony virtually paralysed the conciliation party. Any political . 
action was rendered impossible in districts under military control which, 
by 9 October 1901, included the whole of the Colony with the e~ception of. 
the native territories. The conciliators had, up to the end of 1900, been 
able to voice their opinions freely in the press, in Pat:liament and on 
public platforms, but during the last seventeen months of the "lingering 
war" they struggled to keep their heads above water in the face of growing· 
despondency engendered by. the stringent action of the military authori tie.s 
and the disruption caused by the Boer commandos. As early as June 1900 
Dr. Meiring 'Beck had written to Percy Molteno: "We are in despair here" 
and a year later Merriman reported on his return from England that "the 
1 
spirit seems crushed out of people". The task of rendering assistance 
to the destitute Republicans was the only aspect of the conciliators' 
work which continued unabated. This aspect of their activities could to 
. a certain extent be regarded as non-political and their work was not unduly· 
obstructed by the authorities. 
Despite the general feeling' of dejection and war-weariness, the con-
ciliators refused to encourage the Boers to.surrender. In February 1901 
three members of the ~roonstad Peace Committee, which had been founded for 
this purpose, visited Cape ·Town to seek the Bond.'s assistance to end the· 
war. Ex-commandant P.D. de Wet, a brother of the celebrated Boer general, 
headed the. deputation which also contai-ned a member of the late Free State 
Volksraad. The conciliation party regarded thes~ men as "hands-uppers" 
who represented the few weakling~ in the Boer nation and had no mandate 
from their people. It looked askance at the Committee's peace .efforts in 
the Republics which it regarded as an attempt to seduce th.e burghers from 
their all~giance. 2. The Kroonstad envoys ~et with no success at the Cape. 
When they approached T.P. Theron, chairman of the Bond, he refused to 
I. M.P._, Meiring Beck ·to P.A. Molteno, 18 June 1900;. Merrimari. to. P.A. 
Molteno, 23 June 1901. · 
2. South African News, 2 May 1901. 
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recognise the deputation's status or to enter ·into negotiations on the 
peace question, on the grounds that it was against the Bond's programme 
. f . . 1 3 . o pr~nc~p es. Andrew Murray was ~nunovable in declining to do any-
thing unless the British. Government acknowledged the independence of the 
Republics. 4 As a result of his attitude the Bloemfontein Post, which 
. -
was under official control, published a vituperative article against him 
in which it remarked: 
"It is extremely doubtful whether this blasphemous creature, this 
impious priest,.this Pecksniffian humbug, would sacrifice a tittle 
of his stipend to secure anything which would not feed his person~ 
al vanity or conduce to his material exaltation". 5 
The.South African News expressed its opinion on the peace envoys in a 
scathing leader on 14 February, in which it. condemned De Wet and his asso-
ciates for the disgraceful manner i:n which they were attacking the cause 
with which they had previously been associated. It conceded that if the 
Republican leaders decided to accept the fact of annexation,. it would be 
.the duty of the conciliation party to consider the whole situation afresh. 
But it did not regard the position of the Boer conunandos as hopeless and 
found it incomprehensible that any of their late comrades could adopt an 
attitude such as that of the peace envoys. Although there was now little 
talk of unqualified independence for the Republics the conciliation party 
was still convinced that the Boers would not accept anything less than 
complete self-g.ov:ernment. 
The first serious setback suffered by the conciliation party after 
7• 
the second invasion, came in the form of a military order prohibiting th17 
circulation of the South African News in all districts under mart.ial law. 
This was issued by General Walker, the officer commanding lines of commu-
nication at the Cape, who regarded the paper as an undesirable publica-
tion. 6 The decision was a severe blow for the South African News which 
was still struggling to establish itself in the face of the hostility of 
the Eng~ish-speaking section of the population. Because of its policy the 
3. J.X.M.P., Meiring Beck to Merriman, 27 Feb. 1901; Hofmeyr to Merriman, 
29 April 1901 with a memorandum byTe Water appended. 
4. South African News, May 1901. 
5. Ibid., 15 May 190 I. 




paper had received its main support in the country districts from which 
it \vas now excluded. In December 1899 it had had a daily circulation of 
4 800 copies and sold I 200 weekly editions. Charles Molteno reported,in 
February 1900 that its circulation was growing rapidly in the country 
districts and that support for the paper had generally greatly improved. 
By April 1901 the exclusion of the South African News from martial law 
7 districts had, however·, reduced its daily circulation to I 300 copies • 
. This entailed a heavy loss as its finances had never been very stable. 
It had ·Started off rather ambitiously for an anti-war publication taking 
the field in an imperialist stronghold su~h as Cape Town. Because of its 
unpopular policy the major' financial houses had refused to advertise in it 
and the Cape Argus had even hinted that English-speaking Capetonians should 
boycott the firms that supported it. 8 In December 1899 the South African 
News had been running at a loss· of £1 000 a month and was perilously close 
to bankruptcy. 9 Its discomfiture had been heralded with joy by the im-
perialist press which had ~lways predicted that it would not survive. 
The Cape Times had obtained a copy of a confidential circular to share-
holders of the South African News which it had published, also telegraphing 
.to the Daily News and the Daily Mail in London that the paper was about to 
collapse. The rumour was widely circulated and the London correspondent of 
the South African News had been so convinced of the demise of the paper 
that he had refrained from forwarding his usual "London Letter". 10 The 
280 shareholders of the paper, mostly Cape colonists with limited means, 
had, however, been prepared to waive their dividends and to rally with ad-
ditional support so that the paper survived the crisis although it had to 
. . 1 1 
economise and reduce its size from eight pages to four. By November 
1900 the South Afri"can Ne,vs was again in financial difficulties and Percy 
Molteno appealed to numerous persons, including Captain Sinclair, Sir 
Robert Reid and R.C. Lehmann for assistance to tide the paper over its pre-
sent "pinch". He also made full .use of Charles Molteno's presence.in Eng-
land to secure support for the paper. 12 The banning order which 
7. M.P.C., C. Molteno to ·P.A. Molteno, 21 Feb. 1900; South African News, 
30 Dec. 1899, 19 April 1901. 
8. Cape Argus, 13 olan. 1900. 
9.' M.P., R. Philipson-Stow to P.A. Molteno, 4 Dec. 1899. 
10. Soutl:l African News, 20 Dec. 1899, 19 Jan. 1900. 
11. Ibid., 30 Dec. 1.899; M.P.C., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 21 Feb.· 1900. 
12. M.P., P.A. Molteno to Capt. J. Sinclair, 14 Nov. 1900; P.A. Molteno to 
R.c, •. Lehmann, ·.14 Nov. 1900; P.A. Molteno to Sir R. Reid, 15 Nov. 1900; 
P.A. Molteno 'to.A. Cartwright, 16 Nov. 1900. 
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accompanied the ex'tension of martial law therefore placed the proprietors 
of the newspaper in a most difficult position, With the journal confined 
to Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and the native territories, 
where its friends were stalwart but few in number, they feared that its 
circulation would dwindle to nothing and seriously contemplated closing it 
down. Harry Currey, who appears to have been intimately associated with 
the paper, however, was in_ favour of keeping it going as it would be ex-
tremely difficult to restart it once its small staff had been scattered 
and-had lost their connections. He discussed the possibility of raising 
money for the paper with Joshua Rowntree, who had come to South Africa 
·with Emily Hobhouse to investigate the extent of suffering amongst non-
. combatants, and Sauer and Merriman promised to see what they could do in 
13 this connection as soon as they reached England. . 
The South African News, however, refused to accept the ruling of the 
military authorities without protest, on·7'February the managing director, 
rather unwisely, brought an action against the P_ostmaster-General. Advo-
. cate Burton, who p~esented the case, pointed out .that the military stoppage 
of the paper virtually amounted to its suspension. This arbitrary inter-
ference with the activities of the company had caused it to sustain great 
loss and Burton argued that the Supreme Court would have to decide·whether 
the military authorities were justified in their action. Innes, who as 
Attorney~General appeared for the respondent, however, maintained that the 
reason for the paper 1 s exclusiol_l from martial law districts was no.t the 
question before the court. The applicants had asked that the Postmaster-
General remove certain restrictions which he, in fact, had not imposed. 
He had merely been the channel through which the South African News had 
been informed by the military of th~ restrictions placed upon its circul~­
tiori. The Postmaster-General was not responsible for the order and he 
could therefore not remove it. Both judges concurred in this opinion and· 
14 the South African. News 1 s application was refused with costs, It is 
13. M.P., C. M({lteno to P.A. Molteno, 8 Jan. 1901, 26 Feb. 1901; 
J. X.M.·P. , H. Currey to Merriman, 27 Jan. 190 I. A Quaker anti-war 
syndicate headed by Cadbury had been responsible for. buying o~t the 
Daily News, which under the editorship of Lehmann r~turned to the. 
paths of true Liberalism, Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, V:• iii, 
p. 290. 
14. South African News, 8 Feb, 1901. 
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difficult to imagine what grounds they had for thinking that their peti-
tion would succeed and it can only be surmised that they brought the action 
against the Postmaster-General with the object of drawing attention to 
their· plight. 
Pecuniary embarrassment.was, however, not the paper's only problem 
for on 28 March its office was attacked by a group of Australian troopers. 
They broke into the building after having spent a "lively" evening·in the 
·town, and wrecked everything they could reach, smashing windows, destroy-
f . d b . h 1' h . 15 h . 1ng urn1ture, an atter1ng t e 1g t1ng apparatus. T e Cape T1mes . 
and Cape Argus, neither of which said a word in condemnation of the attack, 
ascribed the Australians' action to the fact that they were smarting under 
the insults levelled against them in the columns of the South African News, 
one of their grievances being that the paper had· stigmatised the Australian 
contingent as "scum". 16 ·The South African News hotly denied having pub-
lished any disparaging remarks about the Australians and was scandalised 
I 7 by the fact that no arrests had been made. As the attackers had not 
been able to get at the composing room or the printing machinery the paper 
appeared as usual, although in a slightly dishevelled state. On April 
it, however, reported that· owing to an "accident" to its machinery it was 
temporarily being printed at the offices of Ons Land. 
On 22 February the South African News again featured in the Supreme 
_Court, this time with the editor, Albert Cartwright, suing the Cape Times, 
proprietors and publishers of the weekly newspaper the Owl, for £5 000 
damages for defamation of character. The action was brought on account of 
an article which had appeared in the Owl on 27 April 1900. In discussing 
the South African News's comment on the triql of the Sunnyside rebels 18 
' it had insinuated that Cartwright would not be in a position to agitate 
for a review of the case after the war. 
"If it has been necessary to pass exemplary sentences _on the 
ignorant, uncouth creatures, what ~easure shall be meted out 
15. South African News, 29 March 1901, 16 May 1901; M.P., C. Molteno to 
P.A. Molteno, 30 March 1901. 
16. Cape Argus, 29 March 1901; Cape Times, 29 March 1901. 
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to the amicable and cultured Albert for the amount of treason, 
sedition and misrepresentation which has been diligently dished 
up every morning for the last six months. I am afraid that 
nothing less than I5 ~onths will ·meet the case". 
In replying to the charge against them the defendants admitted that the 
words used in the article had been strong, but pJ.eaded that they had acted 
under great provocation, In order to substantiate their plea of justifi-
. cation counsel for the defence quoted copiously from past editions of the 
South African News, maintaining that articles written by Cartwright had 
regularly been untruthful and seditious. On this occasion Burton again 
handled the case and with greater success than before, as the jury even-
tually found for the plain.tiff to the tune of one farthing. Ig As Cart-
. . . 
wright maintained that he had taken legal action not for the money but 
to clear his good name, the verdict must have afforded him some slight. 
·satisfaction. This was, however, not the case for long, for the Owl's 
prediction regarding the fate which would befall him was s·oon borne out 
by the course of events. 
On 7 February Burton had maintained in court, while present:ing the 
South African News's action against the Postmaster-General, that the 
military authorities could not have banned_ the p·aper from martial-law dis~ 
tricts on account of its being a treasonable or libellous publication for 
no such charge had been brought against it. This had been a most unfor-
tunate line to take, for on the same day Albert Cartwright was arrested 
for having published a defamatory and seditious libel against Lord 
. . 20 
Kitchener. The charge arose out of the publication, on 6 February, 
of a letter from a British officer in the field, alleging that Kitchener 
had given secret. ins tructio~s to the force pursuing De Wet that no prison-
ers· were to ~e ·taken when it finally caught up with the Boer general and-
his co1mnando. This officer had also been the· author of the letter pub-,. 
lished as.a pamphlet entitled "What is now being. done in South Africa". 
It had been destroyed on instructions from Innes who regarded it as a 
seditious libel, but Cartwright had nevertheless published it on 28 
December I900. 2 I In printing this latest letter the South African News 
maintained in an editorial that it might have been possible to turn a 
blind eye to the officer's first two letters,but the charge contained in 
the third was too dreadful to be ignored. It therefore demanded ·an 
1.9. South African News, 23 Feb. 190 I. 
20. I,bid. , 8 Feb. I90 I • 
21. See above P• I14. 
I 
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explanation from L'ord Kitchener. The editorial also pointed out that 
the letter had appeared three weeks before in Reynolq's Newspaper, the 
Freeman·':s ·Journal, the New Age and Stead's Review of Reviews, none of 
which had been prosecuted. On the following day it again devoted 'a 
leader to the subject, revealing that essential parts of the letter had 
22 
also appeared in the Times on 16 January.- The publication of this 
letter in the South African News was a most injudicious move in view of 
. the fact that three other editor's had already been arrested for pub-
lishing similar material. J.E. de Jong, proprietor of the Worcester 
Advertiser had been arrested on 3 December 1900 on a charge of criminal 
and seditious libel as a result of a letter which appeared in his paper 
alleging that General French had fired cannon at a house in which. 
several women and children had taken shelter. When their presence had 
been pointed out to him he was said to have replied: "Shoot the beggars. 
Afrikanerdom must be swept .from the face of the earth" and, some of the 
victims who had managed to escape from the house, were left lying outside 
witqout it having been ascertained whether any of them were still alive. 
J.A. Vosloo, editor of Ret Oosten in Somerset East, who had also pub-
.lished the letter, had been arrested on 14 December 1900 and F.S .• Malan 
·editor of Ons Land, who had been the first to print it, suffered a similar. 
fate on 7 January 1901. 23 The editors were all let out on bail and none 
appear to have taken the charge too seriously, believing ·that they would 
merely be fined for the offence.' Malan and Cartwright appeared in court 
together. Both pleaded' not guilty and both· undertook their own defence •. 
24 .. From Cartwright's declaration in court ~t appeared that he had re-
ceived the letter from W.T. Stead who personally knew the writer and had 
give? Cartwright his word of honour that the information was genuine. 
Stead had also sent the letter to Lord Roberts who had replied that he did 
not doubt the good standing and ~nblemished ·reputation of the offi'cer 
22. South African News, 7 Feb. ·1901. 
· 23. Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 231; South African News, 6 and 17 Dec. 
1900, 9 .Jan. 1901; B. Cloete, Die lewe van Senator F.S. Malan, pp. 
152-154-. 
24. Cartwright had prepared a statement which he intended reading' in· 
court, but Innes objected on the grounds that a statement tn the 
nature of evidence for the defence had to be made on oath and 
Cartwright ~as · .. therefore not allowed to proceed. The statement 
was published in the South African News on 27 April 1901. II _ .. F 
._.. 
.. ::, ... 
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responsible for it', but that he also did not believe that Kitchener would 
countenance such proceedings. Cartwright'pointed out that the idea of 
25 
shooting prisoners was not new as several leading English newpapers had 
advocated such a policy. In the light of statements which had appeared 
in these papers and in view of the fact that both Stead and Lord Roberts 
had vouched for the bona fides of the writer of the letter, Cartwright 
had obviously believed that there might be some truth in it, and had con-
sidered it a public duty to publish it in order to obtain a deniaL As 
soon as this had been forthcoming from Lord Kitchener he had published .'it 
also. This explanation did not satisfy the court as Mr. Justice Jones 
pointed out that the law did not entitle·:.a person to publish a d~famatory 
libel simply in order to obtain a contradiction. Innes, who conducted 
the prosecution, was also not to be pacified, and he relentlessly pointed 
out the weaknesses in Cartwright's explanation. If the .latter's object 
in publishing the letter had merely been to elicit a denial there had been 
no need to "rub it in" in two leading articles. He could have got a reply 
simply by communicating it to official quarters, which he had not done. 
Neither had he seriously attempted to ascertain the identity of the officer 
. 
concerned. Innes also referred to the fact that Cartwright had, in Decem-
ber 1900, deliberately printed material by the same writer although he knew 
that the pamphlets COt:lcerned were regarded as being seditious. The South 
African News had also frequently contained articles which had sailed too 
close to the wind. Inne·s drew p'articular attention to the vicious attack 
.upon the Anglican Archbishop in the paper's leading article on 9 May 1900. 
It had been inspired by the Archbishop's formal announcement of his support 
for Milner's policy on 21 April 1900. 26 Cartwright ·had· never concealed 
his opinion that the Anglican Church had betrayed its mission by supporting 
the war. The article in question had state4: 
II •••• we have the Anglican Primate of the Cape, in his sacerdotal 
robes,rwith his mitre ·upon his head and his· crozier in his hand, 
leap into the hloody arena of war-politics and there lay about him 
like a gladiator. No words of peace from him. Kill! .Kill! Kill! · 
is his cry. Like the Zulu in batt.le he has smelled blood and sees 
· red ••• " 
25. The Birmingham Gazette, the St. James's Gazette, the Standard and the 
·Daily Telegra£h· 








This leader had not been written by the editor, being a contributed 
article. Cartwright, however, took full responsibility for it, and whi:le 
admitting that it was "a little theatrical", maintained that it was a per-
missible comment on the Archbishop's attitude. The South African News's 
numerous attacks on the Anglican Church, 27 and this article in particular, 
undoubtedly caused great offence. It had also been cited by the publish-. 
· ers of the Owl to justify their allegation that Cartwright's writings 
· had frequently been libellous. 
Although the indictment of seditious libel against Cartwright was 
withdrawn28 Innes emphasized the fact that there was a difference between 
publishing an allegation, such as that made' against Kitchener, in England 
where there was no war· and "where the clash of extreme opinipn on the· 
. other side neutralises the effect", and publishing it "within the sound 
of cannon" in South Africa. The fact that the circulation of the South 
African News had been so restricted that it was unlikely to have a sedi-
tious effect did not weigh with Innes as he.maintained that the story would 
sooner or later reach the martial law districts. That it was bound to do 
so through the columns of the English newspapers which were allowed to cir-
culate without restrictions in _these areas, did not seem to occur.to him. 
. . 
He maintained that ·he did not wish to be unduly hard on Cartwright, but 
thought that he had to suffer the consequences of his actions. The judge 
agreed that Cartwright had placed himself·in a predicament for legally 
there was no defence for what he had done. The jury therefore returned· 
a verdict of guilty. 
Malan's case was heard immediately after Cartwright's and he fared no 
better. He requested a postponement of the trial so that he might contact 
six witnesses, .two of whom were in a military refugee camp. Four of them· 
were said t:o ha;e· bee~ subjected to the treatment mentioned in the letter 
accusing French of having fired on women and children and the one.woman 
was the writer of the libellous letter. It had been sent to her relations 
at Caledon and had been extensively circulated before it had been brought ·to 
Malan's notice·. As Malan could not assure the court that the witnesses 
27. For examples of its attacks upon the Church see_ South African News, 
27 and 28 April 1900, 2 and 31 May 1900. 
28.· Ibid., 24 April .1901. A person could not be charged with two 
diffe~ent crimes arising out of the same set of facts. 
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concerned would supply evidence which would be material to his case, his 
application for a postponement was refused. Innes made it clear that al-
though he was very much fn favour of the liberty of the press, he be-
lieved that an editor had to behave responsibly, and if he deliberately 
chose to publish material which endangered the safety of the state he had 
only himself to blame for the consequences. He pointed out to Malan 
that the allegations against General French were such as to create the 
.impression with the Afrikaners in the Colony that deliberate butchery was 
being practised amongst their kinfolk in the Republics. "IS it to keep 
them quiet or is it to stifle their loyalty? I have spoken warmly on this 
matter because I feel warmly". Malan, who had qualified as an advocate at 
Cambridge, delivered a long and somewhat involved address justifying his 
action. He concluded his defence by stating that the publication of the 
allegation against French was a fair comment "looked at from my side". 
In summing up the judge maintained that the jury's only task was to decide 
whether the charge against Malan fell within the limits laid down by the law 
and.he was therefore found guilty. Malan and Cartwright were both sen-
tenced to one year's imprisonment. De Jong and Vosloo received sentences 
.of six months with an additional two months for DeJong on a separate 
29 
. charge. 
Innes's only comment on the outcome .. of the trials was that Malan and 
Cartwright's sentences were a little more severe than he had expected; 
"b~t no one could say th'at they were undeserved". 30 Merriman, who was 
still in England, condemned the proceedings, remarking that not even in 
the worst crisis in Ireland had four editors been. imprisoned simultaneously. 
The South African News also reacted vigorously. In a leader headed "A 
Seco;nd Ireland", it severely condemned ·Innes for his line of prosecution, 
accusing him of employing double standards. 
" • • • what may be printed • ~ • with impunity by the leading journals 
of England, may not be ••• published in South Africa. So·much for 
the so-called 'equal rights' of British subjects". 
They did not regard as legally valid Innes ,.s "excuse" that it was unwise to 
publish offensive material in view of the disturbed state of the country. 
29. South African News, 19, 20, 23 and 24 April 1901; Davenport. Afrikaner 
·Bond, p. 231; Cloete, F.S. Malan, p. 164. 
30. Wright, Rose Innes Correspondence, p. 280. 
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"As a matter of wisdom and policy, that may be true, but as a 
matter of strict legal right, we venture to say that every 
lawyer in the world would laugh at the.doctrine ••• In the 
not distant future he /lnnes7 will be regarded as a legal 
curiosity ••• while the Jingo press may libel our Dutch fellow-
subjects and leading Afrikaners to their hearts' content, -
calling them 'murderers', 'thieves', 'liars 1 and 1 traitors 1 -
adverse reports of the doings of British soldiers amongst whom 
there are bound to be a certain number of hooligans ••• are to 
·be pounced upon and their authors punished with drastic 
severity ••• Such are the humours of justice in a British 
colony and the vagaries and vindic ti venes s of racial animas i ty! 
The Attorney-General may flatter himself that he now has nearly 
the whole of the opposition editors in prison - a second 
Ireland indeed!" 
They also wished to know how Lord Kitchener 1 s reputation could have be.en 
injured any further by the publication of .the letter in the relatively. 
obscure South African News after it had already been spread throughout 
· the length and breadth of the British Empire by the Times and other 
leading journals. The editorial. also assured those responsible for the 
prosecutions that if they had thought' to strike a crushing blow at 
Afrikanerdom through these vindictive measures they had been mistaken for 
the nation would be all the stronger for such blows and.would be welded 
by them into greater·unity. 31 
The affair confirmed.Innes as the South African News's bete noire 
.and it allowed no opportunity of attacking him to pass. On 27 April it 
returned to the charge with an editorial headed "Evolution of a Politician". 
They had already in June 1900 pointed out that Innes was no longer his old 
"radical" self and warned that he might degenerate into a "colonial. Rose-· 
bery". 32 They now mai.ntained that in at first opposing the war and in-
. dulging in a "somewhat ostentatious 'conscience"' he had merely been sitting 
on the fence. When it became apparent that his support for the side that 
was being worsted might endanger his future in politics h~ had jumped off 
the fence, on the winning side. 
"He chose his time· with consummate skill and is now Attorney-General 
••• like Mr. Chamberlain with the Tories Mr. Innes had to justify . 
. himse 1f with the Jingoes. He had to purify himself of the ultimate 
taint of mugwumpery •• ·• /so now7 he is as keen after the scent of 
dis loyalty a!) .ever a Spanish inquisitor after heresy". 
31. South African News, 23 April 1901. 
32, Ibid., 28 June _.1900. 
__ .. ,., 
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The South African News was particularly incensed at Innes Is attitude 
towards the Cape Daily Telegraph, a Port Elizabeth newspaper which, on 
12 February, reprinted the libellous letter against Kitchener without a 
word to throw doubt upon its accuracy, but·was not prosecuted. At 
Cartwright's trial Innes had dilated upon the danger of "throwing gun-
powder about in South Africa". The South African News pointed out that 
the Cape Daily Telegraph, which was a ministerial organ and therefore 
free to circulate in martial law districts, had been in a better position 
to scatter gunpowder about than the journal whose editor was now languish-
ing in prison. They regarded Innes's attitude in this matter as one of the 
most damning blots .on his official career. 33 His acceptance of the post 
as Chief Justice of the Transvaal and the fact that he was awarded a knight-
hood during the.cRoyal visit in August, provided them with fresh annnuni:-
tion. 34 Innes was accused of deserting the Colony in the midst' of a 
crisis which he had largely helped to create. "One of t~e most regret-: 
table incidents connected with this struggle is to be found in the .fact 
that more than one of our prominent public men should have shown such in-. 
decent haste to grab a share of the spoils which are always at the disposal 
of the victors ••• 11 • 35 
The imprisonment of the editors evoked a strong reaction amongst the 
conciliation party in England, more so as Cartwr~ght was English born and 
had personal friends amongst journalists there. Percy Molteno, who con-
denmed Cartwright Is . sentence as "monstrous and iniquitous II' was convinced 
. that Innes had allowed his feelings to override his judgment at the trial 
. and stigmatised his mode of prosecution .as vindictive and inconsiderate. 36 
Charles Molteno had reported that the proprietors of the South African News 
were determined that Cartwright should suffer as little as possible as a, 
result of his imprisonment and had decided to pay him his salary for· the 
present. He also appealed to Percy Molteno to see what he could do for 
33. South African News, 29 April 1901, 8 May 1901. 
34. Innes claimed that his title was thrust upon him at such short notice 
that he had no opportunity of refusing it. Wright, Rose Innes 
Correspondence, p. 284. 
35. 
36. 
South African News, '24 Aug. 1901. Richard Solomon was censured for 
the same reasons. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 10 ·Jan. 1901. 
M.P., P.A. Mol~~na to c. Molteno, 26 April 1901, 17 May 1901; 










Cartwright in England. His energetic brother at once set about raising 
_a fund in conjunction with a committee which included several journalists 
and was presided over by Lord Farrar. By July the fund amounted to £300. 
Molteno reported regretfully that he had not been able to do the same for 
Malan, but personally contributed generously to a fund being raised for 
37 the editors at the Cape~ 
The leading Liberal newspapers all condemned the editors' sentences, 
the Daily News being of the opinion that the British Government meant to 
muzzle its critics and that this "cruel and horrible" penalty was only the 
first in a series of punishments intended to stifle the voice of free 
·protest in South Afric~. 38 Frederick Dolman, a personal friend of Cart-
wright, tabled a resolution at a meeting -of the .London district of· the 
Institute of Journalists on 28 June, condemning Cartwright-'-s treatment and 
suggesting that action be taken to secure a remission or reduction of his 
. 39 
sentence. The resolution was, however; defeated. Questions were also 
asked in the House of Commons in March and May and the S.A.C.C. forwarded 
a resolution to Chamberlain requesting that representations be made to 
the Cape Government with a view to the commutation of Car~wright's sen-
40 tence. It also published a~ account of the affair in two pamphlets, 
one entitled "The lmprisonment of Mr. Cartwright" and the other "The True 
Facts of the Cartwright Case". In addition several addresses of sympathy 
. 41 
were forwarded to the editors from towns in England. 
During their first month of confinement the editors were treated 
rather roughly, being placed on a par with less reputable prisoners. 
Betty Molteno, who made a particular effort to be of assistance to 
37. M.P., C. Mci~iteno to P.A. Molteno, 30 April 1901; P.A. Molteno to. 
C. Molt~no, 26 April 1901, 14 and 21 June 1901, 19 July 1901·; 
South African· Ne,.;rs, 12 July 1901. 
38, South African News, 13 May 1901 citing the Daily News, 20 April 
1901. See also the article from the Morning Leader, 11 May 1901 
reprinted in the South African News, 1 June 1901 and comment from 
the Manchester Guardian, 13 May 1901 reprinted on 11 June 1901. 
39. South African News, 12 and 19 July 1901. 
40. Ibi,d., 27 March 1901, 4 and 15 May 1901; M.P., P.A. Molteno to 
C. Molteno, 26 April 1901. 




th.em, 42 informed her brother in London that they were being imprisoned 
under most unsatisfactory conditions and that they were not being allowed 
to receive any books or writing materials. 43 Innes sailed from the Cape 
on 1 May to. attend a meeting of a judicial committee and he had hardly 
arrived in London when Percy Molteno and Mackarness called on him to make 
representations regarding the treatment of the edi to~s, It appeared that .. 
Innes was not aware of the manner in which they were being confined and 
agreed that the prison regulations should be altered to enable ;:them to 
receive books and writing materials. He, however, pointed out that the 
prisons were not controlled by his department and advised Molteno to peti• 
tion either the Governor or the Cape ministry if he wished to have the . 
. matter reconsidered. 44 In reporting the result of his interview with 
Innes to Charles and Betty Molteno, Percy Molteno, however, s.tressed the 
fact that it had been entirely private and warned them not to make use of 
it in any public way._ Before this information could reach the Cape the 
editors had already, on 20 May, been removed from the crowded Roeland 
Street jail to more confortable quarters at Tokai and it therefore seems 
unlikely that the amelioration of their condition was in any way due to 
45 intervention from Innes. During their spell at Tokai the editors were 
treated more reasonably. They were allowed regular visitors and Centlivres 
sent them ·daily summaries of .the news so that they were able to keep abreast 
of events. Malan set about learning shorthand from De Jong and Cartwright 
.devoted his time to acquiring a working knowledge of Dutch from the editor 
. of Ons Land as well as to studying French, so that their year in prison was · 
46 
not entirely wasted. In August 1901 Percy Molteno proposed that Cart-
wright might benefit from a visit to England after his release. Cartwright 
did in fact act upon this suggestion and was feted at the House of Commons 
by no less a personage than C.P. Scott, editor of .the Manchester Guardian. 
42. During his imp~isonment Cartwright regularly corresponded with Betty 
Molteno, expressing his thanks for all she had done for him and his 
wife, and for the manner in which this had helped him to overcome the 
initial despondency which he had experienced after his conviction. 
Some of the letters are in the Murray P-arker Collection. See .especial-
ly A. Cartwright to Betty Molteno, 2 May 1901.. · 
43. M.P., Betty Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 1 May 1'901; South Af-rican News, 
· 3 June 190 1. 
44. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 24 May 1901; .M.P.C., P.A. Molteno 
to Betty Molteno, 24 May 1901. 
45. South African News, 21 May 1901. 
46. Clpete;· F.S. Malan, pp. 158-167;. M.P., Betty Molteno to P;A. Molteno, 
July 1901 (no day); M.P.C., A.· Cartwright to Betty Molteno, 6 Dec. 1901. 
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He apparently made a good impression for Leonard Courtney's wife reported 
that his utterances had been very moderate and wanting in bitterness con-
'd . h . . . h ff 47 Sl er1ng t e lnJuStlce e had su ered. 
The South African News's claim that virtually all the opposition 
editors were in jail, was an exaggeration, but their sentences did have a 
drastic effect on the majority of the newspapers concerned. The Worcester 
Advertiser was closed down by the military on 6 January, Ons Land was re-
placed by the Advertentieblad on 8 January, which for the remainder of the 
war avoided contentious subjects, and Het Oosten appears to have gone out 
of circulation on 28 March, the day it was prohibited from circulating 1n 
. . . 48 If . I the Somerset East d1str1ct. Cartwr1ght s sentence was meant to 
cow the South African News into submission it did not have the desired 
effect. His imprisonment resulted in a rush of volunteers to the editorial 
. rescue, two of these being Cronwright-Schreiner and Dr. Kolbe. It is not 
clear who the other contributors were, but it is possible that Harry Currey 
also wrote for the paper, the direction of which devolved upon the sub-
49 
editor, Charles Henry Graham. With the assistance of this small band 
of helpers the South African News was able to "keep its end of the stick up" 
and continued a valiant protest against the. administration of martial law, 
the conditions in the concentration camps and the efforts to suspend the 
Cape constitution. Cronwright-Schreiner, who was in Cape Town from 
December 1900 to May 1901, was not a very imaginative writer, but Kolbe, 
who was also editor of the South African Catholic Magazine, made a valuable 
contribution towards keeping the new~paper going. 50 He undertook the task 
of writing editorials for the Sa~urday edition and probably contributed 
other material as well. His writings were always spirited and. at times, per..., 
haps, a shade too outspoken. Although the South African News continued to 
present good material, the general tone of.its reporting deteriorated. 
Julia Merriman, who must have secured the paper surreptitiously at Graham5-
town, complained that it was becoming so ~abid that she could no ·longer 
d . 51 rea 1t. 
47. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 21 Aug. 1901; J.X.M.P., Kate Courtney 
to Agnes Merriman, 25 July 1902. 
48. South African News, 8 Jan. 1901; Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, pp. 231-232. 
49.· South African News, 15 Feb. 1901. 
50. J.X.M.P., Meiring Beck to Merriman, 8 April 1901, 1 May 1901; M.P., 
P.A. Molteno to· C. Molteno, 3 June 1901; Cronwright-Schreiner, Life. of 
Olive Schreiner, p. 323; Southern Cross, 29 Dec. 1954. 
51. J;x.M.P., Julia Merriman to J.X. Merriman, 30 July 1901. 
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The South African News's attitude was, however, not wholly unjusti-
fied for the senseless and irritating manner in which martial law was 
administered ant.agonised even the loyalists. The conciliators' complaints 
on this score were much the same as they had been in 1900, except that the 
situation was markedly worse during the second invasion of the Colony. 
Innes was convinced that a decided change had come over the entire adminis-
. tration of martial law. He ascribed this partly to the scope of the second 
invasion but mainly to the fact that the Cape Government had agreed to allow 
more serious political offences to be tried by military courts. This 
decision, he thought, created the impression, amongst those engaged in 
administering martial law, that they could act more rigorously than they 
52 had done before. . Others believed that 'the fact that the troops, both 
Colonial and Imperial, had been allowed to act in an unrestrained and law-
less manner in the Republics encouraged them to behave in the same .way in 
53 the Colony. 
On 9 September the South African News published one of its most searing 
indictments of "that abhorrent system of misrule and petty tyranny, mis-
named martial law", under which the Colony had been suffering for the past 
oven ty-two months. · 
"We have experienced the rigours of martial law, felt what a crime 
it is for a free-born Briton to differ in opinion from the commandant 
who rules his village with the autocracy of a Czar. Every district 
where martial law is established and.enforced is being transformed 
into a Khannate·. Measures too often vindictive, brutal, and unjust, 
have been tried and are being tried to break the spirit of the people 
whose offence is that they have opinions of their own and adhere to 
them ••• To be safe from persecution means to be cringingly submissive 
to whatever the powers in charge of a town or district mean to enforce 
That 'it is forbidden' is the quintessence of martial law, as in 
olden times it was the keynote of autocratic power • . • If the Colony 
"QJ.ust be ·ruled by martial law, let it be reasonably administered, let 
us not suf(er the enactments of a set of intolerant officials " 
After the war Merriman summarised the main grievances against martial 
law under the following headings: the handing over of civil jurisdiction 
to the military, the whole system of commandeering goods from farmers, the 
activities of the Intelligence Department and the low quality of the men 
52. Wright, Rose Innes Correspondence, p. 191. 
53 •. M.P., C. Mqlte~o to P.A. Molteno, 30 July 1901. 
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employed by it, the systematic deportation of leading inhabitants regarded 
as 11undesirables 11 , without any cause being shown, the subornation of evi-
dence, and the system of army contracting which enabled a few individuals 
k h d f . 54 Of . to mae an some pro ~ts. these the commandeer~ng of horses, cattle 
and wagons and the prohibitions placed upon the raising of crops in certain 
districts, caused the most general discontent as it affected not only the 
Dutch but also the 'loyal' section of the population. It was alleged that 
martial law had been declared in districts not directly threatened.by in-
vas ion in order to enable the mi H tary to obtain large numbers of horse's 
and mules at prices considerably lower than those which would have prevailed 
in the open market. Additional offence was caused by the fact that many of 
the animals commandeered were quite unsuited for military purposes, persons 
55 thus being needlessly deprived of stock essential for farming purposes. 
With their activities thus disrupted many farmers were placed in severe 
financial straits. In a d·oleful letter to Schreiner, enumerating his 
difficulties, the ex~cabinet minister, A.J. Herholdt, who farmed near 
Graaff-Reinet, _remarked: 110ur prospects are very gloomy. I do not wish to 
give you any details of my experience for fear that I might make myself 
liable to martial law. Suffice it to say that if things do not take a turn 
soon I shall be a ruined man 11 • 56 The wanton destruction of stock and 
other property aggravated the situation and some even feared that if the 
state of affairs continued for any length of time the Colony might be faced 
. h f . 57 w~t am~ne. 
Although the rebellion which accompanied the second invasion was less 
extensive than that which took place at the outbreak of the war58 it was 
serious enough for the military authorities to implement the severest penal-
ties. According to the·provisions of the _T~eason Bill all acts of rebellion j 
committed before 12 April 1901, fell under the jurisdiction of the Special I 
Court. The military authorities, however, paid scant attention to this 
54. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v.. iii, pp. 356-357. For a compre-
·hensive discussion of the administration of martial law during the 
second invasion see Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, pp. 202-224. 
55. South African News, 5 and 24 June 1901.· 
56. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Heroldt to Schreiner, June 1901. 
57. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 30 July 1901, 31 Aug. 1901. 
58. According to Snyman 3 437 ~ebels surrendered in .the Colony at the end 
of the war, almost two-thirds less than the numbers which had been 
in~olved in the first rebellion. Rebelleverhoor in Kaapland, p. 30. 
I --
- 168-
1 . 1 . 59 d fl . . . f . . eg~s at~on an a agrant m~scarr~age o Just~ce 
when Hendrik van Heerden of Middelburg was executed 
his sentence even having been confirmed by military 
was perpetrated 
on 2 March without 
headquarters. 60 
On 19 March three rebels from Hanover, who had been sentenced by a military 
court at De Aar for allegedly having participated in the derailment of a 
train, were also illegally executed. 61 Olive Schreiner, then living at 
Hanover, applied for a pass to travel to De Aar to intercede with General 
Settle on their behalf. She was convinced that they had been convicted 
on false evidence; "They are such poor ignorant fellows, real 'tack-haars' 
and they had no one to defend them". The general, however, refused her 
application, maintaining that he was acting on instructions from his 
superiors. Olive Schreiner therefore had to content herself with rendering 
some assistance to the widow of one of the men who had a large family and 
62 
was living in great poverty. The Sprigg ministry protested vigorously 
against these illegal proceedings, but to no avail. When the Treason Act 
expired on 12 April they were persuaded to ·consent to the more serious 
offence under martial law being tried by military courts on the grounds 
that the civil courts could not deal effectively with such cases in the 
disturbed state o( the Colony. They did so with great: reluctance and only 
after Lord Kitchener had agreed to various safeguards to ensure that the 
. d ' d f . . 1 63 Th' h G . f accuse rece~ve a a~r tr~a • ~s meant t at a overnment not~ce o 
6 April, announcing that rebels :would be tried by. the civil courts after 
the expiry of the Treason Act, had to be cancelled, and the new decision 
was published on 22 April. The Government was at once attacked for sur-
rendering· its powers to the mi l.i tary and its opponents wished to know what 
had transpired between 6 April and 22 April to have caused such a radical 
change of front. 
The conciliators objected to the military tribunals not only because 
they were compo~ed ·of men who had no legal training, but also on the grounds 
that their members were at times colonial volunteers and violent political 
59. Snyman, Rebelleverhoor ~n Kaapland, p. 44. 
60. Ibid., pp. ::·33 ff.. 
61. South African News, 22, 23, 25 and 29 March 1901. 
62. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 19 March 190.1; Cronwright-:-
Schrei~er, Life of Olive Schreiner, pp. 327-328. 




. 64 part~sans. That their·accusations of injustice against the military 
were not without f~undation was proved by the fact that the Royal Commis-
sion which investigated 700 of these cases after the war, drastically 
reduced most of the sentences. 65 
Altogether thirty-two rebels were executed, these severe measures 
being intended to act as a deterrent against rebellion. In themselves 
the executions caused extreme resentment and the fact that they were on 
several occasions conducted in public, with leading residents of the dis-
tricts being compelled to attend, caused an even greater outcry •. The 
South African News condemned these proceedings as "brutal and degrading" 
and an aggrieved colonist remarked that "these khaki fools are sowing a 
rich harvest to be reaped by us who remain in the country when they are 
safely at home"; 66 Innes in particular was viciously attacked for 
"handing over .on 22 April the issues of life and death in the 
Colony to a court of Militiamen, Brabant's Horse and Port Elizabeth 
Volunteers ••• in the ••• districts where these infamous tragedies 
were enacted, his name and those of his colleagues who were party 
to these trials being taken out of the hands of the colonial judges~ 
will be held in everlasting obloquy". 67 
Some of the women of the conciliation party were so distressed by the 
harsh treatment of the rebels that a group, under the leadership of Caroline 
Murray, approached Sir Walter Rely-Hutchinson on 18 July in an attempt to 
secure a remission of the sentences passed on C.J. Classen and Petrus 
Klapper~ Their petition requested the Governor to exert his influence 
"to stop this summary method of dealing with the rebels which we 
feel will not only make a union between English and Dutch fellow 
colonists almost impossible in the future but will now stir up 
such feelings as can only greatly augment the difficulties and 
sufferings of the present. time". 
Rely-Hutchinson, however, replied that he was powerless to act in the matter 
and Kitchener declined to interfere in the cases. Betty Molteno's appeals 
to Sprigg, Thomas Graham (the Colonial Secretary) and the wife of the 
Anglican Archbishop were also of no avail with the result that the men were 
64 •. South African News, 17 July 190L 
65. Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, p. 225. 
66. South African News, 12 July 1901, 28 Aug. 1901.-






executed at Burghersdorp and Somerset East on 23 July. 68 The consensus 
of opinion amongst the co~ciliators was that the severity of these measures 
merely stiffened the.'resistance of the commandos and made surrender more 
difficult. Many who would otherwise have remained loyal were driven into 
rebellion.- Charles Molteno reported to his brother in England that he had 
_it on good authority that in a district where an execution had taken place 
. . 1 . . d h d 69 seventy young men ~nstant y JO~ne t e comman os. 
Martial law also gave the military the opportunity to take action 
against various prominent members of the conciliation party whose activities 
·they had long viewed with disapproval. J.G. van der Horst, a partner of 
·Vincent van der Byl, was one of the first to feel the heavy hand of authority. 
He had been outspoken in his criticism of martial law and in his capacity 
as an attorney he actively assisted many who had fallen foul of the military. 
When he travelled to Beaufort West on business in January he was arbitrarily. 
imprisoned at the town. Being more fortuna·te than many others, he was not 
70 detained for long and was allowed to return to Cape Town. On 22 January 
C.J. Lotter, Charles Molteno's fellow M.L.A. for Jansenville, was arrested 
~ 
v 
at Uitenhage on a charge of high treason, after having been kept under obser- ', 
vation by the Port Elizabeth Intelligence Department for some months. lie 
was released on bail after spending more than a month in prison and the 
charge against him was eventually withdrawn after several preliminary in-
vestigations. These proceedings resulted in renewed fulminations from 
Charles Molteno upon the manner in which martial law was being us~d as an 
engine of political terro~ism. 71 
In view of the hyper-sensitive state·of the military authorities it 
is not surprising that as outspoken a conciliator as Olive Schreiner should 
68. Copies of the petition are in the Murray Parker Collection and in the 
Molteno Papers. See also M.P., H.W.B. Robinson (Private Secretary to 
the Governor),. to Caroline Murray, 21 July 190 I; Betty Molteno to 
P.A. Molteno, ? July 190I; M.P.G., Betty Molteno to Sprigg, I4 July· 
I90 1; South African News, 2I and 25 July 190 I. 
69. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 2I Aug. I90I, 3 Sept. 190I. 
70. South African News, II Jan. I90I; Lewsen, Merriman Correspo~dence, 
v. iii, p •. 247. 
71. South African News, 26 Jan. 1901, I6 Feb. 1901,·1 March 190I; 
Davenport, Afrikaner Bond, p. 234; M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 
26 Feb. 1901; F.C. Mackarness, "Lifting the Veil in Cape Colony 
being some further facts about martial law". 
( . 
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have aroused their suspicions. The S.A.C.C. published details of her ex;.. 
periences in a pamphlet entitled "Olive Schreiner. Her Treatment under 
Martial Law. Breakdown and Recovery". The tract consisted of an article 
reprinted from the Daily News of 17 September 1901. This newspaper claimed 
to have received its information from someone well acquainted with the 
facts of the case •. It declared that both Olive Schreiner and her husband 
hadbeen "marked down" by the authorities. They had visited Cape Town 
after the Worcester Congress, Olive Schreiner returning to Hanover before 
her husband who had some business to attend·to in the city. After the 
extension of martial law he was not allowed to travel to Hanover and 
she was subjected to special persecution in the village •. Of all the in-
habitants she was the only one who was not.allowed to walk or drive out 
from the village and was kept a close prisoner for several months. Under 
the s.train of enforced isolation her delicate health broke down and towards 
the end of May she collapsed and almost died. Only then was her husband 
allowed to return to Hanover. After her .illness she was ·treated with the 
greatest consideration by the military authorities. "The pity is that the 
military authorities only learnt sense by almost_ killing Olive Schreiner". 
Although the basic facts presented in the pamphlet are accurate, its tone 
generally is. too em'otional to ring true. Mindful of the strict censorship 
under martial law, Olive Schreiner was extremely cautious about what she 
, wrote, usually avoiding politics and confining her voluminous corFespondence 
to a discussion of trivialities.· Her letters do, however·, contain indica-
tions that her movements were restricted, but there is no mention that she 
suffered any particular persecution. 72 In his biography of her Cronwright-
Schreiner also does not mention any particularly severe measures being taken 
against Olive Schreiner. He ascribes the breakdown in her health not only to 
her isolation but to the general strain caused by the war, her anxiety about 
the execution of the three Hanover rebels and mainly to the distress she 
felt on receiving the news of her eldest brother's death early in May. 73 
There is, however, no mention of her being critically ill. Despite the fact 
that Cronwright-Schreiner was p.t that stage intimately associated with the 
South African News, ·no mention of his wife being victimised by the military 
appeared in that paper. This may have been because, like most other victims 
under martial law, she was afraid to complain, as this might merely cause 
72. O.S.P., 0. Schreiner to Betty Molteno, 8 and 18 April 1901, 1 Aug. 1901. 
73. Cronwright-Schreiner, Life of Olive Schreiner, pp. 330-331. 
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'\ i"'.., ,.. ~\)~~, f~rther difficulties. Nevertheless it does appear as if the conciliation 
~. ,., 
,_\ party in England exaggerated the affair in the hope of making political 
capital out of it. 
There was, however, no need to manufacture grievances, for evidence 
of flagrant abuses was available in abundance. The cases of the Rev. W.A. 
Alheit and Dr. R.J. Reinecke of Ceres were two of the worst examples of 
conciliators being victimised because of their political opinions.. Alheit 
was one of the most energetic supporters of the conciliation movement at 
Ceres and had been the first chaplain to minister to the Boer prisoners 
of war at the Green Point camp. Dr. Reinecke was one of the five medical 
men who undertook ambulance work with the Boer commandos during the early 
stages of the war and had also been one of the main speakers at the 
Worcester Congress. Both were arrested at Ceres ~n August and, after 
being lodged in jail at Malmesbury until the end of October, they were 
eventually released on parole but neither was allowed to return to Ceres 
until after the end of the war. While in prison they were not allowed to 
see their legal advisers and the commandant refused to inform them what 
the charge against them was. Alheit had evidently caused offence by re-
marking from the pulpit that "it was no time for dancing", an allusion to 
an entertainment organised by the commandant, and Reinecke was apparently 
arrested because he was "an influential man". During his banishment from 
Ceres Reinecke's family·was turned out of his house which was occupied by 
the military. His property was extensively damaged but this was excused 
on the grounds that he was a rebel and deserved such treatment. When the 
matter was raised in the House of Commons, St. John Brodrick, the Secretary 
of State for War, declared that Dr. Reinecke had been arrested for communicat-
ing with the enemy and.the Rev. Alheit for .using treasonable language and 
his influence in favour of the enemy. Details of the cases were published 
by the S.A.C.C. in a pamphlet entitled "A Pastor and a Doctor Imprisoned 
and Exiled under Martial Law". 7 4 
J.X. Merriman was the most prominent member of the conciliation party 
to be "arrested" under martial law.. From the time that the system had been 
extended to Stellenbosch, where his farm Schoongezicht was situated, 
Merriman had feared that action would be taken against him because of his 
74. See also South'African News, 17 Sept. 1901; D.V.P., (U.C.T.), 
R.J. Reinecke.to C.C. de Villiers, 22 Oct. 1901. 
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opposition to the war. Some of the leading imperialists in the district 
had made no secret of the fact that they would welcome the event. On 
25 August two armed me~bers of the district military police called on him 
at his farm and requested that he surrender his travelling pass~ Later 
that day he was asked to give his parole that he would not leave his farm 
and armed guards were 'stationed around his house. The following day his 
c 
wife travelled to Cape Town to present his case to the Governor, who, 
however, maintained that the matter had to be dealt with by General Wynne, 
the officer commanding the Cape Colony District •. An appeal to Richard 
Solomon, who had been appointed Legal Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, 
to intercede with Kitchener, met with the same reply. Merriman placed 
his case in the hands of attorney Vander ~orst and after lengthy·negotia-
tions with the military, Merriman was granted permission to visit Cape Town 
on 5 September. Once in the city he decided to remain there lest renewed 
restrictions be placed upon him at Stellenbosch. This led to a protracted 
wrangle .with the military authorities who maintained that he had been under 
an obligation to return to Stellenbosch and requested him to do so at once. 
Merriman denied that he had given any such undertaking and refused to comply 
with the order. The matter was only cleared up in November, by which time 
mar·tial law had been extended to Cape Town as well. Throughout the whole 
acrimonious affair Richard Solomon behaved in a most sympathetic manner and 
it is evidently as a result of his intercession with Kitchener that the 
matter was eventually resolved. 
The behaviour of the military authorities infuriated Merriman, who 
regarded his treatment as a gross insult to a man of his standing. He 
supplied several associates in Britain, including Campbell-Bannerm~with 
details of his case and requested Percy }1olteno to assist him in taking 
legal action in the matt.er. The advice he received from Mackarness and 
another prominent jurist, however, held 
cularly in view of the decision of the 
out little hope of success, parti-
Judicial Committee of the Privy 
75 Council not to interfere in the Marais case. 
abandoned his decision. to appeal to the courts. 76 
Merriman therefore 
It was never revealed 
75. Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, pp. 214-216, 226-228. 
76. Lewsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, pp. 300-304, 306-307; 
J.X.M.P., Major-General c. Wynne to Merriman, II Sept. 1901, 14 Nov. 
1901; Merriman to Martial Law Board, 18 Oct. 1901; Joint opinion 
of Blake Odgers. and F. Mackarness, 6 Nov. 1901; M.P., Merriman to 
P.A. Molteno, 11 Sept. 1901 • 
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at whose instigation these steps were taken against Merriman, the local 
commandant disclaiming ~11 responsibility in the matter. Nor is it clear 
·what, apart from political vindictiveness, could have prompted the actions 
of the military authorities. The S.A.C.C. hinted that his arrest might 
have had some connection with the appearance, in the British press on 27 
August, of a letter by him condemning martial law. The dates, however, 
do not tally and Merriman's views in the matter were so widely known that 
publicity of this nature could hardly have been of any significance. 77 
From London P~rcy Molteno strongly urged the advisability of register-· 
ing a formal protest against the arbitrary behaviour of the military 
authorities and Charles Molteno used his influence to try to bring this 
about. Sauer favoured the idea, but Merriman app.eared to be reluctant to 
take action. Many other members· of the South African Party shared this 
reluctance as all their previous protests had been treated with contempt. 78 
After their departure from Stel.lenbosch, Merriman and his wife spent a week 
at the home of Charles Molteno. The latter reported that he had almost 
persuaded Merriman to agree to the drawing up of a formal protest when he 
was ordered by the military to ~eturn to Stellenbosch. 
"This further attempt upon his liberty seems to drive everything 
else out of his head ••• and I now doubt whether he will be got. 
to do anything. Of course there have been various deputations 
from the country districts to the Government, protesting against 
the working of martial law ·but nothing of this gets into the 
papers". 79 ·. · 
On one minor occ_asion; however, slight success did attend the efforts of 
the conciliators. On 11 September a certain Mrs. Brooks and seve:n teenage 
girls from Maraisburg were sentenced to thirty days' imprisonment .on account 
of having handed supplies to a Boer Commando which invaded the town, and 
for having sung the Volkslied and fraternised with the King's enemies. 
This sentence was regarded as an outrage by the conciliators and the matter 
was raised at the monthly meeting of the Ladies Central Committee on 20 
77. Merriman's letter was subsequently published as a pamphlet by the 
S.A.C.C. (No. 79) under the title "An English Ex-Minister of the Cape 
on the State of the Cape Colony". 
78. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 8 Aug. 1901;. C. Molteno to P.A. 
Molteno, 27 Aug. 1901. · 
· 79. Ibid., C. Molteno·to P.A. Molteno, 18 Sept. 1901. 
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80 September. It was resolved that the secretary should write to both 
the Governor and the Prime Minister to request the release of the prison-
ers. As a result'of'this request Sprigg made representation to the military 
authorities whereupon the girls were set free. This, however, took place 
only a few days before their sentence was due to expire. 81 
82 Martial law was declared in Cape Town at 2 p.m. on 9 October and 
immediately upon the appearance of the notice, detectives accompanied by 
armed men, called at the home of Mrs. Koopmans de Wet, and the offices of 
the South African News, and the legal firm of Van der Byl, Van der Horst, 
Sauer and Standen as well as that of C.C. de Villiers and carried out a 
search evidently with the object of discovering incriminating documents. 
According to Innes the search was simply carried out at random, but the 
military's choice of suspects gives an interesting indication of whom they 
regarded as the most dangerously disaffected persons in the city. 83 
Nothing of any importance was found but subsequently letters to Mrs. Koopmans 
de Wet which were censored, convinced the military that she had been cor~ 
responding with officials of the late Republics. The person involved was 
.H.N.P. Muller, the Free State consul-general in Holland, an old friend 
·with whom she had been corresponding for the past twenty-three years. 
80. This was the new title adopted by the Ladies Clothi~g Committee for 
Prisoners of War after it had decided to devote its efforts to assist-
ing the women and.children in the concentration camps. 
81. Strydom, Kaapland en die Oorlog, pp. 218-220; South African News, 14 
Sept. 1901; D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book~ 20 Sept. 1901, 18 Oct. 1901; 
H.W.B. RobinsQn (Secretary to the Governor), to Mrs. C.C. de Villiers, 
23 Sept. 1901; S. Cowper (Prime Minister's Secretary), to Mrs. C.C. 
de Villiers, 27 Sept. 1901, 10 Oct. 1901. 
82. The Sprigg ministry was not as indifferent to the interests ~f the 
colonists as the conciliation party believed.. They resisted in parti-
cular Kitchener's demand that martial law should be extended to the 
ports of the Colony. This resulted in extremely strained.relations be-
tween the Government and the military authorities and Innes was strongly 
tempted to resign. The Government eventually agreed to the extension of. 
martial law to the ports on condition·that the powers of the 'military 
authorities in these areas be restricted in certain matters and on con-
dition that a Martial Law Board be created to investigate complaints 
against the system throughout the Colony. This body was, however, in-
effective. Le May, British Supremacy, pp. 114-121; Wright, Rose Innes. 
Correspondence, pp. 298-305. 
83. M.P. , Caroline Murray to P .A. Molteno, 13 Oct. 1901; Lewsen, Merriman 




The military authorities also maintained that her home had been a meeting 
place for enemies of the King. Mrs. Koopmans de Wet was placed under 
house arrest for a few days, but on signing a declaration that she would 
in future refrain from any treasonable activities, which she denied ever 
having been guilty of, the restrictions upon her movements were lifted. 
The Ladies Central Committee was greatly angered by this insul~ to one of 
its most highly honoured members and passed a special resolution sympathis-
. . h h 84 1.ng w1.t er. 
The authorities had undoubtedly viewed the South African News's defiant 
attitude with displeasure and Innes privately complained of the venomous 
·attacks upon him which regularly appeared in its columns and which he sus-
85 pected of having been inspired by Sauer. The extension of martial law 
to Cape Town sounded the death knell of the newspaper. According to Kolbe 
they had long anticipated the event and he believed that it was his last 
ed{torial on 12 October, under the heading "Spring Time", which "brought 
the military crashing down upon us". Refusing to be daunted by the advent 
of martial.law, this irrepressible cleric, in at:t. impertinent article fuli 
of veiled allusions, poked fun at the new state of affairs. He compared 
the situation to Topsy-turvy Land as depicted in Alice through the Looking 
Glass and admitted that the South African News did not feel itself at home 
in the new non-political atmosphere. Making a pretence at avoiding the 
forbidden topic he turned to admire Cape Town in the spring time, expressing · 
.the hope that there would be no offence "in speaking of the flowers that 
bloom in Spring tra la! •i. On 14 October the South African News appeared 
for the last time during the war. Its suppression was the most serious 
blow struck at the conciliation party, for with their correspondence also 
subjected to strict censorshiv, they now had no means of communicating with 
one another or with their allies in England. Charles Molteno declared that 
. 86 
the last vestige of freedom had disappeared and a blanket of silence fell 
over the conciliation party until the end of the war. 
The only positive line of action which still remained open to them 
84. Malan, Marie Koopmans de Wet, pp. 217.-226; Wright, Rose Innes Cor-
respondence, pp. 315-316; D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book, 20 Dec. 1901. 
85. Wright, Rose Innes Correspondence, pp. 289-290. 
86. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 16 Oct. 1901. 
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·was that of rendering assistance to the Boer victims of the war. They 
\vorked in close co-operation with Emily Hobhouse and other members of 
the conciliation party in England, which had from the outset registered 
a vigorous protest against the conduct of the war, and published numerous 
pamphlets to bring the facts regarding farm-burning and the concentration 
camps to the notice of the British public. 87 At the Cape the South 
African News continual.ly criticised the conditions in the concentration 
camps, particularly when the death rate amongst the children began to 
assume alarming proportions during the winter of 1901 •. 88 Members of both 
the Ladies Central Committee and the Gentlemen's Committee unsuccessfully 
tried to secure permission to visit the camps to assess the extent of the 
suffering there. 89 Emily Hobhouse, who wished to take Mrs. Roos, 
treasurer of the Ladies Central Committee, and a few other Dutch women 
with her when she visited the camps between January and April 1901, was 
·not permitted to do so. Betty Molteno's request to Sir Gordon Sprigg that 
she be allowed to visit the camp at Aliwal North met with a most discourag-
ing and injudicious reply. 
"The report on the condition of the camp at Aliwal North is to iny 
mind satisfactory and discloses no reason why a visit should be 
made. I do not in the least concur with the outcry that is raised 
against the Imperial Government with regard to the treatment of the 
wives and children of those \vho are fighting against us, urged on 
by leading men in this Colony, who deserved to be hanged. On the 
contrary I consider that Her Majesty's Government deserve infinite 
credit for their humanity".· 90 
His rash remark caused him to experience considerable embarrassment when 
he next encountered the Molteno sisters, for Betty Molteno told him bluntly: 
91 
"So you want to hang all of us - here we are 11 • 
The conciliation party regarded it as a great triumph that Brodrick, 
adopted many of Emily Hob house's recommenda~ions regarding the concen tra-
tion camps, especially in view of her having been.branded a "hysterical 
woman" by the Cape Times. 92 They saw the acceptance of her advice as an 
87. E.g. No. 58, "A Plain Statement of the Change that has come over the 
War in South Africa" and No. 59 "Farm Burning in South Africa" by 
J.M. Robertson. 
88. For a detailed study of the concentration camps see J .c~ Otto, Die 
Konsen tr asiekampe. 
89. H.P., Minute Book, 13 Dec. 1900; M.P.C., Betty Molteno to Sprigg, 
14 July 1901. 
90. M •. P.C. '·Sprigg to Betty Molteno, 13 July 1901. 
.. 
91. M:P., Betty Molteno to -P.A. Molteno, July 1900 (no day). 




admission of the accuracy of her report and attributed the appointment 
of the Fawcett Commission to the pressure exerted upon the British Govern-
ment after public opinion had been aroused by her revelations. The mere 
fact that there was to be an enquiry, they believed, would prompt the 
authorities to begin putting their house in order, so that the conditions 
in the camps would be c~ns~derably improved. 93 There was, however, a 
'great deal of dissatisfaction over the composition of the commission. The 
conciliators objected in particular to the inclusion of Dr. Jane Waterson 
of Cape Town. Shortly after her appointment she wrote to the Cape Times 
expressing the op1n1on that the privations of the inmates of the camps were 
"assumed". 94 In a st;-ongly worded leader in the South African News Dr. 
Kolbe condemned her as the most rabid Jingo' in Cape Town and stated flatly 
that the conciliation party had no confiderlce in her. Neither did it have 
much faith in Mrs •. Fawcett, an aunt of Edmund Garrett, and an ardent propa~ 
gandist of the war party in England who made no secret of the fact that she 
believed that the conditions in the camps could not possibly be as bad as 
Emily Hobhouse had painted them. 95 
When the commission arrived in Cape Town in August the Ladies Central 
Committee tried to have some of its members added to it. Mrs. C.C. de 
. Villiers, who had recently replaced Mrs. B. Marchand as secretary of the 
committee, Anna Purcell and Caroline Murray were deputed to call on Mrs. 
Fawcett to present their request to her. The interview, which took place 
on 12 August, was, however, barren of success. Protestation that the two 
committees in Cape Town had already forwarded supplies to the value of 
£20 000 to the camps and were therefore entitled to be represented on the 
commission, ~et with the reply that their committee was politically biased. 
Mrs. Fawcett's contention that the commission was non-political drew from 
Anna Purcell the,:_retort that it could hardly be so with Dr. Waterson on it. 
Although Mrs. Fawcett's commission had the power.to add to its number it 
refused to accede to the conciliators' request, but Mrs. Fawcett s.till 
wished to know whether, if her commission found any particularly pressing 
need in any of the camps, it could call on the Ladies Central Committee 
for assistance. Mrs. De Villiers did not reject this request out of hand·, 
93. South African News, 18 July 1901. 
94. Cape Timgs, 24 July· 1901 • 
...... 




but her committee 'subsequently declined to work with the Fawcett Com-
mission. 
Caroline Murray, Mrs. Hay and Mrs. Stegmann were also deputed to 
interview the Governor as to the possibility of having a few of their 
committee included on the Fawcett Commission, but were equally unsuccess-
. ful. Although their request was forwarded to the British Government 
they received no reply and Rely-Hutchinson did not think that the Imperial 
authorities intended taking any notice of it. When they urged him to use 
his influence to assist them the Governor denied having any authority in 
the matter. He maintained that he had not been consulted about the com-
mission and had only learnt of their presence in Cape Town through the 
local press. CarolineMurray also telegraphed Percy Molteno to use his 
influence on their. behalf in London, but Molteno replied that there was 
nothing he could do as the British Government merely wanted a commission 
to whitewash what was being done in the concentration camps. 96 
The Ladies Central Committee suffered another disappointment when 
the authorities refused to allow Emily Hobhouse to return. to her work in 
the camps and forcibly deported. her to England after her arrival in Cape 
Town on 26 October 1901. Her associates at the Cape were scandalised by 
the high-handed behaviour of the military authorities and the Ladies 
Central Committee passed a formal resolution sympathising with her and 
expressing their appreciation for all she had done and suffered on behalf 
. . . . h .R bl. 97 of the~r campatr~ots ~n t e epu ~cs. 
Despite these setbacks the two Cape Town committees continued their 
work, dispatching goods received from sympathisers in Europe and America, 
and from the Bo~r Women and Children's Clothing Fund, and also assisted 
Miss Monkhouse and Miss Mellor, the localrepresentatives_of the South 
96. D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book, 12 and 16 Aug. 1901; Separate setof 
minutes of interviews with Mrs. Fawcett and Sir W. Rely-Hutchinson; 
M.P., P.A. Molteno to Caroline Murray, 8 Aug. 1901. 
97. Fry, Emily Hobhouse, pp. 167-181; D.V.P., (U.C.T.), Minute Book, 
15 Nov. 1901. Betty Molteno and Caroline Murray both did their utmost 
to intercede with the military authorities on Emily Hobhouse's behalf 
and left detailed accounts of the events accompanying her deportation, 
which were meant to be used in the event of legal action being taken 






African Women and'Children's Distress Fund. Caroline Murray coped with 
the correspondence with. these organisations and when she visited England 
the work was taken over by Betty Molteno in February 1902. 98 The latter 
and Alice Greene. who were both teachers. were also instrumental in the 
establishment of a special Education Fund which enabled a few destitute 
Republican children to be sent to schools at Paarl. Knysna and Stellenbosch 
for the duration of the war. 99 Mrs. Koopmans de Wet was the most ener-
getic member of the committee. handling a total of 2 046 crates of clothing 
and supplies at her home. mostly contributions from Europe and America. 
She continued her ¥Ork up to 1904 and issued a separate report in August 
100 
of that year. The Ladies Central Committee reported in August 1901 
but continued its work until well into 1903. The Gentlemen's Committee 
issued a report on 7 August 1902. The work in connection with the Boer 
prisoners of war was then rounded off. but that in connection with the con-
centration camps and the administration of the Widows and. Orph.ans' Fund 
continued. the latter until 190,5. The mon~y ·from this fund was distributed 
through committees in the Transvaal and Free State headed by A.I. Louw 
101 
and J.B.M. Hertzog. 
The general reaction of the conciliation party to the advent of 
peace was one of relief. The occasion was. however. marred by the fact 
that the strength of the movement for the suspension of the Cape constitu-
102 tion and Milner's open support for it, came.to light at the same time. 
James Molteno set .off hot foot for England to fight the movement there 
while Merriman ~ed the opposition to it at the Cape. The conciliation 
party had in fact regarded the repeated prorogation of parliament. as 
"suspension by instalments" and had strongly attacked Sprigg. maintaining 
that he refused to summon parliament for fear of the questions which would 
be asked and the revelation that he had been "a mere marionette of a Prime 
Minister", 103 which would follow. Sprigg's determined opposition to the 
98. M.P.c •• EH/5 Record of clothes and foodstuffs sent to the camps.· 
99. H.P., Verslag en Overzicht van de Werkend Comitee pp. 9-10. 
100. Malan, Marie Koopmans de Wet. pp. 206-217. 
101. South African News, 24 Aug. 1901; H.P., A.I. Louw to J.H. Hofmeyr, 
21 April 1905; J.B.M. Hertzog, 18 April 1905; Verslag en Overzicht 
van de Werkend Comitee •.• 
102~ For a detailed discussion of the movement see E.D. Thielscher, The 
Suspension Movement in the Cape Colony and its effects, 1901-19or' 




suspension of the constitution, however, did much to improve his image in 
the eyes of the conciliators, who had always regarded him as a political 
opportunist of the worst kind. The movement, which was doomed from the 
outset because of Chamberlain's opposition to it, proved to be a two-
edged sword, for it weakened the Progressive Party and resulted in Merriman's 
agreeing to support the Government on condition that it undertook to in-
stitute a thorough enquiry into the administration of martial law. The al-
liance was short-lived, but it helped to clear the political atmosphere 
immediately after the war. Percy Molteno, who arrived in Cape Town in· 
October 1902, reported that he found feeling had greatly improved. Moder~te 
men had coalesced and personal relations between leading politicians had 
been restored. The Imperial authorities had adopted a most conciliatory 
attitude and were particularly polite to his brothers. He also commented 
upon the moderation of the Dutch which he found remarkable in view of all 
104 they had suffered. The fact that the Boer leaders refrained from 
adopting an irreconcilable attitude did much to confound the conciliators' 
predictions of undying race hatred after the war. Their leaders' attitude 
was not an accurate reflection of the feelings of the Afrikaner people in 
general but helped to ease the tension and facilitated the task of recon-
struction. The S.A.C.C. in England disbanded in November 1902 with the 
intention of resuming its work under a new title, possibly the South Africa 
Constitutional Committee, which its original members hoped would secure 
the support of all the l-eading Liberals in England. 105 Percy Molteno, 
however, reported that there seemed to be little enthusiasm for the idea 
at the Cape. 
"It is rather difficult to get any opinion here on such a question. 
No one likes to admit the possibility of any interference from 
England in the internal concerns of this Colony so that they are 
rather inclined to' pay no attention to·what goes on in England". 106 
The idea of a constitutional committee to take t.he place of the S.A.C.C. 
never came to fruition • 
. The South African News, which reaPpeared on 20 August. 19~ ~ed the 
future hopefully despite indications that their old problems were still with 
104. M.P., P.A. Molteno to Mackarness, c. 23 Oct. 1902; P.A. Molteno to 
·capt. Sinclair, 23 Oct. 1902. · 
105. J.X.M.P., L. C.ourtney to Merriman, 14 Nov. 1902. 
106. M.P., _?.A. Molteno to Markarness, 3 Jan •. 1903. 
' ( 
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them. It announced that it accepted the annexation of the Republics as 
a fait accompli and that all Afrikaner aspirations were now contained 
within the bounds of ·t~e British Empire. It intended dealing 
11\vith the future rather than with the past, and /would7 strive 
to avoid raking over the embers of past strife that still glow 
beneath our feet ••• Out of the welter of blood and misery 
the Afrikaner·people have emerged, worthy, by common consent, 
to stand as fellow citizens of the proudest Empire in the world". 
The conciliation party's aim in future would be to remove all distinctions 
between the European races in the country and to secure a free Parliament 
of a united South Africa. "The winter is.over and gone: a po~itical 
Spring is at hand". 107 









In reviewing the activities of the conciliation party in the Cape 
Colony, several issues which require clarifi"cation present themselves. 
The first which comes to mind is the question of whether the conciliators, 
and the Schreiner ministry in particular, could not have made a stronger 
stand before the war. Their cause would obviously have been far better 
served by preventing a war than by trying to mitigate its effects after 
it had already broken out. The decision to leave the handling of the 
crisis in the hands of their leaders, however, sealed their fate. For 
Schreiner's anxiety to avoid a breach with Milner was one of. the major 
considerations diFecting his actions. It was this which caused him to 
oppose any attempt to make Britain's policy towards the Transvaal a 
_parliamentary issue at the Cape. Although dissenting voices remained 
muffled in the months preceding the war, Schreiner was severely criticised 
on this point when his lack of sympathy for the conciliation movement 
became apparent, and especially after the resignation of the ministry and 
his defection from the South African Party. Percy Molteno, exasperated 
by Schreiner's inaction, eventually condemned the ministry as "a mere set 
1 . 
of miserable puppets", and in May 1900 wrote to Schreiner: 
"I cannot help regretting that the whole matter was riot brought. 
into a position of a constitutional struggle when your parliament 
met last year and had the opportunity of repudiating the interpre-
tation put on things by the High Commissioner in his dispatch of 
May 4th. The ignorance here, even of members of parliament, is 
profound and a constitutional struggle then would have roused 
them to enquire what it ~vas about a war only raises emotions 
and delusions ••• passion unseats reason". 2 
After the Prime Minister's resignation one of his disillusioned supporters 
maintained that if it had not been for his "neither-this-nor-that" policy 
there would have been no war. 3 It is, however, unjust to place all the 
blame for the failure of the policy of restraint solely on Schreiner's 
shoulders, for prominent men such as Hofmeyr and Sir Henry de Villiers 
shared his views. Merriman was one of the few who plainly stated his 
1. M.P., P.A. Molteno to C. Molteno, 4 May 1900. 
2. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L~), P.A. Molteno to Schreiner, 17 May 1900. 
3. South African N~ws, 27 Oct. 1900. · 
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dissent. In reflecting upon the events preceding the war, Merriman,· 
in 1916, told the second Lord De Villiers that it was one of the few· 
occasions on which he entirely differed from the Chief Justice. 
"He was • • • opposed to any discussion in our parliament, 
just before the outbreak of the war, of the threatening 
position. There I differed in toto. I always believed 
that a full discussion in our parliament and a moderate but 
firm motion, would have opened the eyes of the people in 
England not only to the facts themselves but to the way in 
which those facts were regarded by the bulk of our population. 
I pressed my view in the Cabinet with the only result of 
driving Schreiner to a pitch of exasperation. My only regret 
is that I did not take the bold course of resigning and there-
after moving a resolution as I did about the Charter. /After 
the Jameson Raid.:] -
The whole efforts of the Progressives were bent on conceal-
ing the facts and pressing on the ill judged diplomacy that 
led to the war. They succeeded and we failed largely owing 
to the want of the one quality that is before all things neces-
sary in statecraft - courage". 4 
Schreiner might have acted more boldly had he not unde~estimated the 
strength of his Government's position. In view of the fact that a 
Progressive ministry would not have been able to command a majority in 
the House of Assembly, his one fear was that the resignation of his 
Government would result in the suspension of the constitution. He was 
not aware of Chamberlain's opposition to so drastic a step and went in 
dread of a general rebellion in the Colony should such a measure be 
resorted to. S Schreiner was therefore determined to deal with the 
situation "as it stands" and, in rebutting Percy Molteno•s accusation 
that he had failed to realise his responsibility towards the people of 
the Colony, pointed out, with some justification that 
"by continuing so long in office, despite enormous external 
and internal difficulties, I have in great measure till today 
gained my simple object, which was, to the greatest extent 
possible, to save "the Colony from devastation by war or the 
even worse consequences of general rebellion". 6 
In view of the dangers inherent in a vigorous policy, the Schreiner 
ministry should not be condemned too strongly for not having had the 
courage to challenge Milner at the outset. As the South African News 
point out when it later defended the government against its detractors, 
7 it was easy to be wise after the event. 
. . 
4. J.H. de Villiers Papers, (S.A.L.), Merriman to Lord Percy de Villiers, 
9 Jan. 1916. 
5. Van Heyningen, Milner and the Schreiner Ministry, P• 130. 
6. W.P.S.P., (S.A.L.), Schreiner to P.A. Molteno, 7 June 1900. 
7. South African News, 21 Sept. 1900. 
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The most perplexing aspect of the conciliation movement arises out 
of the question: what became of the conciliation committee established 
amidst such enthusiasm in Cape Town on 12 March 1900? To all appearances 
this should have been a strong and active committee for some of the 
staunchest and most respected conciliators, such as Andrew Murray, Mrs. 
Koopmans de Wet, Oltve Schreiner, Albert Cartwright and the Molteno 
brothers lent it their support. In trying to trace the fate of the 
committee one is led entirely into the realm of supposition for after 
its first two meetings it was never mentioned again. Charles Molteno, 
who was chairman of the committee, only referred to it twice; the first 
time when he mentioned to Percy Molteno that they intended establishing 
such a body at the Cape and later in April 1900 when he referred to it 
in passing in a letter to Betty Molteno. 8 His apparent silence ·on the 
question might be due to the fact that many of his letters, especially' 
for the period 4 April to l August 1900, are missing from the Molteno 
Papers. This however., does not account for the silence of the South 
African News, which was virtually synonymous with the committee. As 
the conciliators' chief aim was to give as much publicity as possible 
to their activities in order to reveal the strength of the movement, 
it is inconceivable that'the committee's activities would have been 
allowed to pass without mention. Yet the South African News never 
referred to the conciliation committee again after having reported its 
foundation. On three occasions the treasurer acknowledged financial 
contributions to the committee, 9 which eventually amounted to £163-7-6, 
but no indication was ever given as to how the money was spent. It is 
possible that, on the committee becoming defunct, it was paid into one 
of the numerous relief funds, or it may have been absorbed in the fund 
for the People's Deputation. 
The only interpretation which can be placed upon this apparent 
conspiracy of silence, is that the committee, for some reason or another 
failed to function, but that the conciliators refrained from publicising 
the fact for fear of ap·pearing ridiculous in the eyes of their opponents. 
Numerous reasons can be advanced for the failure of the committee, but 
there can be no certainty as to their validity. The most obvious expla-
nation is that the'committee did not receive adequate support. This was v 
8. M.P., C. Molteno to P.A. Molteno, 8 March 1900; ·M.P.C., C. Molteno 
to Betty Molteno, 5 April 1900 •. 
9. South African News, 29 March. 1900, 18 April .1900, 23 May 1900. 
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certainly so with regard to the English-speaking colonists. The majo-
rity of them refused to support the movement because they disagreed with 
its policy. It is also possible that prospective adherents, while de-
precating the drastic nature of the British Government's action, felt 
secretly relieved that the annexation of the Republics had finally re-
moved the greatest obstacle to a South African Union. Like Richard 
Solomon they tended to argue that the wisest course was to accept the 
facts of the case and to try and make the best of the situation. In 
the circumstances they could not have felt any genuine sympathy for the 
· conciliation committee's unrelenting opposition to the annexation of th'e 
Republics, which might account for their failure to support the movement.· 
As it cannot be denied. that, although the movement aimed at _conciliation, 
its activities also stimulated the opposition, so that it aggravated the 
inflamed state of public opinion, this was another circumstance which 
might have alienated those who held moderate views. Schreiner was one 
of those who believed that the movement did more harm than good. The 
treasurer's last report indicates that the committee was still in exis-
tence on 23 May 1900 so that Hargrove's departure in June might have 
deprived it of an impetus after which it sank into oblivion. Conversely, 
the revelation of his indiscretions might have embarrassed the movement 
to such an extent that the committee preferred to put a silent and unob-
trusive end to its activities. Another potent reason for its failure 
might have been the belief by many of the colonists that the battle it 
.was fighting was such a hopeless one that there was no point in continuing 
.its activities. There were several indications that many persons reasoned 
along these lines. At the end of March 1900 Ons Land published a letter 
from an embittered and disillusioned correspondent. In referring to the 
proposal that a deputation be sent to present the conciliation party's 
case to the people of England he said: 
"Een beroep op het Engelsche volk is·niets anders as een 
griypen naar een armzaligen stroohalm; het is boter aan de 
galg; het is - verskoon de uitdrukking - spotternij met onze 
eigenen hulpeloze machteloosheid". 10 
In enumerating the difficulties being experienced by the movement·the 
South African News also complained that manY: people, when asked to sign 
the People's Petition or to endorse the resolutions of the conciliation 
committee, asked 11 ••• what is the use with the British pe·ople in the 
10. Ons Land, 29 March 1900. 
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mood they are ••• ". II The committee's failure must also have been 
due to lack of financial support. The total of £163 raised in two 
months does not indicate an overwhelming response. In remarking on 
the scarcity of money the South African News pointed out that the 
numerous relief funds had made heavy demands upon the colonists who 
12 had responded most generously. T.P. Theron later condemned the 
Worcester Congress as a waste of money which could have been put to 
better use in rendering assistance to the destitute women and children 
in the Republics. It is possible that those who sympathised with the 
movement but regarded it as a hopeless venture, might have preferred to · 
make donations to the relief funds which would have put ·their money to 
better use. There is probably a perfectly simple explanation for the 
discontinuance of the committee's activities, but in the absence of 
reliable facts the matter remains an enigma. 
Whatever the fate of the committee might have been, almost all its 
members were extremely active in their individual capacities. The women, 
including Olive Schreiner at Hanover, and several of the men, especially 
C.P. Schultz, were actively involved in relief work; the legal wing assis~ 
·ted victims of martial law; the churchmen worked amongst the Boer priso-
. ners of war and the Rev. C. Morgan ministered to the political prisoners 
at Tokai; and the journalists, and also Dr. Kolbe carried on their protest 
through the medium of the press. Others; like Merriman and Sauer, who 
sympathised with the movement but did not join the committee because of 
their involvement in politics and their unfortunate entanglement with 
Hargrove, contributed their share by going to England to contend for the 
cause in the political arena. The only serious consequence of the 
failure of the committee was that the movement lacked strong central 
direction which might have enabled it to operate more effectively. The' 
failure of Cartwright's proposed "printer's .ink campaign" was not so 
serious for, unlike the S.A.C.C. ;. the Cape conciliators did not operate 
in conditions where such a campaign could have had fruitful results. 
In Britain many people tended to support the war out of ignorance of the 
true facts of the situation and a well-organised publicity campaign stood 
a chance of winning converts. In South Africa the war party, however, 
sinned against the light for they were in ·a better position to receive ac-
curate information. A printer's in.k campaign was therefore unlikely to 
have had much effect. 
11. South African News, 20 April 1900. · 
12. · Ibid. 
.. ;:~. 
- 188-
In conclusion it has to be considered how much the conciliation 
movement at the Cape really achieved. When considering the results 
of their efforts during the war the temptation arises to conclude that 
they achieved very little although there were indications that the 
Afrikaner people appreciated the stand of individual conciliators. The 
same disillusioned correspondent who remarked upon the "hulpeloze machte-
loosheid11 of his people.in the columns of Ons Land also maintained: 
11 Ik vertrouw dat dan ook de namen van de heeren Cartwright 
Molteno, Hannah (Natal), Hargrove en andere Engelsche die 
voor recht en waarheid in de bres hebben gesprongen, tach 
ter gedachtenis en herinnering voor het nageschlacht bewaard 
zullen b lij ven". 13 
••• 
At the Worcester Congress De Vos said much ~he same thing about the 
members of the conciliation party in England. After Merriman 1 s valiant 
struggle during the parliamentary session of 1900 the Rev. S.P. Helm 
paid him this sincere tribute: 
"Ever since parliament met and you took such a decided stand 
for our poor, despised, crushed people, I felt thankful that 
such men as yourself and Mr. S.auer, who have nothing to gain . 
by your advocacy of our cause, have cast in your lot with us. 
Your friends must naturally belong mostly to the English section 
of society. It will be no wonder if many are estranged, many 
look askance at the pro-Boer Englishmen. There was so much . · 
to lose and so little to gain by takirig your stand on our side. 
From our Dutch members we expected it; there is no merit in 
their being faithful. 
But have you really gained nothing? I am sure that· I, an 
obscure minister and missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church 
though I be, am expressing the feelings of thousands of my· 
countrymen when I say you have gained the deep gratitude and 
respect of our people. I, and many with me, shall look back 
on these years of sorrow and de_spai:r with deep pain; but it 
will be mingled with affection and gratitude to the man who so 
earnestly, so unselfishly pleaded our cause11 • 14 
It is, however, doubtful whether the appreciation of the stance of many 
:: .. 
individuals really coloured the attitude of the Afrikaner people towards 
the British nation as a whole. 
too deep-rooted for that. 
The resentment aroused by the war. was 
The real practical outcome of the conciliation party's work lay 
in the future, as was pointed out by Dr Kolbe in an article in the 
South African News, discussing the future of the national cause and 
13. Ons Land, 29 March 1900. 
1-4. L~wsen, Merriman Correspondence, v. iii, p. · 244. 
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revealing a strong awareness of a separate South African identity. 15 
TJ:ie war caused th~ antagonism, which had existed between the two lan-
guage groups, to reach an.unprecedented height. Although the conci-
liation movement made little impact_ upon it at the time, the very fact 
that it existed prevented the rift between English and Dutch from be-
coming complete. The conciliators, through their co-operation with 
their counterparts in England, acted as a link between the Afrikaner 
people and their sympathisers in Britain whose attitude was to be of 
great significance in the future. One of his Dutch correspondents 
at the Cape wrote to Percy Holteno, pouring out his grievences against 
the imperialist'party and concluded by expressing the hope that he would 
re·ceive a reply in order to show his neighbours that there were English-
men who sympathised with the Dutch. 16 In rounding off his review of 
the Cape Colony during the war Strydom expresses the opinion: 
"Dat rasseversoening na al die gebeurtenisse nog wel 'n kans 
gehad het, is myns insiens enkel daaraan te danke dat die ganse 
Engelse volk nie teen die Afrikaner gekant was nie. Ek is 
daarvan oortuig dat Campbell-Bannerman en.sy Liberale Party in 
Engeland, en Merriman, die Molteno broers, Cartwright, Burton, 
Olive Schreiner en haar eggenoot en die ander Engelssprekendes 
in Suid-Afrika die grondslag gele bet vir rasseversoening. 
Sender bulle sou dit ondenkbaar gewees het dat hierdiegeslag 
van Hollandssprekendes sou kon vergewe het". 17 
Therefore, although the conciliators' achievements were meagre at _the 
time, they helped to lay the foundations for a future reconciliation of 
the white races and some had the satisfaction of seeing their labours 
bear fruit. 
15. South African News, 14 April 1900. 
16. M.P., L.M. Ferreira to P.A. Molteno, 29 June 1900. 




NOTE ON SOURCES 
As the Moltenos played a central role in the conciliation movement 
the P.A. Molteno Papers were my most important source of information. 
The collection, however, proved something of a disappointment as many of 
Charles Molteno's letters are missing. However, I was able to supplement 
the Molteno Papers with the Murray Parker Collection which contains a 
great deal of valuable material. Some of the Molteno brothers' letters 
are in this collection which also contains Caroline Murray's correspondence. 
as well as that between Alice Greene and Betty Molteno and also the latter 
and Olive Schreiner. The Murray Parker Col.lection also contains the only 
letters of Albert Cartwright which I have been able to trace. These docu-
ments also shed interesting light on the activities of the women supporters 
of the conciliation movement, as do the C.C. de Villiers Papers, which 
were a valuable and unexpected find. 
Olive Schreiner's papers are at present scattered amongst various col-
lections in the Jagger Library, but the intention is .to combin~ them into 
a single collection. I have therefore cited her correspondence as Olive 
Schreiner Papers, except for those papers which are in the W.P. Schreiner 
collection and which will remain there. 
The only section of the W.P. Schreiner Papers ~n the Jagger Library 
which was of any interest to me, was that relating to the Hargrove affair. 
The Schreiner Papers in the South African Library, however, 'vere. more use-
ful and Miss Van Heyningen's thesis The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner 
and W.P. Schreiner's Ministry, 1898-1900, was invaluable in providing an 
insight into· the complex problems confronting the Cape ministry during the 
war. ··:::-
Apart from the Molteno Papers, the Merriman Papers were the other 
major source which I consulted, and P. Lewsen's volumes proved a mine of 
information on numerous details. 
The Hofmeyr Papers were of peripheral importance, except for the 
Minute Books· of the Relief Committee which provided valuable additional 




Republicans. The two smaller collections, the Worcester Volkskongres 
Papers and the A. Moorrees Papers yielded valuable additional informa-
tion on the People's ·Deputation, 
In view of the large gaps ~n the Molteno Papers, I relied heavily 
on the South African Ne~vs with which the Moltenos were intimately asso-
. ciated and which was a reliable index to their opinions. This newspaper 
· was also invaluable ~n that it provided a running commentary on the 
major events of the period as seen through the eyes of the conciliation 
party. 
S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner's Land of Free Speech was one of the 
printed sources which proved most useful, as there is very little other 
information available on his activities in England. The volume of Rose 
Innes Correspondence, edited by Harrison M. Wright, contains much valuable 
information and obviated the need to cf te the Innes Papers. 
Mr. Davey also kindly allowed me to read two draft chapters of his 
work based on sources to which I have not had access and ~hich.therefore 
provided interesting new inform~tion on the pro-Boer organisations in 
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